ALL THE

WORKS

OF

EPICTETUS,

Which are now Extant;

CONSISTING OF

His DISCOURSES, preſerved by ARRIAN,

IN FOUR BOOKS,

The ENCHIRIDION, and FRAGMENTS.

Tranſlated from the Original GREEK,

By *ELIZABETH CARTER.*

WITH

An INTRODUCTION, and NOTES, by the Tranſlator.

In TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

The THIRD EDITION.

LONDON:

Printed for J. and F. RIVINGTON, at the Bible and Crown, (N° 62.) in St Paul's Church-yard.

M.DCC.LXVIII.

BRITISH MUSEUM
30
MAY
78

The TRANSLATOR of EPICTETUS owes the Permiſſion of inſerting the following ODE intirely to the Friendſhip of the Writer of it; who, when ſhe favoured her with it, had no Thought of its ever appearing in Print.

An IRREGULAR ODE.

To E. C. *who had recommended to me the* Stoic Philoſophy, *as productive of* Fortitude, *and who is going to publiſh a Tranſlation of* EPICTETUS.

I.

COME, EPICTETUS! Arm my Breaſt
With thy impenetrable Steel,
No more the Wounds of Grief to feel,
Nor mourn by others' Woes depreſt.
Oh teach my trembling Heart
To ſcorn Affliction's Dart;
Teach me to mock the Tyrant Pain!
For ſee around me ſtand
A dreadful murd'rous Band,
I fly their cruel Power in vain!
Here lurks *Diſtemper*'s horrid Train,
And *There* the *Paſſions* liſt their flaming Brands;
Theſe with full Rage my helpleſs Body tear,
While *Thoſe* with daring Hands
Againſt the immortal Soul their impious Weapons rear.

An IRREGULAR ODE.

II.

Where-e'er I turn, freſh Evils meet my Eyes;
Sin, Sorrow, and Diſgrace,
Purſue the Human Race!
There on the Bed of Sickneſs *Virtue* lies!
See *Friendſhip* bleeding by the Sword
Of baſe *Ingratitude!*
See baleful *Jealouſy* intrude,
And poiſon all the Bliſs that *Love* had ſtor'd!
Oh! ſeal my Ears againſt the piteous Cry
Of Innocence diſtreſt!
Nor let me ſhrink, when Fancy's Eye
Beholds the guilty Wretch's Breaſt
Beneath the torturing Pincers heave:
Nor for the num'rous Wants of Mis'ry grieve,
Which all-diſpoſing Heav'n denies me to relieve!

III.

No longer let my fleeting Joys depend
On ſocial, or domeſtic Ties!
Superior let my Spirit riſe,
Nor in the gentle Counſels of a Friend,
Nor in the Smiles of Love, expect Delight:
But teach me in *myſelf* to find
Whate'er can pleaſe or fill my Mind.
Let inward Beauty charm the mental Sight;
Let God-like Reaſon, beaming bright,
Chaſe far away each gloomy Shade,
Till Virtue's heavenly Form diſplay'd

And

And her divineſt Love poſſeſs me whole!
Alone ſhall captivate my Soul,

IV.

But, ah! what means this impious Pride,
Which heav'nly Hoſts deride!
Within *myſelf* does Virtue dwell?
Is all ſerene, and beauteous there?
What mean theſe chilling Damps of Fear?
Tell me, *Philoſophy!* Thou Boaſter! Tell:
This God-like all-ſufficient Mind,
Which, in its own Perfection bleſt,
Defies the Woes, or Malice of Mankind
To ſhake its ſelf-poſſeſſing Reſt,
Is it not foul, weak, ignorant, and blind?
Oh Man! from conſcious Virtue's Praiſe
Fall'n, fall'n!——what Refuge can'ſt thou find!
What pitying Hand again will raiſe
From native Earth thy groveling Frame!
Ah, who will cleanſe thy Heart from Spot of ſinful Blame?

V.

But, See! what ſudden Glories from the Sky
To my benighted Soul appear,
And all the gloomy Proſpect cheer?
What awful Form approaches nigh?
Awful: Yet mild as is the ſouthern Wind
That gently bids the Foreſt nod.
Hark! Thunder breaks the Air, and Angels ſpeak!
"Behold the Saviour of the World! Behold the Lamb of [God!"
Ye Sons of Pride, behold his Aſpect meek!
The Tear of Pity on his Cheek!

See in his Train appear
Humility and *Patience* ſweet,
Repentance, proſtrate at His ſacred Feet, [Hair!
Bedews with Tears, and wipes them with her flowing

VI.

What Scenes now meet my wond'ring Eyes!
What hallow'd Grave,
By mourning Maids attended round,
Attracts the SAVIOUR's Steps? What Heart-felt Wound
His ſpotleſs Boſom heaves with tender Sighs?
Why weeps the SON belov'd, Omnipotent to ſave?
But, lo! He waves his awful Hand!
The ſleeping Clay obeys His dread Command.
Oh Lazarus! come forth!—"Come forth and ſee
"The dear Effects of wond'rous Love!
"He, at whoſe Word the Seas and Rocks remove,
"Thy Friend, thy Lord, thy Maker, weeps for Thee!"

VII.

Thy Walls, *Jeruſalem*, have ſeen thy King
In Meekneſs clad, lament thy hapleſs Fate!
Unquench'd His Love, though paid with ruthleſs Hate!
O loſt, relentleſs *Sion!* Didſt Thou know
Who thus vouchſafes thy Courts to tread,
What loud *Hoſannas* wouldſt thou ſing!
How eager crown His honour'd Head!
Nor ſee unmov'd His kind paternal Woe!
Nor force His Tears, His precious Blood, for thee to flow!

VIII.

VIII.

No more repine, my coward Soul!
The Sorrows of Mankind to ſhare,
Which He, who could the World controul,
Did not diſdain to bear!
Check not the Flow of ſweet fraternal Love,
By Heav'n's high King in Bounty given,
Thy ſtubborn Heart to ſoften and improve,
Thy Earth-clad Spirit to refine,
And gradual raiſe to Love divine
And wing its ſoaring Flight to Heaven!

IX.

Nor thou, ELIZA, who from early Youth
By Genius led, by Virtue train'd,
Haſt ſought the Fountain of eternal Truth,
And each fair Spring of Knowledge drain'd;
Nor Thou, with fond Chimeras vain,
With Stoic Pride, and fancied Scorn
Of human Feelings, human Pain,
My feeble Soul ſuſtain!
Far nobler Precepts ſhould thy Page adorn.
O rather guide me to the ſacred Source
Of real Wiſdom, real Force,
Thy Life's unerring Rule!
To Thee, fair Truth her radiant Form unſhrouds,
Though, wrapp'd in thick impenetrable Clouds,
She mock'd the Labours of the *Grecian* School.

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M. H.

INTRODUCTION.

§. 1. THE Stoic Sect was founded by *Zeno*, about three hundred Years before the Chriſtian Æra: and flouriſhed in great Reputation, till the Declenſion of the *Roman* Empire. A complete Hiſtory of this Philoſophy would be the Work of a large Volume: and nothing further is intended here, than ſuch a ſummary View of it, as may be of Uſe to give a clearer Notion of thoſe Paſſages in *Epictetus*, a ſtrict Profeſſor of it, which allude to ſome of its peculiar Doctrines.

§. 2. That the End of Man is to live conformably to Nature, was univerſally agreed on amongſt all the Philoſophers: but, in what that Conformity to Nature conſiſts, was the Point in Diſpute. The *Epicureans* maintained, that it conſiſted in Pleaſure; of which they conſtituted Senſe the

Judge (*a*). The Stoics, on the contrary, placed it in an abſolute Perfection of the Soul. Neither of them ſeem to have underſtood Man in his mixed Capacity; but while the firſt debaſed him to a mere Animal, the laſt exalted him to a pure Intelligence; and both conſidered him as independent, uncorrupted and ſufficient, either by Height of Virtue, or by well-regulated Indulgence, to his own Happineſs. The Stoical Exceſs was more uſeful to the Public, as it often produced great and noble Efforts towards that Perfection, to which it was ſuppoſed poſſible for human Nature to arrive. Yet, at the ſame time, by flattering Man with falſe and preſumptuous Ideas of his own Power and Excellence, it tempted even the Beſt to Pride: a Vice not only dreadfully miſchievous in human Society, but, perhaps of all others, the moſt inſuperable Bar to real inward Improvement.

§. 3.

(*a*) *Senſibus ipſis judicari voluptates.* Cic. de Fin. L. II. By Pleaſure the *Epicureans* ſometimes explained themſelves to mean, only Freedom from Uneaſineſs: but the Philoſophers of other Sects in general, as well as *Cicero*, inſiſt, producing their own Expreſſions for it, that they meant ſenſual Delights. This, indeed, was more explicitly the Doctrine of *Ariſtippus*, the Father of the *Cyrenaics*: a Sect, however, which ſunk into the *Epicureans*; whoſe Notions plainly led to the Diſſoluteneſs ſo remarkable in the Lives of moſt of them.

§. 3. *Epictetus* often mentions Three Topics, or Claſſes, under which the whole of Moral Philoſophy is comprehended. Theſe are, the *Deſires* and *Averſions*, the *Purſuits* and *Avoidances*, or the Exerciſe of the active Powers, and the *Aſſents* of the Underſtanding.

§. 4. The *Deſires* and *Averſions* were conſidered as ſimple Affections of the Mind, ariſing from the Apprehenſion, that any thing was conducive to Happineſs, or the contrary. The firſt Care of a Proficient in Philoſophy was, to regulate theſe in ſuch a manner, as never to be diſappointed of the one, or incur the other: a Point no otherwiſe attainable, than by regarding all Externals as abſolutely indifferent. *Good* muſt always be the Object of Deſire, and *Evil* of Averſion. The Perſon then, who conſiders Life, Health, Eaſe, Friends, Reputation, *&c.* as *Good*; and their Contraries as *Evil*, muſt neceſſarily *deſire* the one, and be *averſe* to the other: and, conſequently, muſt often find his *Deſire* diſappointed, and his *Averſion* incurred. The Stoics, therefore, reſtrained *Good* and *Evil* to *Virtue* and *Vice* alone: and excluded all Externals from any Share in human Happineſs, which they made entirely dependent on a right Choice. From this Regulation of the *Deſires* and *Averſions* follows that Freedom from Perturbation, Grief,

Ορεξεις Εκκλισεις.

Anger, Pity, &c. and in ſhort, that univerſal Apathy, which they every-where ſtrongly inculcate.

Αφορμαι, Ὁρμαι

§. 5. The next Step to Stoical Perfection was, the Claſs of *Purſuits* and *Avoidances* (*b*). As the *Deſires* and *Averſions* are ſimple Affections, the *Purſuits* and *Avoidances* are Exertions of the active Powers towards the procuring or declining any thing. Under this Head was comprehended the whole Syſtem of moral Duties, according to their incomplete Ideas of them: and a due Regard to it was ſuppoſed to enſure a proper Behaviour in all the ſocial Relations. The conſtant Performance of what theſe point out, naturally followed from a Regulation of the *Deſires* and *Averſions* in the firſt Topic: for where the Inclinations are exerted, and reſtrained as they ought, there will be nothing to miſlead us in Action.

§. 6. The laſt Topic, and the Completion of the Stoic Character, was that of the *Aſſents* (*c*). As

(*b*) The Stoics define theſe Terms: the one, a Motion, by which we are carried toward ſome Object; the other, a Motion, by which we ſtrive to ſhun it. The original Words, by a Happineſs in the *Greek* Language, are properly oppoſed to each other; which the *Engliſh* will not admit. I have choſen the beſt I could find, and wiſh they were better.

(*c*) It ſeems ſtrange, that the Stoics generally put the *Aſſents* laſt: ſince both the Affections and Will ſhould be governed

As the ſecond was to produce a Security from Failure in Practice, *this* was to ſecure an Infallibility in Judgment, and to guard the Mind from ever either admitting a Falſhood, or diſſenting from Truth. A wiſe Man, in the Stoic Scheme, was never to be miſtaken, or to form any Opinion. Where Evidence could not be obtained, he was to continue in Suſpence. His Underſtanding was never to be miſled, even in Sleep, or under the Influence of Wine, or in a Delirium. In this laſt Particular, however, there is not a perfect Agreement: and ſome Authors are ſo very reaſonable, as to admit it poſſible for a Philoſopher to be miſtaken in his Judgment, after he hath loſt his Senſes (*d*).

§. 7.

governed by the Underſtanding; which, therefore, ſhould be rectified, in order to do its Office well. *Epictetus* ſeems to be of this Opinion in B. I. c. 17. But, perhaps, they thought common Senſe, or natural Logic, ſufficient for this Purpoſe; and artificial Logic, which they meant, but did not expreſs clearly, by the Word *Aſſents*, neceſſary as a Guard only againſt Sophiſtry. Yet their mentioning it, as a Guard alſo againſt being miſled, when they were in Drink, and even in their Dreams, leaves but little Room for this Conjecture.

(*d*) Και μην την αρετην Χρυσιππος αποβλητην, Κλεανθης δε αναποβλητην· ὁ μεν, αποβληην δια μεθην και μελαγχολιαν· ὁ δε, αναποβλητην, δια βεβαιυς καταληψεις. DIOG. LAERT. *in* ZENO.

Nam

Φαντασιαι. §. 7. The Subjects of theſe ſeveral Claſſes of philoſophic Exerciſe are, the *Appearances* of Things (*e*). By theſe *Appearances* the Stoics underſtood the Impreſſions (*f*) made on the Soul, by any Objects, preſented either to the Senſes, or to the Underſtanding. Thus a Houſe, an Eſtate, Life, Death, Pain, Reputation, &c. (conſidered in the View, under which they are preſented to the preceptive Faculties) in the Stoical Senſe are, *Appearances*. The Uſe of Appearances is common to Brutes, and Men: an *intelligent* Uſe of them belongs only to the latter: a Diſtinction, which is carefully to be obſerved in reading theſe Diſcourſes.

Δογματα. §. 8. That Judgment, which is formed by the Mind concerning the *Appearances*, the Stoics termed *Principles*: and theſe Principles give a Determination to the Choice.

§. 9.

Nam ſi argumentaberis, ſapientem multo vino inebriari, & retinere rectum tenorem, etiamſi temulentus ſit: licet colligas, nec veneno poto moriturum, &c. SEN. *Epiſt.* 83.

(*e*) The original Word is of peculiar Signification among the Stoics: and I wiſh it could have been rendered into *Engliſh*, in a manner leſs ambiguous, and more expreſſive of its Meaning. But the Stoic Language periſhed with the Stoic Sect: and ſcarcely any of its technical Terms can now be rendered intelligible, except by a Paraphraſe, or a Definition.

(*f*) Τυπωσιν εν ψυχη. DIOG. LAERT. L. VII. §. 45.

§. 9. The *Choice*, among the Stoics, signified, either the Faculty of Willing; or a deliberate Election made of ſome Action, or Courſe of Life. προαιρεσις.

§. 10. As the Appearances reſpect particular Objects, the *Pre-conceptions* are general innate Notions, ſuch as they ſuppoſed to take original Poſſeſſion of the Mind, before it forms any of its own (*g*). To adapt theſe *Pre-conceptions* to particular Caſes, is the Office of Reaſon: and is often inſiſted on by *Epictetus*, as a Point of the higheſt Importance. προληψεις.

§. 11. By the Word, which throughout this Tranſlation is rendered *Proſperity*, the Stoics underſtood the internal State of the Mind, when the Affections and active Powers were ſo regulated, that it conſidered all Events as happy: and, conſequently, muſt enjoy an uninterrupted Flow of Succeſs: ſince nothing could fall out contrary to its Wiſhes (*b*). Ευροια.

Theſe, which have been mentioned, are the technical Terms of the greateſt Conſequence in the Stoic Philoſophy: and which, for that Reaſon,

(*g*) Εστι δε ἡ προληψις, εννοια φυσικη των καθ' ὁλου.
DIOG. LAERT. L. VII. §. 54.

(*b*) I am ſenſible, that *Proſperity*, in common Uſe, relates wholly to external Circumſtances: but I could find no better Word to expreſs the internal good Condition of the Mind, which the Stoics meant by Ευροια. There is an Inſtance of the like Uſe, 3 *John* ver. 2.

ſon, are, except in a very few Places, always rendered by the ſame *Engliſh* Word, There are other Words uſed in a peculiar Senſe by this Sect: but, as they are not of equal Importance, they are neither ſo ſtrictly tranſlated, nor need any particular Definition.

§. 12. The Stoics held Logic in the higheſt Eſteem: and often carried it to ſuch a trifling Degree of Subtilty, as rendered their Arguments very tedious and perplexed. The frequent References to logical Queſtions, and the Uſe of ſyllogiſtical Terms, are the leaſt agreeable Part of the Diſcourſes of *Epictetus:* ſince, however well they might be underſtood by ſome of his Hearers, they are now unintelligible to the greateſt Part of his Readers. Indeed, with all his Strength and Clearneſs of Underſtanding, he ſeems to have been hurt by this favourite Science of his Sect. One is ſometimes ſurpriſed to find his Reaſoning incoherent and perplexed: and his Scholars rather ſilenced by Interrogatories, which they are unable to comprehend, than convinced by the Force of Truth; and then given up by him, as if they were hopeleſs and unteachable. Yet many a well-meaning Underſtanding may be loſt in a Wood by the Confuſion of dialectical Quibbles, which might have been led, without Difficulty, to the Point in view, if it had been ſuffered to follow the Track of common Senſe.

§. 13.

§. 13. The Stoic Scheme of Theology, as it is explained in *Cicero*, and other antient Writers, appears, in many Parts of it, ſtrangely perplexed and abſurd. Some however of this ſeeming Abſurdity may poſſibly ariſe from the Uſe of ſtrong Figures; and the infinite Difficulty of treating a Subject, for which no human Language can ſupply proper and adequate Terms (*i*). The Writings of the firſt Founders of the Stoic Philoſophy, who treated expreſly on Phyſiology and Metaphyſics, are now loſt: and all that can be known of their Doctrine is from Fragments, and the Accounts given of them by other Authors. By what can be collected from theſe, and particularly by the Account which *Diogenes Laertius* gives of the Stoics, they appear to have held, that there is one ſupreme God, incorruptible, unoriginated (*k*), immortal, rational, and perfect in Intelligence and Happineſs: unſuſceptible of all Evil: governing the World, and every thing in it, by his Providence: not however of the human Form; but the Creator of the Univerſe: the Father

(*i*) Quicquid de Deo dixeris, quidquid tacitæ mentis cogitatione conceperis, in humanum tranſilit, et corrumpitur, ſenſum: nec habet propriæ ſignificationis notam, quod noſtris verbis dicitur, atque ad humana negotia compoſitis. ARNOB. *adv. Gentes*, L. III. p. 111. Ed. *Ludg. Bat.* 1651.

(*k*) Αφθαρτον και αγενητος. DIOG. LAERT. L. VII. §. 137.

ther likewiſe of all (*l*): and that the ſeveral Names of *Apollo*, *Minerva*, *Ceres*, &c. only denote different Exertions of his Power in the different Parts of the Univerſe (*m*). It would be well, if they had ſtopt here: but they plainly ſpeak of the World, as God, or of God as the Soul of the World, which they call his Subſtance (*n*): and I do not recollect any Proof, that they believed Him to exiſt in the extramundane Space. Yet they held the World to be finite (*o*), and corruptible: and that, at certain Periods, it was to undergo ſucceſſive Conflagrations, and then all Beings were to be reſorbed into God, and again reproduced by Him (*p*). What they intended by being reſorbed into God, as I do not comprehend, I will not attempt to explain: but I fear they underſtood by it, a Loſs of ſeparate perſonal Exiſtence. Yet ſome of the later Stoics departed from

(*l*) Θεον δ' ειναι Ζωον αθανατον, λογικον, τελειον, η νοερον εν ευδαιμονια, κακου παντος ανεπιδεκτον, προνοητικον κοσμου τε και των εν κοσμω· μη ειναι μεντοι ανθρωπομορφον· ειναι δε τον μεν δημιουργον των ολων, ωσπερ και πατερα παντων. Ib. §. 147.

(*m*) Πολλαι προσηγοριαις προσονομαζεται κατα τας δυναμεις. Ib.

(*n*) Ουσιαν δε Θεου Ζηνων μεν φησι τον ολον κοσμον και τον ουρανον. Ib. §. 148.

(*o*) Ὁ μεν ουν κοσμος περιπερασμενος εστι. Ib.

(*p*) Κατα χρονων τινας περιοδους αναλισκων εις εαυτον πασαν την ουσιαν, και παλιν εξ εαυτου γεννων. Ib. §. 137.

from this Doctrine of the Conflagration, and ſuppoſed the World to be immortal (*q*). Indeed there is often ſo much Obſcurity, and Appearance of Contradiction, in their Expreſſions, that it is very difficult, if not impoſſible, to form any preciſe Idea of their Meaning. They who, with Impartiality, read what the antient Philoſophers, of all Sects, have written on the Nature of God, will often find Cauſe to think, with the utmoſt Veneration and Gratitude, on the only Book, in which this important Article is explained, ſo far as is neceſſary to be known, in a manner perfectly agreeable to the Principles of ſimple, unperverted Reaſon. For what it graciouſly teaches more than Reaſon could, it confirms by ſuch Evidences of its Authority, as Reaſon muſt admit, or contradict itſelf.

§. 14. The Stoics ſometimes define God to be an intelligent, fiery Spirit, without Form, but paſſing into whatever Things it pleaſes, and aſſimilating itſelf to all (*r*): ſometimes active operative Fire (*s*). It might be hoped, that theſe were only metaphorical Phraſes, if they did not expreſsly

(*q*) See PHILO JUDÆUS, of the Incorruptibility of the World, p. 947. Ed. *Par.*

(*r*) Θεος εστι πνευμα νοερον και πυρωδες, ουκ εχον μορφην, μεταβαλλον δε εις α βουλεται και συνεξομοιουμενον απασι. POSIDONIUS.

(*s*) Πυρ τεχνικον. PLUT. *de Placit. Philoſoph.* L. I. c. 7.

expreſsly ſpeak of God as corporeal; which is objected to them by *Plutarch* (*t*). Indeed they defined all Eſſence to be Body (*u*). An Error of which, probably, they did not diſcover the ill Tendency, any more than *Tertullian*; who inconſiderately followed them in this very unphiloſophical Notion, that what is not Body, is nothing at all (*w*). His Chriſtian Faith ſecures him from the Imputation of Impiety: and the juſt and becoming Manner, in which the Stoics, in many Inſtances, ſpeak of God, ſhould incline one to form the ſame favourable Judgment of them: and thoſe Authors ſeem guilty of great Injuſtice, who repreſent them, as little better than Atheiſts.

§. 15. They held the Eternity of Matter, as a paſſive Principle; but that it was reduced into Form by God; and that the World was made, and is continually governed by Him (*x*). They ſometimes

(*t*) Ουτοι τον Θεον, αρχην οντα, Σωμα νοερον, και νουν εν ὑλῃ ποιουντες, ου καθαρον, ουδε απλουν ουδε ασυνθετον, αλλα εξ ἑτερου, και δι' ἑτερου αποφαινουσι. PLUT. *de communibus notitiis adv. Stoicos*, p. 1085.

(*u*) Σωμα δε εστι, κατ' αυτους, ἡ ουσια. DIOG. LAERT. L. VII. §. 150.

(*w*) *Adv. Praxeam*, c. 7. Yet, *De Anima*, c. 7. he ſays, Omne corporale paſſibile eſt; which he certainly did not think God was.

(*x*) Δοκει δ' αυτοις αρχας ειναι των ολων δυο, το ποιουν και το πασχον· το μεν ουν πασχον ειναι την αποιον ουσιαν, την ὑλην. Το δε ποιουν, τον εν αυτῃ λογον, τον Θεον. DIOG. LAERT. L. VII. §. 134.

ſometimes repreſent him, as modelling the Conſtitution of the World with ſupreme Authority (*y*): at others, as limited by the Materials, which He had not the Power to change (*z*). *Epictetus* may be thought to incline to this latter Opinion (*a*): yet his Words are capable of a different Turn. And there are, perhaps, more Arguments, in the Writings of the Stoics, to prove their Belief of the uncontroulable Power of the Deity in the Formation of Things, than thoſe, which ſome unguarded Expreſſions appear to furniſh againſt it.

§. 16. Of all the Philoſophers the Stoics were the cleareſt and moſt zealous Aſſertors of a particular Providence (*b*): a Belief, which was treated with the utmoſt Contempt by the *Epicureans* (*c*). As this Principle is, of all others, the moſt conducive to the Intereſt of Virtue, and lays the Foundation

(*y*) Deus iſta temperat, quæ circumfuſa Rectorem ſequuntur & Ducem. Potentius autem eſt quod facit, quod eſt Deus, quam materia patiens Dei. SEN. *Epiſt.* 65.

Nulli igitur eſt naturæ obediens, aut ſubjectus Deus. Omnem ergo regit ipſe naturam. CIC. *de Nat. Deor.* L. II. §. 30. Ed. *Dav.*

(*z*) Non poteſt artifex mutare materiam. SEN. *de Provid.* c. 8.

(*a*) B. I. c. 1.

(*b*) Non univerſo Hominum Generi, ſolum, ſed etiam ſingulis, &c. CIC. *de Nat. Deor.* L. III.

(*c*) Anus fatidica. Ib. L. I.

Foundation of all true Piety, the Stoics are intitled to the higheſt Honour for their ſteady Defence of it; and their utter Rejection of the idle, and contemptible Notion, of Chance (*d*).

§. 17. By *Fate* they ſeem to have underſtood a Series of Events, appointed by the immutable Counſels of God: or, that Law of his Providence, by which he governs the World (*e*). It is evident by their Writings, that they meant it in no Senſe, which interferes with the Liberty of human Actions. *Cicero* allows, that *Chryſippus* endeavoured to reconcile Fate with Free Will: and that it was contrary to his Intention, that, by a perplexed Way of arguing, he confirmed the Doctrine of Neceſſity (*f*). Whenever they ſpeak of God, as ſubject to *Fate*, which it muſt be owned they ſometimes do in a very ſtrong and unguarded manner, their Meaning ſeems to be, that his own eternal Will is his Law: that he cannot change; becauſe

(*d*) Nec ſine Ratione, quamvis ſubita, accidere. SEN. *de Provid.* c. 1.

(*e*) Λογος, καθ' ον ὁ κοσμος διοικειται. DIOG. LAERT. L. VII. §. 149.

(*f*) *Chryſippus*—Applicat ſe ad eos potius, qui neceſſitate motus Animos [Animorum. *Dav.*] liberatos volunt. Dum autem verbis utitur ſuis, delabitur in eas Difficultates, ut neceſſitatem Fati confirmet *invitus*. CIC. *de Fato*, §. 17. *Dav. Chryſippus* autem, cum & neceſſitatem improbaret, &c. §. 18.

becauſe He always ordains what is beſt (*g*): and that, as Fate is no more than a connected Series of Cauſes, God is the Firſt Original Cauſe, on which all the reſt depend (*h*).

§. 18. They imagined the whole Univerſe to be peopled with Gods, Genii, and Demons: and among other inferior Divinities reckoned the Sun, Moon, and Stars, which they conceived to be animated and intelligent; or inhabited by particular Deities, as the Body is by the Soul, who preſided over them, and directed their Motions (*i*).

§. 19. The Stoics held both the above-mentioned Intelligences, and the Souls of Men, to be Portions of the Eſſence of God (*k*), or Parts of the Soul of the World (*l*): and to be corporeal (*m*), and periſhable (*n*). Some of them indeed maintained, that human Souls ſubſiſted after Death: but that they were, like all other Beings, to be conſumed at the Conflagration. *Cleanthes* taught, that all Souls laſted till that Time: *Chryſippus*,

(*g*) SEN. *de Beneficiis*, L. VI. c. 23.

(*h*) Ib. L. IV. c. 7.

(*i*) CIC. *de Natura Deorum*, L. II. c. 15.

(*k*) EPIC. B. I. c. 14, &c.

(*l*) Ἧς μέρη εἶναι τὰς ἐν τοῖς Ζῴοις. DIOG. LAERT. L. VII. §. 156.

(*m*) Τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν—καὶ σῶμα εἶναι. Ib.

(*n*) Τὴν ψυχὴν μετὰ θάνατον ὑπομένειν, φθαρτὴν δ' εἶναι. Ib.

ſippus, only thoſe of the Good (*o*). *Seneca* is perpetually wavering: ſometimes ſpeaking of the Soul as immortal; and, at others, as periſhing with the Body. And indeed there is nothing but Confuſion, and a melancholy Uncertainty, to be met with among the Stoics, on this Subject.

§. 20. There is, I think, very little Evidence to be found, that they believed future Rewards or Puniſhments, compared with that which appears to the contrary (*p*): at leaſt the Reader will obſerve, that *Epictetus* never aſſerts either. He ſtrongly inſiſts, that a bad Man hath no other Puniſhment, than being ſuch; and a good Man, no other Reward (*q*): and he tells his Diſciple, that, when Want of Neceſſaries obliges him to go out of Life, he returns to the Four Elements, of which he was made: that there is no *Hades*, nor *Acheron*, nor *Pyriphlegethon* (*r*): and he clearly affirms

(*o*) Κλεανθης πασας, επιδιαμενειν φασι, μεχρι εκπυρωσεως. Χρυσιππος δε, τας των Σοφων μονων. Ib. §. 197.

(*p*) *Lactantius*, indeed, L. VII. c. 7. ſays: Eſſe inferos Zenon Stoicus docuit, & ſedes piorum ab impiis eſſe diſcretas: & illos quidem quietas & delectabiles incolere Regiones; hos vero luere pœnas in tenebroſis locis, atque in cœni voraginibus horrendis. But I know not that any other Author relates this of him.

(*q*) See B. I. c. 12. p. 59. B. III. c. 7. p. 33. Id. c. 24. p. 116. B. IV. c. 9. §. 2, 3. Id. c. 10. §. 2. c. 12. §. 4.

(*r*) B. III. c. 13. p. 52.

affirms, that perſonal Exiſtence is loſt in Death (*s*). Had *Epictetus* believed future Rewards, he muſt, of Courſe, have made frequent mention of them (*t*). *M. Antoninus*, upon a Suppoſition that Souls continue after Death, makes them to remain for ſome Time in the Air: and then to be changed, diffuſed, kindled, and reſumed into the productive Intelligence of the Univerſe (*u*). In another Place, he vindicates the Conduct of

(*s*) B. III. c. 24. p. 126.

(*t*) The only Paſſage, that I can recollect, in which any Intimation ſeems to be given of a future Reward, is in the XVth Chapter of the *Enchiridion*: and, probably, even there he means only a Happineſs to be enjoyed in the preſent Life, after due Improvement in Philoſophy; though he expreſſes it by the very ſtrong Figures of partaking the Feaſts and Empire of the Gods. For, doubtleſs, the wiſe Man, like his Kindred Deities, feaſted upon every Thing that happened; and, by willing as *Jupiter* did, reigned along with Him. Beſides, *Epictetus* ſays there, of *Diogenes*, and *Heraclitus*, or *Hercules*, not that they *are*, but that they *were* divine Perſons: which muſt refer to ſomething which had ceaſed when he wrote; and, conſequently, to their Felicity before, not after their Deaths. At leaſt, he doth not intimate any thing concerning their ſecond Life: and if that was to be ſhort, as it might be (and it could not reach beyond the Conflagration), and was not very certain neither, the Hope of it would be a very inſufficient Counterbalance to vehement Appetites and Paſſions.

(*u*) L. 4. §. 21. Theſe Expreſſions, *diffuſed* and *kindled*, allude to the Stoic Doctrine, that Souls are Portions of the Deity, ſeparated for a Time, and that His Eſſence is Fire.

ſon: the latter, which was unfortunately maintained by the Stoics, is repugnant to both.

§. 24. That there is an intrinſic Beauty and Excellency in moral Goodneſs; that it is the Ornament and Perfection of all rational Beings; and that, till Conſcience is ſtifled by repeated Guilt, we feel an Obligation to prefer and follow, ſo far as we perceive it, in all Caſes; and find an inward Satisfaction, and generally receive outward Advantages from ſo doing, are Poſitions, which no thinking Perſon can contradict: but it doth not follow from hence, that in ſuch a Mixture, as Mankind, it is its own ſufficient Reward. God alone, infinitely perfect, is happy in, and from Himſelf. The Virtue of *finite* Beings muſt be defective: and the Happineſs of *created* Beings muſt be dependent. It is undeniable Fact, that the natural Conſequences of Virtue in ſome, may be interrupted by the Vices of others. How much are the beſt Perſons liable to ſuffer from the Follies of the Unthinking; from the Ill-nature, the Rage, the Scorn of the Malevolent; from the cold and the penurious Hard-heartedneſs of the Unfeeling; from Perſecutions, for the ſake both of Religion and Honeſty; from ill Returns to conjugal, to paternal, to friendly Affection; and from an innumerable Train of other Evils, to which the moſt amiable Diſpoſitions, are uſually the moſt ſenſible. It is no leſs undeniable,

niable, that the natural Conſequences of Virtue are interrupted by the Struggles of our own Paſſions; (which we may overcome rewardably, though very imperfectly; or, if we live to overcome more perfectly, we may not live to enjoy the Victory;) by Sickneſs, Pain, Languor, Want; and by what we feel from the Death, or the Sufferings of thoſe, with whom we are moſt nearly connected. We are often indeed afflicted by many of theſe Things, more than we ought to be. But Concern for ſome, at leaſt our own Failings, for Inſtance, is directly a Duty; for others, it is viſibly the Inſtrument of moral Improvement; for more ſtill, it is the unavoidable Reſult of our Frame: and they who carry it too far, may, on the whole, be good Characters; and even they who do not, in any conſiderable Degree, may however be extremely wretched. How then can Virtue be its own Reward to Mankind in general, or indeed a proportionable Reward to almoſt any Man? Or how, unleſs the View be extended beyond ſuch a Scene of Things, the certain Means of Happineſs? The originally *appointed* Means of Happineſs it undoubtedly is: but that it ſhould be an effectual and infallible Means to Creatures ſo imperfect, paſſing through ſuch a diſordered World, is impoſſible, without a State of future Reward; and of this the Goſpel alone gives us full Aſſurance.

§. 25. By rejecting the Doctrine of Recompences in another Life, the Stoics were reduced to the Extravagance of ſuppoſing Felicity to be enjoyed in Circumſtances, which are incapable of it. That a good Man ſtretched on a Rack, or repoſing on a Bed of Roſes, ſhould enjoy himſelf equally, was a Notion which could gain but few Proſelytes: and a ſad Experience, that Pain was an Evil, ſometimes drove their own Diſciples from the thorny Aſperities of the Portico, to the flowery Gardens of *Epicurus*.

§. 26. The abſolute Indifference of all Externals, and the Poſition, That Things independent on Choice are nothing to us, the grand Point on which their Arguments turned, every one, who feels, knows to be falſe: and the Practice of the Wiſeſt and Beſt among them, proved it in Fact to be ſo. It is remarkable, that no Sect of Philoſophers ever ſo dogmatically preſcribed, or ſo frequently committed, Suicide, as thoſe very Stoics, who taught that the Pains and Sufferings, which they ſtrove to end by this Act of Rebellion againſt the Decrees of Providence, were no Evils. How abſolutely this horrid Practice contradicted all their noble Precepts of Reſignation and Submiſſion to the Divine Will, is too evident to need any Enlargement. They profeſſed indeed in Suicide to follow the divine Will: but this was a lamen-

a lamentably weak Pretence. Even ſuppoſing Sufferings to be Evils, they are no Proof of a Signal from God to abandon Life; but to ſhow an exemplary Patience, which he will Reward: but, ſuppoſing them, as the Stoics did, not to be Evils, they afford not ſo much as the Shadow of a Proof.

§. 27. As the Stoics by the Permiſſion of Suicide, plainly implied, that external Inconveniencies were not indifferent in the Extremity; it follows, that they muſt proportionably be allowed not to be indifferent in the inferior Degrees: of which *Zeno* ſeemed to be perfectly well convinced by hanging himſelf when his Finger aked. And where was the Uſe of taking ſo much Pains to ſay, and believe what they knew to be falſe? It might, perhaps, be thought to be of ſome Benefit, in the Time of the later Stoics, to the great Men of *Rome*, whom the Emperors frequently butchered at their Pleaſure: and this is the Uſe, to which *Epictetus* is perpetually applying it. Yet, even in this Caſe, the Stoic Doctrine, where Men could bring themſelves to act upon it, made them abſurdly rough, as appears by the Hiſtory of *Helvidius Priſcus*: and hindered the Good, they might otherwiſe have done. And, if a Man, taught thus to deſpiſe Tortures and Death, ſhould happen at the ſame time to be wrong headed, for which he had no ſmall Chance, he would, in one Reſpect, be a more terrible wild Beaſt, than

an Enthuſiaſt of any other Sect; as he would not think his Sufferings Evils: though in another he would be leſs ſo, as he would not hope to be rewarded for them hereafter.

§. 28. The Stoics are frequently, and juſtly, charged with great Arrogance in their Diſcourſes, and even in their Addreſſes to God. They aſſert however the Doctrine of Grace, and the Duty of Praiſe and Thankſgiving for the divine Aſſiſtance in moral Improvements (*b*). But there doth not, I think, appear any Inſtance of a Stoic, or perhaps any other Heathen Philoſpher, addreſſing his Repentance to God, and begging Pardon for his Failings, or directing his Diſciples to do it. Indeed nothing can excuſe their Idolatry of human Nature: which they proudly, and inconſiſtently ſuppoſed perfect and ſelf-ſufficient. *Seneca* carried the Matter ſo far, as by an impious Antitheſis, to give his wiſe Man the Superiority to God (*c*). *Epictetus* indeed was attentive enough to the Voice of Conſcience to own himſelf not perfect (*d*): and he ſometimes tells his Hearers, that they cannot

(*b*) B. II. c. 18. §. 3, 4. B. III. c. 21. p. 72, 186, 187. See likewiſe *M. Antoninus*, L. I. §. 17. L. IX. §. 4. L. XII. §. 14.

(*c*) Eſt aliquid, quo ſapiens antecedat Deum. Ille naturæ beneficio, non ſuo, ſapiens eſt: ecce res magna, habere imbecilitatem hominis, ſecuritatem Dei. SEN. *Epiſt.* 53.

(*d*) B. IV. c. 1. §. 17. B. IV. c. 8. p. 230.

cannot be perfect yet (*e*). But even He at other times informs them, that they are not inferior to the Gods (*f*). The Stoical Boasting will, however, imply less of personal Arrogance, if we can suppose, that those Speeches, which so ill become human Imperfection, were always uttered, as perhaps in part they often were, in the Character of their Idol, the perfectly wise and good Man, which they owned to be merely an ideal Being (*g*). At least, it may be affirmed with Truth, that they frequently mention themselves with Decency and Humility, and with an express Confession of their Deviation from this faultless Exemplar.

§. 29. But then where was the Use of their favourite Doctrine, that a wise Man must always be happy? Might not a Person, determined to follow his own Inclinations, very reasonably object, "What is that to me, if I am not, or to "any body else, if no one ever was, a *wise* Man? "But, suppose I were one; which is the better "grounded Argument? *You must always be happy, and therefore Externals are no Evils*: or, "*These Things are Evils, and therefore I am not "happy*.—But *Epictetus* will say, You have a

(*e*) B. I. c. 15. p. 67. B. IV. c. 12. §. 4.

(*f*) B. I. c. 12. p. 60.

(*g*) Quis sapiens sit, aut fuerit, nec ipsos Stoicos solere dicere. Cic. *Acad.* L. IV.

" Remedy: the Door is open; go, with great " good Humour and Thankfulneſs, and hang " yourſelf: and there will be an End of your " Pain and you together.—A fine Scheme of " Happineſs indeed! and much to be thankful " for! Why, is it not the ſhorter and merrier " Way, inſtead of ſtudying this crabbed Philoſo- " phy, to indulge myſelf, in whatever I like, as " long as I can, (it may chance to be a good " while) and hang myſelf thankfully, when I " feel Inconveniencies from that? The Door is " juſt as open in one Caſe, as in the other; and " nothing beyond it, either pleaſing or terrible " in either."—Such, alas! is the Concluſion too commonly drawn; and ſuch muſt be the Conſequence of every Doctrine, not built upon ſolid Foundations.

§. 30. *Epictetus* often lays it down as a Maxim, that it is impoſſible for one Perſon to be in Fault, and another to be the Sufferer. This, on the Suppoſition of a future State, will certainly be made true at laſt; but in the Stoical Senſe, and Syſtem, is an abſolute Extravagance. Take any Perſon of plain Underſtanding, with all the Feelings of Humanity about him, and ſee whether the ſubtleſt Stoic will ever be able to convince him, that while he is inſulted, oppreſſed, and tortured, he doth not *ſuffer*. See what Comfort it will

will afford him, to be told, that, if he ſupports his Afflictions and ill Treatment with Fortitude and Patience, Death will ſet him free, and then he and his Perſecutor will be equally rewarded; will equally loſe all perſonal Exiſtence, and return to the Elements. How different are the Conſolations propoſed by Chriſtianity, which not only aſſures its Diſciples, that they ſhall *reſt from their Labours* in Death, but that *their Works ſhall follow them*: and, by allowing them to *rejoice in Hope*, teaches them the moſt effectual Way of becoming *patient in Tribulation*.

§. 31. The Stoical Doctrine, that human Souls are literally Parts of the Deity, was equally ſhocking, and hurtful: as it ſuppoſed Portions of his Being to be wicked and miſerable; and, by debaſing Mens Ideas of the divine Dignity, and teaching them to think themſelves eſſentially as good as He, nouriſhed in their Minds an irreligious and fatal Preſumption. Far differently the Chriſtian Syſtem, repreſents Mankind, not as a Part of the Eſſence, but a Work of the Hand of God: as created in a State of improveable Virtue and Happineſs: Fallen, by an Abuſe of Free Will, into Sin, Miſery, and Weakneſs (*b*); but redeemed from them by an Almighty Saviour; furniſhed with additional Knowledge and Strength;

(*b*)—Cito nequitia ſubrepit: virtus difficilis inventu eſt, rectorem, ducemque deſiderat. Etiam ſine magiſtro vitia diſcuntur. SEN. *Natural. Quæſt.* L. III. c. 30.

commanded to uſe their beſt Endeavours; made ſenſible, at the ſame time, how wretchedly defective they are; yet aſſured of endleſs Felicity on a due Exertion of them. The Stoic Philoſophy inſults human Nature, and diſcourages all our Attempts, by enjoining and promiſing a Perfection in this Life, of which we feel ourſelves incapable. The Chriſtian Religion ſhows Compaſſion to our Weakneſs, by preſcribing to us only the practicable Taſk of aiming continually at further Improvements: and animates our Endeavours, by the Promiſe of a divine Aid, equal to every Trial.

§. 32. Specifying thus the Errors and Defects of ſo celebrated a Syſtem, is an unpleaſing Employment: but in an Age, fond of preferring the Gueſſes of human Sagacity before the unerring Declarations of God, it ſeemed on this Occaſion neceſſary to obſerve, that the Chriſtian Morality is agreeable to Reaſon and Nature: that of the Stoics, for the moſt part, founded on Notions, intelligible to few; and which none could admit, without Contradiction to their own Hearts. They reaſoned, many times, admirably well, but from falſe Principles: and the nobleſt of their practical Precepts, being built on a ſandy Baſis, lay at the Mercy of every ſtrong Temptation.

§. 33. Stoiciſm is indeed, in many Points inferior to the Doctrine of *Socrates*: which did not teach,

teach, that all Externals were indifferent: which did teach a future State of Recompence; and, agreeably to that, forbad Suicide. It doth not belong to the preſent Subject to ſhow, how much even this beſt Syſtem is excelled by Chriſtianity. It is ſufficient juſt to obſerve, that the Author of it died in a Profeſſion, which he had always made, of his Belief in the popular Deities, whoſe Superſtitions, and impure Worſhip was the great Source of Corruption in the Heathen World: and the laſt Words he uttered, were a Direction to his Friend, for the Performance of an idolatrous Ceremony. This melancholy Inſtance of Ignorance and Error, in the moſt illuſtrious Character for Wiſdom and Virtue, in all Heathen Antiquity, is not mentioned as a Reflection on his Memory, but as a Proof of human Weakneſs in general. Whether Reaſon could have diſcovered the great Truths, which in theſe Days are aſcribed to it, becauſe now ſeen ſo clearly by the Light of the Goſpel, may be a *Queſtion*; but that it never did, is an undeniable *Fact:* and that is enough to teach us Thankfulneſs for the Bleſſing of a better Information. *Socrates*, who had, of all Mankind, the faireſt Pretenſions to ſet up for an Inſtructor and Reformer of the World, confeſſed, that he knew nothing, referred to Tradition, and acknowledged the Want of a ſuperior Guide: and there is a remarkable Paſſage in *Epictetus*,

tetus, in which he repreſents it, as the Office of his ſupreme God, or of One deputed by Him, to appear among Mankind, as a Teacher and Example (*g*).

§. 34. Upon the whole, the ſeveral Sects of Heathen Philoſophy ſerve, as ſo many ſtriking Inſtances of the Imperfection of human Wiſdom; and of the extreme Need of a divine Aſſiſtance, to rectify the Miſtakes of depraved Reaſon, and to replace natural Religion on its true Foundation. The Stoics every-where teſtify the nobleſt Zeal for Virtue, and the Honour of God: but they attempted to eſtabliſh them on Principles, inconſiſtent with the Nature of Man, and contradictory to Truth and Experience. By a direct Conſequence of theſe Principles, they were liable to be ſeduced, and in Fact, often were ſeduced into Pride, Hard-heartedneſs, and the laſt dreadful Extremity of human Guilt, Self-murder.

§. 35. But however indefenſible the Philoſophy of the Stoics in ſeveral Inſtances may be, it appears to have been of very important Uſe, in the Heathen World: and they are, on many Accounts, to be conſidered in a very reſpectable Light. Their Doctrine of Evidence and fixed Principles, was an excellent Preſervative from the Miſchiefs, that might have ariſen from the Scepticiſm of the Academics and Pyrrhoniſts, if unoppoſed:

(*g*) B. IV. c. 8. §. 6.

oppoſed: and their zealous Defence of a particular Providence, a valuable Antidote to the atheiſtical Scheme of *Epicurus*. To this may be added, that their ſtrict Notions of Virtue in moſt Points, (for they ſadly failed in ſome) and the Lives of ſeveral among them, muſt contribute a good deal to preſerve luxurious States from an abſolutely univerſal Diſſoluteneſs; and the Subjects of arbitrary Government, from a wretched and contemptible Puſilanimity.

§. 36. Even now, their Compoſitions may be read with great Advantage, as containing excellent Rules of Self-government, and of ſocial Behaviour; of a noble Reliance on the Aid and Protection of Heaven, and of a perfect Reſignation and Submiſſion to the divine Will: Points, which are treated with great Clearneſs, and with admirable Spirit, in the Leſſons of the Stoics; and though their Directions are ſeldom practicable on their Principles, in trying Caſes, may be rendered highly uſeful in Subordination to Chriſtian Reflections.

§. 37. If, among thoſe, who are ſo unhappy as to remain unconvinced of the Truth of Chriſtianity, any are prejudiced againſt it by the Influence of unwarrantable Inclinations: ſuch Perſons will find very little Advantage in rejecting the Doctrines of the New Teſtament for thoſe of the Portico; unleſs they think it an Advantage to be

laid

laid under moral Reſtraints, almoſt equal to thoſe of the Goſpel, while they are deprived of its Encouragements and Supports. Deviations from the Rules of Sobriety, Juſtice and Piety, meet with ſmall Indulgence in the Stoic Writings: and they, who profeſs to admire *Epictetus*, unleſs they purſue that ſeverely virtuous Conduct which he everywhere preſcribes, will find themſelves treated by him, with the utmoſt Degree of Scorn and Contempt. An immoral Character is indeed, more or leſs, the Out-caſt of all Sects of Philoſophy: and *Seneca* quotes even *Epicurus*, to prove the univerſal Obligation of a virtuous Life (*b*). Of this great Truth, *God never left himſelf without Witneſs*. Perſons of diſtinguiſhed Talents and Opportunities ſeem to have been raiſed, from time to time, by Providence, to check the Torrent of Corruption, and to preſerve the Senſe of moral Obligations on the Minds of the Multitude, to whom the various Occupations of Life left but little Leiſure to form Deductions of their own. But then they wanted a proper Commiſſion to enforce their Precepts: they intermixed with them

(*b*) Eo libentius Epicuri egregia dicta commemoro, ut iſtis, qui ad illa confugient, ſpe mala inducti, qua velamentum ſeipſos ſuorum vitiorum habituros exiſtimant, probem, quocunque ierint, honeſte eſſe vivendum. SEN. *Epiſt.* 21. It was hard indeed to reconcile this with ſome of his other Doctrines.

them through falſe Reaſoning, many groſs Miſtakes; and their unavoidable Ignorance, in ſeveral important Points, entangled them with Doubts, which eaſily degenerated into pernicious Errors.

§. 38. If there are others, who reject Chriſtianity, from Motives of Diſlike to its peculiar Doctrines: they will ſcarcely fail of entertaining more favourable Impreſſions of it, if they can be prevailed on, with Impartiality, to compare the holy Scriptures, from whence alone the Chriſtian Religion is to be learned, with the Stoic Writings; and then fairly to conſider, whether there is any thing to be met with in the Diſcourſes of our bleſſed Saviour, in the Writings of his Apoſtles, or even in the obſcureſt Parts of the prophetic Books, by which, equitably interpreted, either their Senſes, or their Reaſon are contradicted, as they are by the Paradoxes of theſe Philoſophers: and if not, whether Notices from above, of Things, in which, though we comprehend them but imperfectly, we are poſſibly much more intereſted, than at preſent we diſcern, ought not to be received with implicit Veneration; as uſeful Exerciſes and Trials of that Duty, which finite Underſtandings owe to infinite Wiſdom.

§. 39. Antiquity furniſhes but very few Particulars of the Life of *Epictetus*. He was born at *Hierapolis*, a City of *Phrygia:* but of what Parents, is unknown: as well as by what Means he

he came to *Rome*, where he was the Slave of *Epaphroditus*, one of *Nero*'s Courtiers (*i*). It is reported, that when his Maſter once put his Leg to the Torture, *Epictetus*, with great Compoſure, and even ſmiling, obſerved to him; "You will "certainly break my Leg:" which accordingly happened; and he continued, in the ſame Tone of Voice—"Did not I tell you, that you would "break it (*k*)?" This Accident might, perhaps, be the Occaſion of his Lameneſs: which, however, ſome Authors ſay he had from his early Years (*l*); and others attribute to the Rheumatiſm (*m*). At what Time he obtained his Liberty doth not appear. When the Philoſophers, by a Decree of *Domitian*, were baniſhed from *Rome*, *Epictetus* retired to *Nicopolis* (*n*), a City of *Epirus*, where he taught Philoſophy; from which he doth not ſeem to have derived any external Advantages, as he is univerſally ſaid to have been extremely poor. At leaſt, he was ſo when he lived at *Rome*: where his whole Furniture conſiſted of a Bed (*o*), a Pipkin, and an Earthen Lamp (*p*); which laſt was purchaſed for about a hundred Pounds after his

(*i*) SUIDAS in VOC.
(*k*) ORIG. contra CELS. L. VII. §. 53.
(*l*) SUIDAS in VOC.
(*m*) SIMPLIC. Com. p. 102.
(*n*) A. GELL. L. XV. c. 11.
(*o*) SIMPLIC. Com. p. 102.
(*p*) Id. Ib.

his Death, by a Perſon whom *Lucian* ridicules for it, as hoping to acquire the Wiſdom of *Epictetus* by ſtudying over it. His only Attendant was a Woman, whom he took in his advanced Years, to nurſe a Child, whom, otherwiſe, one of his Friends would have expoſed to periſh (*q*): an amiable Proof of the poor old Man's Good-nature, and Diſapprobation, it is to be hoped, of that ſhocking, yet common Inſtance of Heathen Blindneſs and Barbarity.

In this extreme Poverty, a Cripple, unattended, and deſtitute of almoſt every Convenience of Life, *Epictetus* was not only obliged by the Rules of his Philoſophy to think himſelf happy, but actually did ſo, according to the Diſtich of which *Aulus Gellius* affirms him to have been the Author (*r*).

A Slave, in Body maim'd, as Irus (*s*) *poor;*
Yet to the Gods was Epictetus *dear.*

He is ſaid to have returned to *Rome* in the Reign of *Adrian*, and to have been treated by him with a high Degree of Familiarity (*t*). If this be true, he lived to a great Age. But that he ſhould continue alive, to the Time of *M. Antoninus*, as *Themiſtius*

(*q*) SIMPLIC. Com. p. 272.
(*r*) A. GELLIUS, L. II. c. 18.
(*s*) The Name of a Beggar in *Homer*.
(*t*) ÆLII. Spart. ADRIAN. c. 17.

Themiſtius (*u*), and *Suidas* (*w*) affirm, is utterly improbable (*x*), as the learned *Fabricius* obſerves; to whoſe Life of *Epictetus* (*y*) I am greatly indebted. When, or where, he died, is, I think, nowhere mentioned. All Authors agree in bearing Teſtimony to the unblemiſhed Conduct of his Life, and the Uſefulneſs of his Inſtructions. The laſt-named Emperor expreſſes much Obligation to a Friend, who had communicated his Works to him (*z*): and in another Place, he ranks him, not only with *Chryſippus*, but with *Socrates* (*a*). *A. Gellius* calls him the greateſt of the Stoics (*b*): *Origen* affirms, that his Writings had done more Good than *Plato's* (*c*): And *Simplicius* ſays, perhaps by way of indirect Oppoſition to an infinitely better Book, that he who is not influenced by them, is reclaimable by nothing but the Chaſtiſements of another World (*d*). In what manner he inſtructed his Pupils, will be ſeen in the following Treatiſe.

§. 40.

(*u*) Orat. Conſ. ad. *Jovian.* Imp.

(*w*) In Voc.

(*x*) The Reign of *Nero* began *A. D.* 54. of *Adrian*, 117. of *M. Antoninus*, 161.

(*y*) *Bibl. Gr.* Vol. III. p. 257.

(*z*) L. I. §. 7.

(*a*) L. VII. §. 19.

(*b*) *Noct. Att.* L. I. c. 2.

(*c*) Contra *Celſ.* L. VI. §. 2.

(*d*) Com. p. 2.

§. 40. There are ſo many of the Sentiments and Expreſſions of Chriſtianity in it, that one ſhould be ſtrongly tempted to think, that *Epictetus* was acquainted with the New Teſtament, if ſuch a Suppoſition was not highly injurious to his Character. To have known the Contents of that Book, and not to have been led by them into an Enquiry, which muſt have convinced him of their Truth, would argue ſuch an Obſtinacy of Prejudice, as one would not willingly impute to a Mind, which appears ſo well diſpoſed. And, even paſſing over this Conſideration, to have borrowed ſo much from Chriſtianity as he ſeems to have done, without making the leaſt Acknowledgement from whence he received it, would be an Inſtance of Diſingenuity, utterly unworthy of an honeſt Man, and inconſiſtent with his Practice in other Reſpects: for he often quotes, with great Applauſe, the Sentences of many Writers, not of his own Sect. Poſſibly indeed he might, like the other Heathens in general, have a peculiar Contempt of, and Averſion to, Chriſtian Authors, as akin to the *Jews*, and Oppoſers of the eſtabliſhed Worſhip, notwithſtanding thoſe Parts of them, which he muſt approve. But ſtill I hope, his Conformity with the ſacred Writings may be accounted for, without ſuppoſing him acquainted with Chriſtianity, as ſuch. The great Number of its Profeſſors, diſperſed through the *Roman* Empire,

pire, had probably introduced ſeveral of the New Teſtament Phraſes into the popular Language: and the Chriſtian Religion might by that Time have diffuſed ſome Degree of general Illumination; of which many might receive the Benefit, who were ignorant of the Source from whence it proceeded: and *Epictetus* I apprehend to have been of this Number. Several ſtriking Inſtances of this Reſemblance between him and the New Teſtament, have been obſerved in the Notes; and the attentive Reader will find many, which are not mentioned; and may perceive from them, either that the Stoics admired the Chriſtian Language, however they came to the Knowledge of it; or that treating a Subject practically, and with a Feeling of its Force, leads Men to ſuch ſtrong Expreſſions, as we find in Scripture, and ſhould find oftener in the Philoſophers, if they had been more in earneſt: but however, they occur frequently enough to vindicate thoſe, in which the Scriptures abound, from the Contempt and Ridicule of light Minds.

§. 41. *Arrian*, the Diſciple of *Epictetus*, to whom we are obliged for theſe Diſcourſes, was a *Greek* by Birth, but a Senator and Conſul of *Rome*; and an able Commander in War (*m*). He imitated *Xenophon*, both in his Life and Writings; and particularly, in delivering to Poſterity the Converſations

(*m*) FABRICII *Bibl. Gr.* Vol. III. L. IV. c. 8. p. 269, &c.

ons of his Maſter. There were originally Twenty Books of them, beſides the *Enchiridion*, which ſeems to be taken out of them, and an Account of his Life and Death. Very little Order or Method is to be found in them, or was from the Nature of them to be expected. The Connexion is often ſcarcely diſcoverable: a Reference to particular Incidents, long ſince forgotten, at the ſame time that it evidences their Genuineneſs, often renders them obſcure in ſome Places; and the great Corruption of the Text, in others. Yet, under all theſe Diſadvantages, this immethodical Collection is perhaps one of the moſt valuable Remains of Antiquity; and they, who conſult it with any Degree of Attention, can ſcarcely fail of receiving Improvement. Indeed it is hardly poſſible to be inattentive to ſo awakening a Speaker as *Epictetus*. There is ſuch a Warmth and Spirit in his Exhortations; and his good Senſe is enlivened by ſuch a Keenneſs of Wit, and Gaiety of Humour, as render the Study of him, a moſt delightful as well as profitable Entertainment.

§. 42. For this Reaſon it was judged proper, that a Tranſlation of him ſhould be undertaken; there being none, I believe, but of the *Enchiridion*, in any modern Language, excepting a pretty good *French* one, publiſhed about a hundred and fifty Years ago, and ſo extremely ſcarce, that I was unable to procure it, till Mr. *Harris* obligingly lent it me,

me, after I had publiſhed the Propoſals for printing this: which, notwithſtanding the Aſſiſtance given me in the Proſecution of it, hath ſtill, I am ſenſible, great Faults. But they, who will ſee them the moſt clearly, will be the readieſt to excuſe, as they will know beſt the Difficulty of avoiding them. There is one Circumſtance, which, I am apprehenſive, muſt be particularly ſtriking, and poſſibly ſhocking to many, the frequent Uſe of ſome Words in an unpopular Senſe: an Inconvenience, which, however, I flatter myſelf, the Introduction and Notes will, in ſome Degree, remove. In the Tranſlation of technical Terms, if the ſame *Greek* Word had not always been rendered in the ſame manner, at leaſt, when the Propriety of our Language will at all permit it, every new Expreſſion would have been apt to raiſe a new Idea. The Reader, I hope, will pardon, if not approve, the Uncouthneſs, in many Places, of a Tranſlation pretty ſtrictly literal: as it ſeemed neceſſary, upon the whole, to preſerve the original Spirit, the peculiar Turn and characteriſtic Roughneſs of the Author. For elſe, taking greater Liberties would have ſpared me no ſmall Pains.

I have been much indebted to Mr. *Upton's* Edition: by which, many Paſſages, unintelligible before, are cleared up. His Emendations have often aſſiſted me in the Text; and his References furniſhed me with Materials for the Hiſtorical Notes.

A R-

ARRIAN

TO

LUCIUS GELLIUS.

Wiſheth all Happineſs.

I Neither compoſed the Diſcourſes of *Epictetus* in ſuch a manner, as Things of this Nature are commonly compoſed: nor did I myſelf produce them to public View, any more than I compoſed them. But whatever Sentiments I heard from his own Mouth, the very ſame I endeavoured to ſet down in the very ſame Words, as far as poſſible, and preſerve as Memorials for my own Uſe, of his Manner of Thinking, and Freedom of Speech.

Theſe Diſcourſes are ſuch as one Perſon would naturally deliver from his own Thoughts, *extempore*, to another; not ſuch as he would prepare to be read by Numbers afterwards. Yet, notwithſtanding this, I cannot tell how, without

either my Conſent or Knowledge, they have fallen into the Hands of the Public. But it is of little Conſequence to me, if I do not appear an able Writer: and of none to *Epictetus*, if any one treats his Diſcourſes (*a*) with Contempt; ſince it was very evident, even when he uttered them, that he aimed at nothing more than to excite his Hearers to Virtue. If they produce that one Effect, they have in them what, I think, philoſophical Diſcourſes ought to have. And ſhould they fail of it, let the Readers, however, be aſſured, that when *Epictetus* himſelf pronounced them, his Audience could not help being affected in the very Manner he intended they ſhould. If by themſelves they have leſs Efficacy, perhaps it is my Fault, or perhaps it is unavoidable.

Farewel.

(*a*) He means the Compoſition, not the Subject-matter of them.

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THE DISCOURSES OF *EPICTETUS.*

BOOK I.

CHAP. I.

Of the Things which are, and of thoſe which are not, in our own Power.

§. 1. OF other Faculties, you will find no one that contemplates, or conſequently approves or diſapproves, itſelf. How far does the contemplative Power of Grammar extend?

As far as the Judging of Language.

Of Muſic?

As far as Judging of Melody.

Does either of them contemplate itſelf, then? By no means.

Thus, for Inſtance, when you are to write to your Friend, Grammar will tell you what to write: but whether you are to write to your Friend at all, or no, Grammar will not tell you. Thus Muſic, with regard to Tunes: but whether it be proper or improper, at any particular Time, to ſing or play, Muſic will not tell you.

What will tell, then?

That which contemplates both itſelf and all other Things.

And what is that?

The *reaſoning Faculty*: for that alone is found to conſider both itſelf, its Powers, its Value, and likewiſe all the reſt. For what is it elſe that ſays, Gold is beautiful? (for the Gold itſelf does not ſpeak) Evidently that Faculty, which judges of the Appearances of Things (*a*). What elſe diſtinguiſhes Muſic, Grammar, the other Faculties, proves their Uſes, and ſhows their proper Occaſions?

Nothing but this.

§. 2. As it was fit then, this moſt excellent and ſuperior Faculty alone, a right Uſe of the Appearances of Things, the Gods have placed in our own Power; but all other Matters, not in our Power. Was it becauſe they would not? I rather

(*a*) See Introduction, §. 7.

ther think, that if they could, they had granted us theſe too: but they certainly could not. For, placed upon Earth, and confined to ſuch a Body, and to ſuch Companions, how was it poſſible that, in theſe Reſpects, we ſhould not be hindered by Things without us?

§. 3. But what ſays *Jupiter*? "O *Epictetus*, "if it were poſſible, I had made this little Body "and Property of thine free, and not liable to "Hindrance. But now do not miſtake: it is "not thy own, but only a finer Mixture of Clay "(*b*). Since, then, I could not (*c*) give thee this, "I have given thee a certain Portion of myſelf: "this Faculty of exerting the Powers of Purſuit "and Avoidance (*d*), of Deſire and Averſion, "and, in a Word, the Uſe of the Appearances "of Things. Taking Care of this Point, and "making what is thy own to conſiſt in this, thou "wilt never be reſtrained, never be hindered; "thou wilt not groan, wilt not complain, wilt not "flatter any one. How then! Do all theſe Ad-

 "vantages

(*b*) The Sacred Writers alſo mention Man as made of Clay, *Gen.* ii. 7. *Job* x. 9. xxxiii. 6. Η συ λαξων γην ωπλον, πλασας ζωον, xxxviii. 14.

(*c*) One would hope, from the Context, that *Epictetus* is here ſpeaking only of a moral, not a natural Impoſſibility; an Impoſſibility ariſing merely from the preſent Conſtitution of Things. See Introduction, §. 17. See likewiſe B. II. chap. v. §. 5.

(*d*) See Introduction, §. 5.

"vantages ſeem ſmall to thee? Heaven forbid!
"Let them ſuffice thee then, and thank the Gods."

§. 4. But now, when it is in our Power to take Care of *one* Thing, and to apply to *one*, we chuſe rather to take Care of *many*, and to incumber ourſelves with *many*; Body, Property, Brother, Friend, Child, and Slave; and, by this Multiplicity of Incumbrances, we are burdened and weighed down. Thus, when the Weather doth not happen to be fair for ſailing, we ſit ſcrewing ourſelves, and perpetually looking out.—Which Way is the Wind?—North.—What have we to do with that?—When will the Weſt blow?—When itſelf, Friend, or *Æolus* pleaſes; for *Jupiter* has not made *You* Diſpenſer of the Winds, but *Æolus*.

§. 5. What then is to be done?

To make the beſt of what is in our Power, and take the reſt as it naturally happens.

And how is that?

As it pleaſes God.

What, then, muſt *I* be the only one to loſe my Head?

Why, would you have all the World, then, loſe their Heads for your Conſolation? Why are not you willing to ſtretch out your Neck, like *Lateranus* (*e*), when he was commanded by *Nero* to

(*e*) *Plautius Lateranus*, a Conſul elect, was put to Death by the Command of *Nero*, for being privy to the Conſpiracy

to be beheaded? For, ſhrinking a little, after receiving a weak Blow, he ſtretched it out again. And before this, when *Epaphroditus* (*f*), the Freedman of *Nero*, interrogated him about the Conſpiracy; "If I have a Mind to ſay any thing, "replied he, I will tell it to your Maſter."

§. 6. What then ſhould we have at hand upon ſuch Occaſions? Why what elſe but—what is *mine*, and what not *mine*; what is permitted me, and what not.—I muſt die: and muſt I die *groaning* too?—Be fettered. Muſt it be *lamenting* too?—Exiled. And what hinders me, then, but that I may go ſmiling, and chearful, and ſerene?—"Betray a ſecret"—I will not betray it; for this is in my own Power.—"Then I will fetter you."—What do you ſay, Man? Fetter *me*? Your will fetter my *Leg*; but not *Jupiter* himſelf can

Conſpiracy of *Piſo*. His Execution was ſo ſudden, that he was not permitted to take Leave of his Wife and Children; but was hurried into a Place appropriated to the Puniſhment of Slaves, and there killed by the Hand of the Tribune *Statius*. He ſuffered in obſtinate Silence, and without making any Reproach to *Statius*, who was concerned in the ſame Plot for which he himſelf was puniſhed. TACITUS, *L.* XV. *c.* 60.

(*f*) *Epaphroditus* was the Maſter of Requeſts and Freedman of *Nero*, and the Maſter of *Epictetus*. He aſſiſted *Nero* in killing himſelf; for which he was condemned to Death by *Domitian*. SUETONIUS *in vitâ Neronis*, *c.* 49. *Domit. c.* 14.

get the better of my *Choice* (*g*). "I will throw "you into Priſon: I will behead that paltry Body "of yours." Did I ever tell you, that I alone had a Head not liable to be cut off?——Theſe Things ought Philoſophers to ſtudy; theſe ought they daily to write; and in theſe to exerciſe themſelves.

§. 7. *Thraſeas* (*h*) uſed to ſay, "I had rather "be killed To-day, than baniſhed To-morrow." But how did *Rufus* (*i*) anſwer him? "If you "prefer it as a heavier Misfortune, how fooliſh "a Preference! If as a lighter, who has put it "in your Power? Why do not you ſtudy to be "contented with what is allotted you?"

§. 8. Well, and what ſaid *Agrippinus* (*k*), upon this Account? "I will not be a Hindrance to my-"ſelf."

(*g*) See Introduction, §. 9.

(*h*) *Thraſeas Pætus*, a Stoic Philoſopher, put to Death by *Nero*. He was Huſband of *Arria*, ſo well known by that beautiful Epigram in *Martial*. The Expreſſion of *Tacitus* concerning him is remarkable: *After the Murder of ſo many excellent Perſons*, Nero *at laſt formed a Deſire of cutting off Virtue itſelf, by the Execution of* Thraſeas Pætus *and* Bareas Soranus. *L.* xvi. *c.* 21.

(*i*) *Rufus* was a *Tuſcan*, of the Equeſtrian Order, and a Stoic Philoſopher. When *Veſpaſian* baniſhed the other Philoſophers, *Rufus* was alone excepted. UPTON.

(*k*) *Agrippinus* was baniſhed by *Nero*, for no other Crime than the unfortunate Death of his Father, who had been cauſeleſsly killed by the Command of *Tiberius*: and this had furniſhed a Pretence for accuſing him of hereditary Diſloyalty. TACITUS, *L.* xvi. *c.* 28, 29.

"ſelf." Word was brought him, "Your Cauſe "is trying in the Senate."—"Good Luck attend "it.—But it is Eleven o'Clock" (the Hour when he uſed to exerciſe before bathing): "Let us go "to our Exerciſe." When it was over, a Meſſenger tells him, "You are condemned." To Baniſhment, ſays he, or to Death? "To Baniſh-"ment."—What of my Eſtate?—"It is not "taken away." Well then, let us go as far as *Aricia* (*l*), and dine there.

§. 9. This it is to have ſtudied (*m*) what ought to be ſtudied; to have rendered our Deſires and Averſions incapable of being reſtrained, or incurred. I muſt die: if inſtantly, I will die inſtantly; if in a ſhort Time, I will dine firſt; and when the Hour comes, then I will die. How? As becomes one who reſtores what is not his own.

(*l*) *Aricia*, a Town about ſixteen Miles from *Rome*, which lay in his Road to Baniſhment.

(*m*) This chearful Readineſs for Death, whenever appointed by Providence, is noble in a Chriſtian, to whom dying is taking Poſſeſſion of Happineſs. But in Stoics, who ſeem to form no Hope beyond the Grave, it had ſurely more Inſenſibility than true Bravery, and was indeed contrary to Nature.

CHAP. II.

In what Manner, upon every Occaſion, to preſerve our Character.

§. 1. TO a reaſonable Creature, that alone is inſupportable which is unreaſonable: but every thing reaſonable may be ſupported. Stripes are not naturally inſupportable.—"How "ſo?"—See how the *Spartans* (*a*) bear whipping, after they have learned that it is a reaſonable Thing. Hanging is not inſupportable: for, as ſoon as a Man has taken it into his Head that it is reaſonable, he goes and hangs (*b*) himſelf. In ſhort we ſhall find by Obſervation, that no Creature is oppreſſed ſo much by any thing, as by what is unreaſonable; nor, on the other hand, attracted

(*a*) The *Spartans*, to make a Trial of the Fortitude of their Children, uſed to have them publickly whipt at the Altar of *Diana*; and often with ſo much Severity, that they expired. The Boys ſupported this Exerciſe with ſo much Conſtancy, as never to cry out, nor even groan. UPTON *from* Cicero, &c.

(*b*) The Suppoſition made by *Epictetus*, that it may be reaſonable, ſometimes, for Perſons to kill themſelves, is a ſtrong and alarming Inſtance of the great Neceſſity of being careful, not only in *general* to form juſt and diſtinct Ideas of reaſonable and unreaſonable, but to apply them properly to *particular* Subjects; ſince ſuch a Man as He, failed in ſo important a Caſe, at the very Time when he was giving Cautions to others.

attracted to any thing ſo ſtrongly, as to what is reaſonable.

§. 2. But it happens that different Things are *reaſonable* and *unreaſonable*, as well as good and bad, advantageous and diſadvantageous, to different Perſons. On this Account, chiefly, we ſtand in need of a liberal Education, to teach us, to adopt the Preconceptions of reaſonable and unreaſonable to particular Caſes, conformably to Nature. But to judge of reaſonable, and unreaſonable, we make uſe not only of a due Eſtimation of Things without us, but of what relates to each Perſon's particular Character. Thus, it is reaſonable for one Man to ſubmit to a dirty (*c*) diſgraceful Office, who conſiders this only, that if he does not ſubmit to it, he ſhall be whipt, and loſe his Dinner; but if he does, that he has nothing hard or diſagreeable to ſuffer: whereas to another it appears inſupportable, not only to ſubmit to ſuch an Office himſelf, but to bear with any one elſe who does. If you aſk me, then, whether you ſhall do this dirty Office or not, I will tell you, it is a more valuable Thing to get a Dinner, than not; and a greater Diſgrace to be whipt, than not to be whipt: ſo that, if you meaſure yourſelf by theſe Things, go and do your Office.

(*c*) The Tranſlation here gives only the general Senſe, as a more particular Deſcription would be ſcarcely ſupportable in our Language.

" Ay, but this is not ſuitable to my Cha-
" racter."

It is *You* who are to conſider that, not *I*: for it is you who know yourſelf, what Value you ſet upon yourſelf, and at what Rate you ſell yourſelf: for different People ſell themſelves at different Prices.

§. 3. Hence *Agrippinus* (*d*), when *Florus* was conſidering whether he ſhould go to *Nero*'s Shows, ſo as to perform ſome Part in them himſelf, bid him go.—" But why do not *you* go then?" ſays *Florus*. " Becauſe, replied *Agrippinus*, *I* do not " deliberate about it." For he who once ſets himſelf about ſuch Conſiderations, and goes to calculating the Worth of external Things, approaches very near to thoſe who forget their own Character. For, why do you aſk me whether Death or Life be the more eligible? I anſwer, Life. Pain or Pleaſure? I anſwer, Pleaſure.—" But if I do not act a Part, I ſhall loſe my " Head."—Go and act it then, but *I* will not. —" Why?"—Becauſe you eſteem yourſelf only as one Thread of many that make up the Piece. —" What then?"—You have nothing to care for, but how to be like the reſt of Mankind, as one Thread deſires not to be diſtinguiſhed from the

(*d*) *Nero* was remarkably fond of Theatrical Entertainments; and uſed to introduce upon the Stage the Deſcendants of noble Families, whom Want had rendered venal. TACITUS, *L.* xiv. *c.* 14.

the others. But *I* would be the Purple (*e*), that ſmall and ſhining Thing, which gives a Luſtre and Beauty to the reſt. Why do you bid me reſemble the Multitude then? At that Rate, how ſhall I be the Purple?

§. 4. This *Priſcus Helvidius* (*f*) too ſaw, and acted accordingly: for when *Veſpaſian* had ſent to forbid his going to the Senate, he anſwered, "It is in your Power to prevent my continuing "a Senator; but while I am one, I muſt go."— "Well then, at leaſt be ſilent there."—"Do "not aſk my Opinion, and I will be ſilent."— "But I muſt aſk it."—"And I muſt ſpeak what "appears to me to be right."—"But if you do, "I will put you to Death."—"Did I ever tell "you that I was immortal? You will do your "Part, and I mine: It is yours to kill, and mine "to die intrepid; yours to baniſh me, mine to "depart untroubled."

§. 5. What Good, then, did *Priſcus* do, who was but a ſingle Perſon? Why, what Good does

(*e*) An Alluſion to the Purple Border, which diſtinguiſhed the Dreſs of the *Roman* Nobility.

(*f*) *Helvidius Priſcus* was no leſs remarkable for his Learning and Philoſophy, than for the Sanctity of his Manners and the Love of his Country. He behaved however with too much Haughtineſs, on ſeveral Occaſions, to *Veſpaſian*, who ſentenced him to Death with great Reluctance, and even forbad the Execution, when it was too late. SUETON. *in Veſp.* §. 15.

the Purple do to the Garment? What, but the being a ſhining Character in himſelf (*g*), and ſetting a good Example to others? Another, perhaps, if in ſuch Circumſtances *Cæſar* had forbidden his going to the Senate, would have anſwered, "I am obliged to you for excuſing me." But ſuch a one he would not have forbidden to go: well knowing, that he would either ſit like a Statue; or, if he ſpoke, he would ſay what he knew to be agreeable to *Cæſar*, and would overdo it, by adding ſtill more.

§. 6. Thus acted even a Wreſtler, who was in Danger of Death, unleſs he conſented to an ignominious Amputation. His Brother, who was a Philoſopher, coming to him, and ſaying, "Well, Brother, what do you deſign to do? "Let us cut away this morbid Part, and return "again to the Field." He refuſed, and courageouſly died.

§. 7. When it was aſked, whether he acted thus as a Wreſtler, or a Philoſopher? I anſwer, As a *Man*, ſaid *Epictetus*; but as a Man who had been proclaimed a Champion at the Olympic Games; who had been uſed to ſuch Places, and not exerciſed merely in the School of *Bato* (*b*). Another

(*g*) Αυτω in the Original refers to ιματιω; but the Figure would have appeared harſh in the Tranſlation.

(*b*) *Bato* was a famous Maſter of the Olympic Exerciſes. UPTON.

Another would have had his very Head cut off, if he could have lived without it. This is that Regard to Character, ſo powerful with thoſe who are accuſtomed to introduce it, from their own Breaſts, into their Deliberations.

§. 8. "Come now, *Epictetus*, take off your "Beard (*i*)."—If I am a Philoſopher, I anſwer, I will not take it off.—"Then I will take off "your Head."—If that will do you any Good, take it off.

§. 9. It was aſked, How ſhall each of us perceive what belongs to his Character? Whence, replied *Epictetus*, does a Bull, when the Lion approaches, perceive his own Qualifications (*k*), and expoſe himſelf alone for the whole Herd? It is evident, that with the Qualifications, occurs, at the ſame time, the Conſciouſneſs of being indued with them. And in the ſame manner, whoever of Us hath ſuch Qualifications, will not be ignorant of them. But neither is a Bull, nor a gallant-ſpirited Man, formed all at once. We are to exerciſe and qualify ourſelves, and not to run raſhly upon what doth not concern us.

§. 10.

(*i*) *Domitian* ordered all the Philoſophers to be baniſhed. To avoid this Inconvenience, thoſe who had a Mind to diſguiſe their Profeſſion, took off their Beards. UPTON.

(*k*) This Term was uſed, among the Stoics, to expreſs the natural or acquired Powers neceſſary to the Performance of any Action.

§. 10. Only consider at what Price you sell your own Will and Choice, Man (*l*): if for nothing else, that you may not sell it for a Trifle. Greatness indeed, and Excellence, perhaps belong to others, to such as *Socrates*.

Why then, as we are born with a like Nature, do not all, or the greater Number, become such as he?

Why, are all Horses swift? Are all Dogs sagacious? What then, because Nature hath not befriended me, Shall I neglect all Care of myself? Heaven forbid! *Epictetus* is inferior to *Socrates* (*m*); but if superior to —— this is enough for me. I shall never be *Milo*, and yet I do not neglect my Body;

(*l*) See Introduction, §. 9.

(*m*) This is a difficult Place. The Text, as it stands now, is Επικτητος χρεισσων Σωκρατου ουκ εςιν· ει δε μη, ου χειρων· τουτο μοι ικανον εςιν. Which must be translated, Epictetus *is not superior to* Socrates: *But if not, he is not inferior*; *and this is enough for me*. By a Change in the Pointing, it might perhaps be translated, *but if he is not inferior, this is enough for me*. And sometimes the Stoics considered themselves as not inferior to the Deity. See Lib. I. c. xii. §. 2. But neither of these Renderings makes a proper Connexion: I have therefore adventured to suppose, that χρεισσων and χειρων have changed Places; that ουκ hath arisen from a casual Repetition of the two last Letters of Σωκρατου; and that μη ου is the Remainder of some proper Name: perhaps Μελητου, as he was one of the Accusers of *Socrates*: which cannot now be known. This will give the Sense which I have expressed, and it is the only unexceptionable one that I can find.

Body; nor *Cræſus*, and yet I do not neglect my Property: nor, in general, do we omit the Care of any thing belonging to us, from a Deſpair of arriving at the higheſt Degree of Perfection.

CHAP. III.

How, from the Doctrine that God is the Father of Mankind, we may proceed to its Conſequences.

§. 1. IF a Perſon could be perſuaded of this Principle as he ought, that we are all originally deſcended from God, and that he is the Father of Gods and Men; I conceive he never would think meanly or degenerately concerning himſelf. Suppoſe *Cæſar* were to adopt you, there would be no bearing your haughty Looks: and will you not be elated on knowing yourſelf to be the Son of *Jupiter?* Yet, in fact, we are not elated. But having two Things in our Compoſition, intimately united, a Body in common with the Brutes, and Reaſon and Sentiment in common with the Gods; many incline to this unhappy and mortal Kindred, and only ſome few to the divine and happy one. And, as of Neceſſity every one muſt treat each particular Thing, according to the Notions he forms about it; ſo thoſe few, who ſuppoſe, that they are made for Fidelity, Decency, and a well-grounded Uſe of the Appearances of Things,

never think meanly or degenerately concerning themſelves. But with the Multitude the Caſe is contrary: "For what am I? A poor contemp-"tible Man, with this miſerable Fleſh of mine!" Miſerable indeed. But you have likewiſe ſomething better than this paultry Fleſh. Why then, overlooking *that*, do you pine away in Attention to *this?*

§. 2. By means of this [animal] Kindred, ſome of us, deviating towards it, become like Wolves, faithleſs, and inſidious, and miſchievous: others, like Lions, wild, and ſavage, and untamed: but moſt of us Foxes, and Wretches even among Brutes. For what elſe is a ſlanderous and ill-natured Man, than a Fox, or ſomething yet more wretched and mean? See then, and take heed, that you do not become ſuch Wretches.

CHAP. IV.

Of Improvement.

§. 1. HE who is entering on a State of Improvement, having learnt from the Philoſophers, that the Object of Deſire is Good, of Averſion, Evil; and having learnt too, that Proſperity and Eaſe are no otherwiſe attainable by Man, than in not being diſappointed of his Deſire, nor incurring his Averſion: ſuch an one removes totally from

from himſelf, and poſtpones Deſire (*a*), and applies Averſion only to Things dependent on Choice. For if he ſhould be averſe to Things independent on Choice; he knows, that he muſt ſometimes incur his Averſion, and be unhappy. Now if Virtue promiſes Happineſs, Proſperity, and Eaſe; then, an Improvement in Virtue is certainly an Improvement in each of theſe. For to whatever Point the Perfection of any thing abſolutely brings us, Improvement is always an Approach towards it.

§. 2. How happens it then, that when we confeſs Virtue to be ſuch, yet we ſeek, and make an oſtentatious Show of Improvement in other Things? What is the Buſineſs of Virtue?

A proſperous Life.

Who is in a State of Improvement then? He who hath read the many Treatiſes of *Chryſippus* (*b*)? Why, doth Virtue conſiſt in having read *Chryſippus* through? If it doth, Improvement is confeſſedly nothing elſe than underſtanding a great

(*a*) See *Enchiridion*, c. ii. Note (*b*).

(*b*) *Chryſippus* is called, by *Cicero*, the moſt ſubtile Interpreter of the Stoic Dreams, and the Support of the Portico. He compoſed 705 Volumes; which is not very wonderful, as he was ſo fond of Quotations, that in one of his Pieces he tranſcribed almoſt an entire Play of *Euripides*. His chief Study was Logic, which he carried to a trifling Degree of Subtilty. There is nothing now remaining of his Works but ſome of their Titles. He died about 200 Years

great deal of *Chryſippus*: otherwiſe we confeſs Virtue to produce one Thing; and declare Improvement, which is an Approach to it, to be quite another Thing.

§. 3. This Perſon, ſays one [of you], is already able to read *Chryſippus*, by himſelf. —"Certainly, Sir, you have made a vaſt Improvement!" What Improvement? Why do you ridicule him? Why do you withdraw him from a Senſe of his Misfortunes? Why do not you ſhow him the Buſineſs of Virtue, that he may know where to ſeek Improvement?—Seek it there, Wretch, where your Buſineſs lies. And where doth your Buſineſs lie? In Deſire and Averſion; that you may neither be diſappointed of the one, nor incur the other; in exerting the Powers of Purſuit and Avoidance, that you may not be liable to fail; in Aſſent and Suſpenſe, that you may not be liable to be deceived. The firſt and moſt neceſſary is

Years before the Chriſtian Æra, and was honoured by the *Athenians* with a Statue in the *Ceramicus*. His Death is ſaid to have been occaſioned by an immoderate Fit of Laughing, at ſeeing an Aſs eat Figs. *Chryſippus* deſired the Aſs might have a Glaſs of Wine to waſh them down; and was ſo diverted with his own Conceit, that it coſt him his Life. He is ſaid to have been a very copious and laborious Writer, but obſcure and immoral; though one would be inclined to think, from the Reſpect with which he is mentioned by *Epictetus*, that this latter Accuſation was groundleſs.

is the firſt Topic (*c*). But if you ſeek to avoid incurring your Averſion, trembling and lamenting all the while, at this Rate how do you improve?

§. 4. Show me then your Improvement in this Point. As if I ſhould ſay to a Wreſtler, Show me your Shoulders; and he ſhould anſwer me, "See my Poiſers."——Do you and your Poiſers look to that: I deſire to ſee the Effect of them.

"Take the Treatiſe on the Subject of *the active* "Powers, and ſee how thoroughly I have pe- "ruſed it."

I do not enquire into this, Wretch: but how you exert thoſe Powers; how you manage your Deſires and Averſions, how your Intentions and Purpoſes; how you are prepared for Events, whether conformably or contrary to Nature. If conformably, give me Evidence of that, and I will ſay you improve: if contrary, go your way, and not only comment on theſe Treatiſes, but write ſuch yourſelf; and what Service will it do you? Do not you know that the whole Volume is ſold for Half a Crown? Doth he who comments upon it, then, value himſelf at more than Half a Crown? Never look for your Buſineſs in one Thing, and for Improvement in another.

Where is Improvement, then?

If

(*c*) See Introduction, §. 4, 5, 6.

If any of you, withdrawing himſelf from Externals, turns to his own Faculty of Choice, to exerciſe, and finiſh, and render it conformable to Nature; elevated, free, unreſtrained, unhindered, faithful, decent: if he hath learnt too, that whoever deſires, or is averſe to, Things out of his own Power, can neither be faithful nor free, but muſt neceſſarily be changed and toſſed up and down with them; muſt neceſſarily too be ſubject to others, to ſuch as can procure or prevent what he deſires or is averſe to: if, riſing in the Morning, he obſerves and keeps to theſe Rules; bathes and eats as a Man of Fidelity and Honour; and thus, on every Subject of Action, exerciſes himſelf in his principal Duty; as a Racer, in the Buſineſs of Racing; as a public Speaker, in the Buſineſs of exerciſing his Voice: this is he, who truly improves; this is he, who hath not travelled in vain. But if he is wholly intent on reading Books, and hath laboured that Point only, and travelled (*d*) for that: I bid him go home immediately, and not neglect his domeſtic Affairs; for what he travelled for, is nothing. The only real Thing is, ſtudying how to rid his Life of Lamentation, and Complaint, and *Alas!* and *I am undone*, and Misfortune, and Diſappointment; and to learn what Death, what Exile, what a Priſon,

(*d*) An Alluſion to the antient Cuſtom among Philoſophers, of travelling into foreign Countries, for Improvement.

Priſon, what Poiſon is: that he may be able to ſay in a Priſon, like *Socrates*, "My dear *Crito*; "if it thus pleaſes the Gods, thus let it be;" and not —"Wretched old Man, have I kept "my grey Hairs for this!" Who ſpeaks thus? Do you ſuppoſe I will name ſome mean and deſpicable Perſon? Is it not *Priam* who ſays it? Is it not *Oedipus?* Nay, how many Kings ſay it? For what elſe is Tragedy, but the Sufferings of Men, ſtruck by an Admiration of Externals, repreſented in that Kind of Poetry? If one was to be taught by Fictions, that Externals independent upon Choice are nothing to us; *I*, for my Part, ſhould wiſh for ſuch a Fiction, as that, by which I might live proſperouſly and undiſturbed. What *you* wiſh for, it is *your* Buſineſs to conſider.

§. 5. Of what Service, then, is *Chryſippus* to us?

(*e*) To teach you, that thoſe Things are not falſe, on which Proſperity and Eaſe depend. "Take my Books, and you will ſee, how true "and comformable to Nature thoſe Things are, "which render me eaſy." How great a Happineſs!

(*e*) What ought to be our Diſpoſitions towards Good and Evil, may be learned from Philoſophy: but what that certainly-attainable Good, and that Evil which, without our own Faults, we need never incur, are, Chriſtianity alone can teach. That alone can enable us to unite the Wiſdom, Courage, Dignity, and Compoſure of the Stoics, with the Humility that belongs to our frail Nature, and the various Affections that are inſeparable from Humanity.

neſs! And how great the Benefactor, who ſhows the Way! To *Triptolemus* all Men have raiſed Temples and Altars, becauſe he gave us a milder Kind of Food: but to him who hath diſcovered, and brought to Light, and communicated, the Truth to all (*f*); the Means, not of living, but of living well; who among you ever raiſed an Altar or a Temple, or dedicated a Statue, or who worſhips God on that Account? We offer Sacrifices on the Account of thoſe [Benefactors] who have given us Corn and the Vine; and ſhall we not give Thanks to God, for thoſe who have produced that Fruit in the human Underſtanding, by which they proceed to diſcover to us the true Doctrine of Happineſs?

CHAP.

(*f*) *Epictetus* ſpeaks with great Thankfulneſs to Heaven on the Account of *Chryſippus*, a ſubtile and perplexed Writer, from whoſe Inſtructions, only a few ſtudious abſtracted Perſons could derive any Benefit. How much ſtronger ought to be the Gratitude of thoſe, who are bleſſed with the Knowledge of Him, who hath *brought Life and Immortality to Light* (the Word is the ſame in *Epictetus* and St. *Paul*); who hath rendered the Way to Virtue and to Happineſs not only intelligible, but acceſſible, to all Mankind; and who is Himſelf *the Way, the Truth, and the Life.*

CHAP. V.

Concerning the Academics (*a*).

§. 1. IF any one oppoſes very evident Truths, it is not eaſy to find a Reaſon which may perſuade him, to alter his Opinion. This ariſes neither from his own Strength, nor from the Weakneſs of his Teacher: but when, after being driven upon an Abſurdity, he becomes petrified, how ſhall we deal with him any longer by Reaſon?

§. 2. Now there are two Sorts of Petrifaction: The one, a Petrifaction of the Underſtanding; the other, of the Senſe of Shame, when a Perſon hath obſtinately ſet himſelf not to aſſent to evident Truths, nor to quit the Defence of Contradictions. We all dread a bodily Mortification; and would make uſe of every Contrivance to avoid it: but none of us is troubled about a Mortification in the Soul. And yet, indeed, even with regard to the Soul, when a Perſon is ſo affected, as not to apprehend or underſtand any thing, we think him in a ſad Condition: but where the Senſe of Shame

(*a*) The Academics held, that there is nothing to be known; that we have not Faculties to diſtinguiſh between Truth and Falſhood; and their Cuſtom was neither to affirm nor deny any thing.

Shame and Modeſty is under an abſolute Mortification, we go ſo far, as even to call *this*, Strength of Mind (*b*).

§. 3. Are you certain that you are awake?—"I am not (replies ſuch a Perſon): for neither "am I certain, when, in dreaming, I appear to "myſelf to be awake."—Is there no Difference, then, between theſe Appearances?—"None."—Shall I argue with this Man any longer? For what Steel or what Cauſtic can I apply, to make him ſenſible of his Mortification? He is ſenſible of it: and pretends not to be ſo. He is even worſe than dead. Doth not he ſee the Repugnancy of contradictory Propoſitions? He ſees it; and is never the better. He is neither moved, nor improves. Nay, he is in a yet worſe Condition: his Senſe of Shame and Modeſty is utterly extirpated. His reaſoning Faculty indeed is not extirpated; but turned wild and ſavage. Shall I call *this*, Strength of Mind? By no Means: unleſs we allow it be ſuch in the vileſt Debauchées, publicly to ſpeak and act whatever comes into their Heads.

CHAP.

(*b*) A Sceptic was held to be an *Eſprit fort*.

CHAP. VI.

Of Providence.

§. 1. FROM every Event that happens in the World, it is eaſy to celebrate Providence, if a Perſon hath but theſe two Circumſtances in himſelf; a Faculty of conſidering what happens to each Individual, and a grateful Temper. Without the firſt, he will not perceive the Uſefulneſs of Things which happen: and without the other, he will not be thankful for them. If God had made Colours, and had not made the Faculty of ſeeing them, what would have been their Uſe?

None.

On the contrary, if he had made the Faculty, without ſuch Objects as fall under its Obſervation, what would have been the Uſe of that?

None.

Again: If he had formed both the Faculty and the Objects, but had not made Light?

Neither in that Caſe would they have been of any Uſe.

§. 2. Who is it then that hath fitted each of theſe to the other? Who is it that hath fitted the Sword to the Scabbard, and the Scabbard to the Sword? Is it no one? From the very Conſtruc-

tion of a complete Work, we are uſed to declare poſitively, that it muſt be the Operation of ſome Artificer, and not the Effect of mere Chance. Doth every ſuch Work, then, demonſtrate an Artificer; and do not viſible Objects, and the Senſe of Seeing, and Light, demonſtrate one? Doth not the Difference of the Sexes, and their Inclination to each other, and the Uſe of their ſeveral Powers; do not theſe Things, neither, demonſtrate an Artificer?

Moſt certainly they do.

§. 3. But farther: This Conſtitution of Underſtanding, by which we are not ſimply impreſſed by ſenſible Objects; but take and ſubtract from them; and add and compoſe ſomething out of them; and paſs from ſome to others abſolutely remote (*a*): Is not all this, neither, ſufficient to prevail on ſome Men, and make them aſhamed of leaving an Artificer out of their Scheme? If not, let them explain to us what it is that effects each of theſe; and how it is poſſible that Things ſo wonderful, and which carry ſuch Marks of Contrivance, ſhould come to paſs ſpontaneouſly, and without Deſign.

What, then, do theſe Things come to paſs for *our* Service only?

Many

(*a*) The Tranſlation follows ουδαμως in Mr. *Upton's Addenda*.

Many for *ours* only; ſuch as are peculiarly neceſſary for a reaſonable Creature: but you will find many, common to us with mere Animals.

Then, do *they* too underſtand what happens?

Not at all: For Uſe is one Affair, and Underſtanding another. But God had Need of Animals, to make Uſe of the Appearances of Things (*b*); and of Us to *underſtand* that Uſe. It is ſufficient, therefore, for them to eat, and drink, and ſleep, and continue their Species, and perform other ſuch Offices as belong to each of them: but to *us*, to whom he hath given likewiſe a Faculty of Underſtanding, theſe Offices are not ſufficient. For if we do not act in a proper and orderly Manner, and ſuitably to the Nature and Conſtitution of each Thing; we ſhall no longer attain our End. For where the Conſtitution of Beings is different, their Offices and Ends are different likewiſe. Thus where the Conſtitution is adapted only to Uſe, there Uſe is alone ſufficient: But where Underſtanding is added to Uſe, unleſs that too be duly exerciſed, the End of ſuch a Being will never be attained.

§. 4. Well then: each of the Animals is conſtituted either for Food, or Huſbandry, or to produce Milk; and the reſt of them for ſome other like Uſe: and for theſe Purpoſes what need is there of *underſtanding* the Appearances of Things,

(*b*) See Introduction, §. 7.

and being able to make Diſtinctions concerning them? But God hath introduced *Man*, as a Spectator of Himſelf, and of his Works; and not only as a Spectator, but an Interpreter of them. It is therefore ſhameful that *Man* ſhould begin, and end, where irrational Creatures do. He is indeed rather to begin there, but to end where Nature itſelf hath fixt our End; and that is in Contemplation, and Underſtanding, and in a Scheme of Life conformable to Nature.

§. 5. Take care, then, not to die without being Spectators of theſe Things. You take a Journey to *Olympia* to behold the Work (*c*) of *Phidias*, and each of you thinks it a Misfortune to die without a Knowledge of ſuch Things: and will you have no Inclination to underſtand, and be Spectators of thoſe Works, for which there is no need to take a Journey; but which are ready and at hand, even to thoſe who beſtow no Pains (*d*)! Will you never perceive, then, either what you are, or for what you were born; nor for what Purpoſe you are admitted Spectators of this Sight?

But there are ſome Things unpleaſant and difficult, in Life.

And

(*c*) The famous Statue of *Jupiter Olympius*.

(*d*) The Tranſlation follows a conjectural Emendation of Mr. *Upton*'s on this Paſſage.

And are there none at *Olympia*? Are not you heated? Are not you crouded? Are not you without good Conveniencies for bathing (*e*)? Are not you wet through, when it happens to rain? Do not you bear Uproar, and Noiſe, and other diſagreeable Circumſtances? But I ſuppoſe, by comparing all theſe with the Advantage of ſeeing ſo valuable a Sight, you ſupport and go through them. Well: and [in the preſent Caſe] have not you received Faculties by which you may ſupport every Event? Have not you received Greatneſs of Soul? Have not you received a manly Spirit? Have not you received Patience? What ſignifies to me any thing that happens, while I have a Greatneſs of Soul? What ſhall diſconcert or trouble or appear grievous to me? Shall I not make Uſe of my Faculties, to that Purpoſe for which they were granted me; but lament and groan at what happens?

§. 6. Oh, but my Noſe (*f*) runs.

And what have you Hands for, Beaſt, but to wipe it?

But was there then any good Reaſon, that there ſhould be ſuch a dirty Thing in the World?

(*e*) It was one Part of the Elegance of thoſe Times, to bathe every Day.

(*f*) *Epictetus* probably introduces this ridiculous Complaint, in order to intimate, that others commonly made are little leſs ſo. See *M. Antoninus*, l. viii. §. 50. of *Gataker*'s Edition and the *Glaſgow* Tranſlation.

And how much better is it that you ſhould wipe your Noſe, than complain? Pray, what Figure do you think *Hercules* would have made, if there had not been ſuch a Lion, and a Hydra, and a Stag, and unjuſt and brutal Men; whom he expelled and cleared away? And what would he have done, if none of theſe had exiſted? Is it not plain, that he muſt have wrapt himſelf up and ſlept? In the firſt Place, then, he would never have become a *Hercules*, by ſlumbering away his whole Life in ſuch Delicacy and Eaſe: or if he had, what Good would it have done? What would have been the Uſe of his Arm, and the reſt of his Strength; of his Patience, and Greatneſs of Mind; if ſuch Circumſtances and Subjects of Action had not rouſed and exerciſed him?

What then muſt we provide theſe Things for ourſelves; and introduce a Boar, and a Lion, and a Hydra, into our Country?

This would be Madneſs and Folly. But as they were in being, and to be met with, they were proper Subjects to ſet off and exerciſe *Hercules*. Do *you* therefore likewiſe, being ſenſible of this, inſpect the Faculties you have: and after taking a View of them, ſay, "Bring on me now, O "*Jupiter*, what Difficulty thou wilt, for I have "Faculties granted me by Thee, and Abilities "by which I may acquire Honour and Ornament

"to

"to myſelf."—No: but you ſit trembling, for fear this or that ſhould happen: and lamenting, and mourning, and groaning at what doth happen; and then you accuſe the Gods. For what is the Conſequence of ſuch a Meanſpiritedneſs, but Impiety? And yet God hath not only granted theſe Faculties, by which we may bear every Event, without being depreſſed or broken by it; but, like a good Prince, and a true Father, hath rendered them incapable of Reſtraint, Compulſion, or Hindrance, and intirely dependent on our own Pleaſure: nor hath he reſerved a Power, even to himſelf, of hindering or reſtraining them. Having theſe Things free, and your own, will you make no Uſe of them, nor conſider what you have received, nor from whom? But ſit groaning and lamenting, ſome of you, blind to him who gave them, and not acknowledging your Benefactor; and others, baſely turning yourſelves to Complaints and Accuſations of God? Yet I undertake to ſhow you, that you have Qualifications and Occaſions for Greatneſs of Soul, and a manly Spirit: but what Occaſions you have to find Fault, and complain, do *you* ſhow me.

CHAP. VII.

Of the Uſe of convertible and hypothetical Propoſitions, and the like.

§. 1. IT (*a*) is a Secret to the Vulgar, that the Practice of convertible, and hypothetical, and interrogatory Arguments, and, in general, of all other logical Forms, hath any Relation to the Duties of Life. For, in every Subject of Action, the Queſtion is, how a wiſe and good Man may find a Way of extricating himſelf, and a Method of Behaviour conformable to his Duty upon the Occaſion. Let them ſay, therefore, either that the Man of Virtue will not engage in Queſtions and Anſwers; or that, if he doth, he will not think it worth his Care whether he behaves raſhly and at hazard in queſtioning and anſwering: or if they allow neither of theſe; it is neceſſary to confeſs, that ſome Examination ought to be made of thoſe Topics, in which the Affair of Queſtion and Anſwer is principally concerned. For what is the Profeſſion of Reaſoning? To lay down true Poſitions; to reject falſe ones; and to ſuſpend the Judgment in doubtful ones. Is it enough,

(*a*) It is but fair to warn the Reader, that little Entertainment is to be expected from this Chapter, which is wholly logical.

enough, then, to have learned merely this? It is enough, ſay you.—Is it enough, then, for him who would not commit any Miſtake in the Uſe of Money, merely to have heard, that we are to receive the good Pieces, and to reject the bad?—This is not enough:—What muſt be added beſides?—That Faculty which tries and diſtinguiſhes what Pieces are good, what bad.—Therefore, in Reaſoning too, what hath been already ſaid is not enough: but it is neceſſary that we ſhould be able to prove and diſtinguiſh between the true, and the falſe, and the doubtful.—It is neceſſary.

§. 2. And what farther is profeſſed in Reaſoning?—To admit the Conſequence of what you have properly granted.—Well: and here, too, is the mere Knowing this enough?—It is not; but we muſt learn how ſuch a Thing is the Conſequence of ſuch another; and when one Thing follows from one Thing, and when from many Things in common. Is it not moreover neceſſary, that he, who would behave ſkilfully in Reaſoning, ſhould both himſelf demonſtrate whatever he delivers, and be able to comprehend the Demonſtrations of others; and not be deceived by ſuch as ſophiſticate, as if they were demonſtrating. Hence, then, the Employment and Exerciſe of concluding Arguments and Figures ariſes; and appears to be neceſſary.

§. 3. But it may poſſibly happen, that from the Premiſes which we have properly granted, there ariſes ſome Conſequence, which, though falſe, is nevertheleſs a Conſequence. What then ought I to do? To admit a Falſehood?—And how is that poſſible?—Well: or to ſay that my Conceſſions were not properly made?—But neither is this allowed—Or that the Conſequence doth not ariſe from the Premiſes?—Nor is even this allowed.—What then is to be done in the Caſe?—Is it not this? As the having once borrowed Money, is not enough to make a a Perſon a Debtor, unleſs he ſtill continues to owe Money, and hath not paid it: ſo the having granted the Premiſes, is not enough to make it neceſſary to grant the Inference, unleſs we continue our Conceſſions. If the Premiſes continue to the End, ſuch as they were when the Conceſſions were made, it is abſolutely neceſſary to continue the Conceſſions, and to admit what follows from them. But if the Premiſes do not continue ſuch as they were when the Conceſſion was made, it is abſolutely neceſſary to depart from the Conceſſion, and admit [rather the contrary: I mean] what doth not (*b*) follow from the

(*b*) The Paſſage ſeems to require that αναακολυθον ſhould be ακολυθον; *We are to depart from the Conceſſion, and admit what follows from the Argument itſelf.* The Meaning I apprehend

the Argument itſelf. For this Inference is no Conſequence of ours, nor belongs to us, when we have departed from the Conceſſion of the Premiſes. We ought then to examine theſe Kinds of Premiſes, and their Changes and Converſions, on which any one, by laying hold, either in the Queſtion itſelf, or in the Anſwer, or in the ſyllogiſtical Concluſion, or in any other thing of that ſort, gives an Occaſion to the Unthinking of being diſconcerted, not foreſeeing the Conſequence. — Why ſo? — That in this Topic we may not behave contrary to our Duty, nor with Confuſion.

§. 4. The ſame Thing is to be obſerved in Hypotheſes and hypothetical Arguments. For it is ſometimes neceſſary to require ſome Hypotheſis to be granted, as a kind of Step to the reſt of the Argument. Is every given Hypotheſis then to be granted, or not every one; and if not every one, which? And is he who has granted an Hypotheſis, for ever to abide by it? Or is he ſometimes to depart from it, and admit only Conſequences, but not to admit Contradictions? — Ay: but a Perſon may ſay, on your admitting

apprehend to be, that if, in the Courſe of an Argument, our Opponent ſophiſtically alters the State of the Queſtion on which our Conceſſions were founded, it is lawful to revoke thoſe Conceſſions; and admit no Conſequence but what is fairly drawn from the Argument itſelf.

the Hypotheſis of a Poſſibility, I will drive you upon an Impoſſibility. With ſuch a one as this, ſhall the Man of Prudence not engage; but avoid all Examination and Converſation with him? —And yet who, beſides the Man of Prudence, is capable of treating an Argument, or who beſides is ſagacious in Queſtions and Anſwers, and incapable of being deceived and impoſed on by Sophiſtry?—Or will he indeed engage, but without regarding whether he behaves raſhly and at hazard in the Argument?—Yet how then can he be ſuch a one, as we are ſuppoſing him? But, without ſome ſuch Exerciſe and Preparation, is it poſſible for him to preſerve himſelf conſiſtent? Let them ſhew this: and all theſe Theorems will be ſuperfluous and abſurd, and unconnected with our Idea of the virtuous Man. Why then are we ſtill indolent, and ſlothful, and ſluggiſh, ſeeking Pretences of avoiding Labour? Shall we not be watchful to render Reaſon itſelf accurate?—"But ſuppoſe, after all, I ſhould "make a Miſtake in theſe Points:" have I killed a Father?—Wretch! why, in this Caſe, where had you a Father to kill? What is it then that you have done? The only Fault that you could commit, in this Inſtance, you have committed. This very Thing I myſelf ſaid to *Rufus*, when he reproved me, for not finding ſomething that was omitted in ſome Syllogiſm. Why, ſaid I,

have

have I burnt the Capitol then? Wretch! anſwered he, was the Thing here omitted the Capitol? Or are there no other Faults, but burning the Capitol, or killing a Father? and is it no Fault to treat the Appearances preſented to our Minds raſhly, and vainly, and at hazard; not to comprehend a Reaſon, nor a Demonſtration, nor a Sophiſm; nor, in ſhort, to ſee what is for, or againſt one's ſelf in a Queſtion or Anſwer? Is nothing of all this any Fault?

CHAP. VIII.

That Faculties are not ſafe to the Uninſtructed.

§. 1. IN as many Ways as equivalent Syllogiſms may be varied, in ſo many may the Forms of Arguments, and Enthymemas, be varied likewiſe. As for Inſtance: *If you had borrowed, and not paid, you owe me Money. But you have not borrowed, and not paid; therefore you do not owe me Money.* To perform this ſkilfully, belongs to no one more than to a Philoſopher. For if an Enthymema be an imperfect Syllogiſm; he who is exerciſed in a perfect Syllogiſm, muſt be equally ready at an imperfect one.

(*a*) Why then do not we exerciſe ourſelves and others, after this Manner?

Becauſe,

(*a*) This is ſpoken by one of the Audience.

Becauſe, even now, though we are not exerciſed in theſe Things, nor diverted, by me, at leaſt, from the Study of Morality; yet we make no Advances in Virtue. What is to be expected then if we ſhould add this Avocation too? Eſpecially, as it would not only be an Avocation from more neceſſary Studies, but likewiſe a capital Occaſion of Conceit and Inſolence. For the Faculty of arguing, and of perſuaſive Reaſoning is great; and, particularly, if it be much laboured, and receive an additional Ornament from Rhetoric. For, in general, every Faculty is dangerous to weak and uninſtructed Perſons; as being apt to render them arrogant and elated. For by what Method can one perſuade a young Man, who excells in theſe Kinds of Study, that he ought not to be an Appendix to *them*, but they to *him?* Will he not trample upon all ſuch Advice; and walk about elated, and puffed up, not bearing any one ſhould touch him, to put him in mind, where he is wanting, and in what he goes wrong.

What then, was not *Plato* a Philoſopher?

Well, and was not *Hippocrates* a Phyſician? Yet you ſee [how elegantly] he expreſſes himſelf. But is it in Quality of Phyſician, then, that he expreſſes himſelf ſo? Why do you confound Things, accidentally united, from different Cauſes, in the ſame Men? If *Plato* was handſome and well-made, muſt I too ſet myſelf to endeavour at becoming

becoming handſome and well-made; as if this was neceſſary to Philoſophy, becauſe a certain Perſon happened to be at once handſome and a Philoſopher? Why will you not perceive and diſtinguiſh what are the Things, that make Men Philoſophers, and what belong to them on other Accounts? Pray, if I (*b*) were a Philoſopher, would it be neceſſary, that you ſhould be lame too?

§. 2. What then? Do I reject theſe Faculties? By no Means. For neither do I reject the Faculty of Seeing. But if you aſk me, what is the Good of Man; I have nothing elſe to ſay to you, but that it is a certain Regulation of the Choice, with regard to the Appearances of Things.

CHAP.

(*b*) *Epictetus*, whenever he has Occaſion to mention himſelf, ſpeaks with remarkable Modeſty; and in a Stile very different from that of many of the more ancient Philoſophers; as appears by the ſeveral arrogant Speeches recorded of them by *Diogenes Laertius*, &c. It is probable he might improve in this humble Diſpoſition, by the Character of *Socrates*, which he ſeems particularly to have ſtudied, and admired. Yet other Philoſophers had ſtudied and admired the ſame Character, without profiting by it. Perhaps the ſober and unaſſuming Temper of Chriſtianity might, from the Example of its Profeſſors in thoſe Days, have produced this, and other good Effects, in the Minds of many who knew little, if any thing, of the Goſpel itſelf.

CHAP. IX.

How, from the Doctrine of our Kindred to God, we are to proceed to its Conſequences.

§. 1. IF what Philoſophers ſay of the Kindred between God and Men be true; what has any one to do, but, like *Socrates*, when he is aſked what Countryman he is, never to ſay that he is a Citizen of *Athens*, or of *Corinth*; but of the World? For why do you ſay that you are of *Athens*: and not of that Corner only, where that paultry Body of yours was laid at its Birth? Is it not, evidently, from what is principal, and comprehends not only that Corner, and your whole Houſe; but the general Extent of the Country, from which your Pedigree is derived down to you, that you call yourſelf an *Athenian*, or a *Corinthian*? Why may not he then, who underſtands the Adminiſtration of the World; and has learned that the greateſt, and moſt principal, and comprehenſive, of all Things, is this Syſtem, compoſed of Men and God: and that from Him the Seeds of Being are deſcended, not only to my Father or Grandfather, but to all Things that are produced and born on Earth; and eſpecially to rational Natures, as they alone are qualified to partake of

of a Communication with the Deity, being connected with him by Reaſon: Why may not [ſuch a one] call himſelf a Citizen of the World? Why not a Son of God? And, why ſhall he fear any thing that happens among Men? Shall Kindred to *Cæſar*, or any other of the Great at *Rome*, enable a Man to live ſecure, above Contempt, and void of all Fear whatever: and ſhall not the having God for our Maker, and Father, and Guardian, free us from Griefs and Terrors?

§. 2. "But how ſhall I ſubſiſt? For I have "nothing."

Why, how do Slaves, how do Fugitives? To what do they truſt, when they run away from their Maſters? Is it to their Eſtates? Their Servants? Their Plate? To nothing but themſelves. Yet they do not fail to get Neceſſaries. And muſt a Philoſopher, think you, when he leaves his own Abode, reſt and rely upon others; and not take care of himſelf? Muſt he be more helpleſs and anxious than the brute Beaſts; each of which is ſelf-ſufficient, and wants neither proper Food, nor any ſuitable and natural Proviſion? One would think, there ſhould be no Need for an old Fellow to ſit here contriving, that you may not think meanly, nor entertain low and abject Notions of yourſelves: but that his Buſineſs would be, to take care, that there may not happen to be [among you] young Men of ſuch

a Spirit, that, knowing their Affinity to the Gods; and that we are as it were ſettered by the Body and its Poſſeſſions, and by ſo many other Things as are neceſſary, upon theſe Accounts, for the Œconomy and Commerce of Life; they ſhould reſolve to throw them off, as both troubleſome and uſeleſs, and depart to their Kindred.

§. 3. This is the Work, if any, that ought to employ your Maſter and Preceptor, if you had one: that you ſhould come to him, and ſay; "*Epictetus*, we can no longer bear being tied "down to this paultry Body: feeding and reſting, "and cleaning it, and hurried about with ſo many "low Cares on its Account. Are not theſe Things "indifferent, and nothing to us; and Death no "Evil? Are not we Relations of God: and did "we not come from him? Suffer us to go back "thither from whence we came: ſuffer us, at "length, to be delivered from theſe Fetters, that "chain and weigh us down. Here, Thieves and "Robbers, and Courts of Judicature, and thoſe "who are called Tyrants, ſeem to have ſome "Power over us, on account of the Body and "its Poſſeſſions. Suffer us to ſhow them, that "they have no Power."

§. 4. And in this Caſe it would be my Part to anſwer: "My Friends, wait for God, till he ſhall "give the Signal, and diſmiſs you from this Ser-"vice: then return to him. For the preſent, be "content

"content to remain in this Poſt, where he has "placed you. The Time of your Abode here is "ſhort, and eaſy to ſuch as are diſpoſed like you: "For what Tyrant, what Robber, what Thief, "or what Courts of Judicature are formidable to "thoſe, who thus account the Body, and its "Poſſeſſions, as nothing? Stay. Depart not in-"conſiderately."

§. 5. Thus ought the Caſe to ſtand between a Preceptor and ingenuous young Men. But how ſtands it now? The Preceptor has no Life in him: you have none neither. When you have had enough To-day, you ſit weeping about To-morrow, how you ſhall get Food. Why, if you have it, Wretch, you will have it: if not you will go out of Life. The Door is open: why do you lament: What room doth there remain for Tears? What Occaſion for Flattery? Why ſhould any one Perſon envy another? Why ſhould he be ſtruck with awful Admiration of thoſe who have great Poſſeſſions, or are placed in high Rank, [as is common]? Eſpecially, if they are powerful and paſſionate? For what will they do to us? The Things which *they* can do, *we* do not regard: the Things which *we* are concerned about, *they* cannot do. Who then, after all, ſhall command a Perſon thus diſpoſed? How was *Socrates* affected by theſe Things? As it became one perſuaded of his being a Relation of the Gods.

"If

" If you ſhould tell me (ſays he to his Judges), " we will acquit you, upon Condition that you " ſhall no longer diſcourſe in the Manner you " have hitherto done, nor make any Diſturbance " either among our young or our old People;" I would anſwer; " You are ridiculous in think- " ing, that if your General had placed me in " any Poſt, I ought to maintain and defend it, " and chuſe to die a thouſand times, rather than " deſert it: but that if God hath aſſigned me " any Station or Method of Life, I ought to " deſert *that* for you (*a*)."

§. 6. This it is, for a Man to be truly a Relation of God. But we conſider ourſelves as a mere Aſſemblage of Stomach and Entrails, and bodily Parts. Becauſe we fear, becauſe we deſire; we flatter thoſe who can help us in theſe Matters; we dread the very ſame Perſons.

§. 7. A Perſon deſired me once to write for him to *Rome*. He was one vulgarly eſteemed unfortunate, as he had been formerly illuſtrious and rich, and afterwards ſtript of all his Poſſeſſions, and reduced to live here. I wrote for him in a ſubmiſſive Stile: but, after reading my Letter, he returned it to me, and ſaid: " I wanted " your Aſſiſtance, not your Pity; for no Evil " hath befallen me."

§. 8.

(*a*) Δει ημας ſhould probably be δι ὑμας, and is ſo tranſlated.

§. 8. (*b*) Thus *Rufus*, to try me, uſed to ſay, this or that you will have from your Maſter. When I anſwered him, theſe are [uncertain] human Affairs: Why then, ſays he, ſhould I intercede with him (*c*), when you can receive theſe Things from yourſelf? For what one hath of his own, it is ſuperfluous and vain to receive from another. Shall I then, who can receive Greatneſs of Soul and a manly Spirit from myſelf, receive an Eſtate, or a Sum of Money, or a Place, from you? Heaven forbid! I will not be ſo inſenſible of my own Poſſeſſions. But, if a Perſon is fearful and abject, what elſe is neceſſary, but to write Letters for him as if he was dead. "Pray oblige us with the Corpſe and Blood "of ſuch a one." For, in fact, ſuch a one is Corpſe and Blood; and nothing more. For, if he was any thing more, he would be ſenſible, that one Man is not rendered unfortunate by another.

CHAP.

(*b*) This Paſſage has great Difficulties, which I know not how to ſolve, any otherwiſe than by ſuppoſing ſomething after *ανθρωπινα* to be loſt.

(*c*) The Tranſlator follows Mr. *Upton*'s Conjecture in this Place, and the *French* Verſion agrees with it.

CHAP. X.

Concerning Thoſe who ſtrove for Preferments at Rome.

§. 1. IF we all applied ourſelves as heartily to our proper Buſineſs, as the old Fellows at *Rome* do to their Schemes; perhaps *we* too might make ſome Proficiency. I know a Man older than I am, and who is now Superintendant of Proviſions at *Rome*. When he paſt through this Place, on his Return from Exile, what an Account did he give me of his former Life! and how did he promiſe, that for the future, when he was got back, he would apply himſelf to nothing but how to ſpend the Remainder of his Days in Repoſe and Tranquillity. "For how few have "I now remaining!"—You will not do it, ſaid I. When you are once got within the Smell of *Rome*, you will forget all this: and, if you can but once gain Admittance to Court, you will (*a*) go in, heartily rejoiced, and thank God. "If you ever "find me, *Epictetus*, ſaid he, putting one Foot "into the Court, think of me whatever you "pleaſe." Now, after all, how did he act? Before

(*a*) Εσται probably ſhould be Εισιεναι, and the *French* Tranſlator ſeems to have made and followed the ſame Conjecture.

Before he entered the City, he was met by a Billet from *Cæſar*. On receiving it, he forgot all his former Reſolutions; and has ever ſince been heaping up one Incumbrance upon another. I ſhould be glad now, to have an Opportunity of putting him in mind of his Diſcourſe upon the Road; and of ſaying, how much more clever a Prophet am I than you!

§. 2. What then do I ſay? that Man is made for an inactive Life? No, ſurely. "But why is "not ours a Life of Activity?" For my own part, as ſoon as it is Day, I recollect a little what Things I am to read over again [with my Pupils], and then ſay to myſelf quickly, What is it to me how ſuch a one reads? My chief Point is to get to ſleep.

§. 3. But, indeed, what Likeneſs is there between the Actions of theſe [old Fellows at *Rome*] and ours? If you conſider what it is they do, you will ſee. For about what are they employed the whole Day, but in calculating, contriving, conſulting, about Proviſions; about an Eſtate; or other Emoluments like theſe? Is there any Likeneſs, then, between reading ſuch a Petition from any one, as—"*I intreat you to give me a Permiſſion to export Corn*;" and—"*I intreat you to* "*learn from* Chryſippus, *of what Nature the Ad-* "*miniſtration of the World is; and what Place a* "*reaſonable Creature holds in it. Learn, too, what*

"*you*

" *you yourſelf are*; *and wherein your Good and Evil* " *conſiſts.*" Are theſe Things at all alike? Do they require an equal Degree of Application? And is it as ſhameful to neglect the one as the other (*b*)?

§. 4. Well, then, are we Preceptors the only idle Dreamers? No: but you young Men are ſo firſt, in a greater Degree. And ſo even we old Folks, when we ſee young ones trifling, are tempted to grow fond of trifling with them. Much more, then, if I was to ſee you active and diligent, I ſhould be excited to join with you in ſerious Induſtry.

CHAP. XI.

Of Natural Affection.

§. 1. WHEN one of the great Men came to viſit him; *Epictetus*, having inquired into the Particulars of his Affairs, aſked him, Whether he had a Wife and Children? The other replying, that he had; *Epictetus* likewiſe inquired, In what Manner do you live with them? Very miſerably, ſays he—How ſo? For Men do not marry, and get Children, to be miſerable;

(*b*) This Paſſage has a ſtriking Reſemblance to that in Scripture, where the Children of this World are ſaid to be wiſer in their Generation than the Children of Light.

ſerable; but rather to make themſelves happy.—But, I am ſo very miſerable about my Children, that the other Day, when my Daughter was ſick, and appeared to be in Danger, I could not bear even to be with her; but ran away, till it was told me, that ſhe was recovered.—And pray do you think this was acting right?—It was acting naturally, ſaid he.—Well: do but convince *me* that it was acting naturally, and I will convince *you* that every thing natural is right.—All, or moſt of us Fathers, are affected in the ſame Way.—I do not deny the Fact: but the Queſtion between us is, whether it be right. For, by this Way of Reaſoning, it muſt be ſaid, that Tumours happen for the Good of the Body, becauſe they do happen: and even that Vices are natural, becauſe all, or the moſt Part of us, are guilty of them. Do you ſhow me then, how ſuch a Behaviour as yours, appears to be natural.

I cannot undertake that. But do you rather ſhow me, how it appears to be neither natural, nor right.

If we were diſputing about Black and White, what Criterion muſt we call in, to diſtinguiſh them?

The Sight.

If about Hot and Cold, and Hard and Soft, what?

The Touch.

Well then: when we are debating about Natural and Unnatural, and Right and Wrong; what Criterion are we to take?

I cannot tell.

And yet, to be ignorant of a Criterion of Colours, or of Smells, or Taſtes, might perhaps be no very great Loſs. But do you think, that he ſuffers only a ſmall Loſs, who is ignorant of what is Good and Evil, and Natural and Unnatural, to Man?

No. The very greateſt.

Well: tell me; Are all Things which are judged good and proper by ſome, rightly judged to be ſo? Is it poſſible, that the ſeveral Opinions of *Jews*, and *Syrians*, and *Egyptians*, and *Romans*, concerning Food, [for Inſtance] ſhould all be right?

How can it be poſſible?

I ſuppoſe then, it is abſolutely neceſſary, if the Opinions of the *Egyptians* be right, the others muſt be wrong: if thoſe of the *Jews* be good, all the reſt muſt be bad.

How can it be otherwiſe?

And where Ignorance is, there likewiſe is Want of Learning, and Inſtruction, in neceſſary Points.

It is granted.

Then, as you are ſenſible of this, you will for the future apply to nothing, and think of nothing elſe, but how to acquaint yourſelf with the Criterion

terion of what is agreeable to Nature: and to uſe that, in judging of each particular Caſe.

§. 2. At preſent the Aſſiſtance I have to give you, towards what you deſire, is this. Doth Affection ſeem to you to be a right and a natural Thing (*a*)?

How ſhould it be otherwiſe?

Well: and is Affection natural and right, and Reaſon not ſo?

By no means.

Is there any Oppoſition, then, between Reaſon and Affection?

I think not.

If there was, of two Oppoſites if one be natural, the other muſt neceſſarily be unnatural. Muſt it not?

It muſt.

What we find, then, at once affectionate, and reaſonable, *that* we may ſafely pronounce to be right and good.

Agreed.

Well, then: you will not diſpute, but that to run away, and leave a ſick Child, is contrary to Reaſon. It remains for us to conſider, whether it be conſiſtent with Affection.

Let us conſider it.

(*a*) The Stoics ſay, that wiſe and good Men have the truly natural Affection towards their Children; and that bad Perſons have it not. DIOG. LAERT. L. vii. §. 120.

Did you, then, from an Affection to your Child, do right in running away, and leaving her? Hath her Mother no Affection for the Child?

Yes, ſurely, ſhe hath.

Would it have been right, then, that her Mother too ſhould leave her; or would it not?

It would not.

And doth not her Nurſe love her?

She doth.

Then ought not ſhe likewiſe to leave her?

By no means.

And doth not her Preceptor love her?

He doth.

Then ought not he alſo to have run away, and left her: and ſo the Child to have been left alone, and unaſſiſted, from the great Affection of her Parents, and her Friends; or to die in the Hands of People, who neither loved her, nor took care of her?

Heaven forbid!

But is it not unreaſonable and unjuſt, that what you think right in yourſelf, on the Account of your Affection; ſhould not be allowed to others, who have the very ſame Affection as you?

It is abſurd.

Pray, if you were ſick yourſelf, ſhould you be willing to have your Family, and even your Wife and

and Children, ſo very affectionate, as to leave you helpleſs and alone?

By no means.

Or would you wiſh to be ſo loved by your Friends, as from their exceſſive Affection, always to be left alone when you were ſick? Or would you not rather wiſh, if it were poſſible, to have ſuch a Kind of Affection from your Enemies, as to make them always keep from you? If ſo, it remains, that your Behaviour was by no means affectionate. Well then: was it merely *nothing* that induced *you* to deſert your Child?

How is that poſſible?

No: but it was ſome ſuch Motive, as induced a Perſon at *Rome* to hide his Face while a Horſe was running, to which he earneſtly wiſhed Succeſs: and when, beyond his Expectation, it won the Race; he was obliged to have Recourſe to Spunges, to recover his Senſes.

And what was this Motive?

At preſent perhaps it cannot be accurately explained. It is ſufficient to be convinced, (if what Philoſophers ſay be true) that we are not to ſeek it from without: but that there is univerſally one and the ſame Cauſe, which moves us to do or forbear any Action; to ſpeak or not to ſpeak; to be elated or depreſſed; to avoid or purſue: that very Cauſe which hath now moved us two; you, to come, and ſit and hear me; and me, to ſpeak as I do.

And what is that?

Is it any thing elſe, than that it ſeemed right to us to do ſo?

Nothing elſe.

And if it had ſeemed otherwiſe to us, what ſhould we have done elſe, than what we thought right? This, and not the Death of *Patroclus*, was the Cauſe of Lamentation to *Achilles*, (for every Man is not thus affected by the Death of a Friend) that it ſeemed right to him. This too was the Cauſe of your running away from your Child, that it ſeemed right: and if hereafter you ſhould ſtay with her, it will be becauſe *that* ſeemed right. You are now returning to *Rome*, becauſe it ſeems right to you: but if you ſhould alter your Opinion, you will not return. In a Word, neither Death, nor Exile, nor Pain, nor any thing of this Kind, is the Cauſe of our doing, or not doing, any Action: but our Opinions and Principles. Do I convince you of this, or not?

You do.

§. 3. Well then: ſuch as the Cauſe is, ſuch will be the Effect. From this Day forward, then, whenever we do any thing wrong, we will impute it only to the Principle from which we act: and we will endeavour to remove that, and cut it up by the Roots, with greater Care than we would Wens and Tumours from the Body.

Body. In like manner, we will aſcribe what we do right, to the ſame Cauſe: and we will accuſe neither Servant, nor Neighbour, nor Wife, nor Children, as the Cauſes of any Evils to us; perſuaded, that if we had not ſuch Principles, ſuch Conſequences would not follow. Of theſe Principles we ourſelves, and not Externals, are the Maſters.

Agreed.

From this Day, then, we will neither conſider nor enquire of what Sort, or in what Condition, any thing is; our Eſtate, or Slaves, or Horſes, or Dogs, but only our *Principles*.

I wiſh to do it.

You ſee, then, that it is neceſſary for you to become a Scholar: that Kind of Animal which every one laughs at; if you really deſire to make an Examination of your Principles. But this, as you are ſenſible, is not the Work of an Hour or a Day.

CHAP. XII.

Of Contentment.

§. 1. CONCERNING the Gods, ſome affirm, that there is no Deity: others, that he indeed exiſts; but ſlothful, negligent, and without a Providence: a third Sort admit both his

Being and Providence, but only in great and heavenly Objects, and in nothing upon Earth: a fourth, both in Heaven and Earth; but only in general, not Individuals: a fifth, like *Ulyſſes* and *Socrates* (*a*):

O Thou, who, ever preſent in my Way,
Doſt all my Motions, all my Toils ſurvey.
POPE's Homer.

It is, before all Things, neceſſary to examine each of theſe; which is, and which is not, rightly ſaid. Now, if there are no Gods, how is it our End to follow them? If there are, but they take no Care of any thing; how will it be right, in this Caſe, to follow them? Or, if they both are, and take Care; yet, if there is nothing communicated from them to Men, nor indeed to myſelf in particular, how can it be right even in this Caſe? A wiſe and good Man, after examining theſe Things, ſubmits his Mind to him who adminiſters the Whole, as good Citizens do to the Laws of the Commonwealth.

§. 2. He, then, who comes to be inſtructed, ought to come with this Intention: "How may "I

(*a*) It was the Opinion of *Socrates*, That the Gods know all Things that are either ſaid or done, or ſilently thought on: that they are every where preſent, and give Significations to Mankind concerning all human Affairs. XEN. MEM. L. 1.

" I in every thing follow the Gods? How may " I acquieſce in the divine Adminiſtration? And " how may I be free?" For He is free, to whom all happens agreeably to his Choice, and whom no one can reſtrain.

What! then, is Freedom Diſtraction?

By no means: for Madneſs and Freedom are incompatible.

But I would have whatever appears to me to be right, happen; however it comes to appear ſo.

You are mad: you have loſt your Senſes. Do not you know, that Freedom is a very beautiful and valuable Thing? But for me to chuſe at random, and for things to happen agreeably to ſuch a Choice, may be ſo far from a beautiful Thing, as to be, of all others, the moſt ſhocking. For how do we proceed in Writing? Do I chuſe to write the Name of *Dion* [for Inſtance] as I will? No: but I am taught to be willing to write it, as it ought to be writ. And what is the Caſe in Muſic? The ſame. And what in every other Art or Science? Otherwiſe, it would be to no Purpoſe to learn any thing; if it was to be adapted to each one's particular Humour. Is it then only in the greateſt and principal Point, that of Freedom, permitted me to will at random? By no means: but true Inſtruction is this: learning to will, that Things ſhould happen as they do. And how do they happen? As the

Appointer of them hath appointed. He hath appointed, that there ſhould be Summer and Winter; Plenty and Dearth; Virtue and Vice; and all ſuch Contrarieties, for the Harmony of the Whole (*a*). To each of us he hath given a Body, and its Parts, and our ſeveral Properties, and Companions. Mindful of this Appointment, we ſhould enter upon a Courſe of Education and Inſtruction, not to change the Conſtitutions of Things; which is neither put within our Reach, nor for our Good; but that, being as they are, and as their Nature is with regard to us, we may have our Mind accommodated to what exiſts. Can we, for Inſtance, fly Mankind? And how is that poſſible? Can we, by converſing with them, change them? Who hath given us ſuch a Power? What then remains, or what Method is there to be found for ſuch a Commerce with them, that while *they* act agreeably to the Appearances in their own Minds, *we* may nevertheleſs be affected conformably to Nature? But you are wretched and diſcontented. If you are alone, you term it a Deſart; and if with Men, you call them Cheats and Robbers. You find Fault too with your Parents, and Children, and Brothers, and Neighbours. Whereas you ought, when you live alone, to call *that* a Repoſe and Freedom; and to eſteem yourſelf as reſembling the

(*a*) See *Enchiridion*, c. xxvii.

the Gods: and when you are in Company, not to call it a Crowd and a Tumult, and a Trouble; but an Aſſembly, and a Feſtival; and thus to take all Things contentedly. What, then, is the Puniſhment of thoſe who do not? To be juſt as they are. Is any one diſcontented with being alone? Let him be in a Deſart (*b*). Diſcontented with his Parents? Let him be a bad Son; and let him mourn. Diſcontented with his Children? Let him be a bad Father. Throw him into Priſon. What Priſon? Where he already is: for he is in a Situation againſt his Will; and wherever any one is againſt his Will, that is to him a Priſon: juſt as *Socrates* was *not* in Priſon; for he was willingly there. "What then muſt "my Leg be lame?"—And is it for one paultry Leg, Wretch, that you accuſe the World? Why will you not give it up to the Whole? Why will you not withdraw yourſelf from it? Why will you not gladly yield it to him who gave it? And will you be angry and diſcontented with the Decrees of *Jupiter*; which he, with the *Fates*, who ſpun in his Preſence the Thread of your Birth, ordained and appointed? Do not you know how very ſmall a Part you are of the Whole? That is, as to Body: for, as to Reaſon, you are neither worſe, nor leſs, than the Gods. For Reaſon is not meaſured by Length or Height; but

(*b*) See Introduction, §. 20.

by Principles. Will you not therefore place your Good there, where you are equal to the Gods (*c*)? "How wretched am I in ſuch a Father and "Mother!"—What, then, was it granted you to come before-hand, and make your own Terms, and ſay; "Let ſuch and ſuch Perſons, at this "Hour, be the Authors of my Birth?" It was not granted: for it was neceſſary that your Parents ſhould exiſt before you, and ſo you be born afterwards.—Of whom?—Of juſt ſuch as they were. What, then, ſince they are ſuch, is there no Remedy afforded you? Now, ſurely, if you were ignorant to what Purpoſe you poſſeſs the Faculty of Sight, you would be wretched and miſerable, in ſhutting your Eyes at the Approach of Colours: and are not you more wretched and miſerable, in being ignorant, that you have a Greatneſs of Soul, and a manly Spirit, anſwerable to each of the abovementioned Accidents? Occurrences proportioned to your Faculty [of Diſcernment] are brought before you: but you turn it away, at the very Time when you ought to have it the moſt open, and quick-ſighted. Why do not you rather thank the Gods, that they have made you ſuperior to whatever they have not placed in your own Power; and have rendered you accountable for that only, which is

(*c*) One of the Stoic Extravagancies; ariſing from the Notion, that human Souls were literally Parts of the Deity.

is in your own Power? Of your Parents they acquit you; as not accountable: of your Brothers they acquit you: of Body, Poſſeſſions, Death, Life, they acquit you. For what, then, have they made you accountable? For that which is alone in your own Power: a right Uſe of the Appearances of Objects. Why, then, ſhould you draw thoſe Things upon yourſelf, for which you are not accountable? This is giving one's ſelf Trouble, without need.

CHAP. XIII.

How every Thing may be performed acceptably to the Gods.

WHEN a Perſon inquired, How any one might eat acceptably to the Gods: if he eats with Juſtice, ſays *Epictetus*, and Gratitude; and fairly and temperately, and decently, muſt he not alſo eat acceptably to the Gods? And when you call for hot Water, and your Servant doth not hear you; or, if he doth, brings it only warm; or perhaps is not to be found at home; then, not to be angry, or burſt with Paſſion: is not this acceptable to the Gods?

But how, then, can one bear ſuch things?

Wretch, will you not bear with your own Brother, who hath God for his Father, as being a Son from the ſame Stock, and of the ſame high Deſcent

Deſcent [with yourſelf]? But, if you chance to be placed in ſome ſuperior Station, will you preſently ſet yourſelf up for a Tyrant? Will you not remember what you are, and over whom you bear Rule? That they are by Nature your Relations, your Brothers; that they are the Offſpring of God (*a*)?

But I have them by Right of Purchaſe, and not they me.

Do you ſee what it is you regard? That it is Earth and Mire, and theſe wretched Laws of dead (*b*) Men; and that you do not regard thoſe of the Gods.

CHAP. XIV.

That all Things are under the divine Inſpection.

§. 1. WHEN a Perſon aſked him, How any one might be convinced, that each of his Actions are under the Inſpection of God? Do not you think, ſays *Epictetus*, that all Things are mutually bound together, and united?

I do.

Well:

(*a*) *If I did deſpiſe the Cauſe of my Man Servant, or my Maid Servant, when they contended with me: what then ſhall I do when God riſeth up? And when he viſiteth, what ſhall I anſwer him? Did not he who made me in the Womb, make him? And did not One faſhion us in the Womb?* Job xxxi. 13, 14, 15.

(*b*) *i. e.* Deceaſed Legiſlators, who had in View low and worldly Conſiderations.

Well: and do not you think, that Things on Earth feel the Influence of the heavenly Bodies?

Yes.

Elſe how could the Trees ſo regularly, as if by God's expreſs Command, bud, (*a*) bloſſom, bring forth Fruit, and ripen it: then let it drop, and ſhed their Leaves, and lie contracted within themſelves in Quiet and Repoſe; all when He ſpeaks the Word? Whence, again, are there ſeen, on the Increaſe and Decreaſe of the Moon, and the Approach and Departure of the Sun, ſo great Viciſſitudes and Changes, to the direct contrary, in earthly Things? Have then the very Leaves, and our own Bodies, this Connection and Sympathy with the Whole; and have not our Souls much more? But our Souls are thus connected and intimately joined to God, as being indeed Members, and diſtinct Portions, of his Eſſence: and muſt not he be ſenſible of every Movement of them, as belonging, and connatural to himſelf? Can even *you* think of the divine Adminiſtration, and every other divine Subject, and together with theſe of human Affairs alſo? Can *you* at once receive Impreſſions on your Senſes and your Underſtanding, from a thouſand Objects? At once aſſent to ſome things, deny or ſuſpend your

(*a*) There is a Beauty in the Original, ariſing from the different Terminations in the Verbs, which cannot be preſerved in our Language.

your Judgment concerning others, and preſerve in your Mind Impreſſions from ſo many and various Objects, and whenever you are moved by [the Traces of] them, hit on Ideas ſimilar to thoſe which firſt impreſſed you? Can *you* retain a Variety of Arts, and the Memorials of ten thouſand Things? And is not *God* capable of ſurveying all Things, and being preſent with all, and receiving a certain Communication from all? Is the Sun capable of illuminating ſo great a Portion of the Univerſe, and of leaving only that ſmall Part of it unilluminated, which is covered by the Shadow of the Earth: and cannot *He* who made and revolves the Sun, a ſmall Part of himſelf, if compared with the Whole; cannot *He* perceive all Things?

§. 2. "But *I* cannot (ſay you) attend to all "Things at once." Why, doth any one tell you, that you have equal Power with *Jupiter?* No: but nevertheleſs He has aſſigned to each Man a Director, his own good Genius, and committed him to his Guardianſhip: a Director, whoſe Vigilance no Slumbers interrupt, and whom no falſe Reaſonings can deceive. For, to what better and more careful Guardian could he have committed us? So that when you have ſhut your Doors, and darkened your Room, remember, never to ſay that you are alone; for you are not: but God is within, and your Genius is within: and what need have

have they of Light, to ſee what you are doing? To (*b*) this God you likewiſe ought to ſwear ſuch an Oath as the Soldiers do to *Cæſar*. For do they, in order to receive their Pay, ſwear to prefer before all things, the Safety of *Cæſar*: and will not *you* ſwear, who have received ſo many and ſo great Favours: or, if you have ſworn, will you not ſtand to it? And what muſt you ſwear? Never to diſobey, nor accuſe, nor murmur at any of the Things appointed by him: nor unwillingly to do or ſuffer any thing neceſſary. Is this Oath like the former? In the firſt, Perſons ſwear not to honour any other beyond *Cæſar*; in the laſt, beyond all, to honour themſelves.

CHAP. XV.

What it is that Philoſophy promiſes.

§. 1. WHEN one conſulted him, How he might perſuade his Brother to forbear treating him ill: Philoſophy, anſwered *Epictetus*, doth not promiſe to procure any thing external to Man; otherwiſe it would admit ſomething beyond its proper Subject-matter. For the Subject-matter of a Carpenter is Wood; of a Statuary, Braſs: and

(*b*) Perhaps the Και in this Line may have been miſplaced; and it ſhould be read τουτῳ Και τῳ Θεῳ δεῖ ὑμας; and then the Tranſlation will be——To this [Genius] and to God you ought to ſwear, &c.

and ſo, of the Art of Living, the Subject-matter is each Perſon's own Life.

What, then, is my Brother's?

That, again, belongs to his own Art [of Living;] but to your's is external: like an Eſtate, like Health, like Reputation. Now Philoſophy promiſes none of theſe. In every Circumſtance I will preſerve the governing Part conformable to Nature. Whoſe governing Part? His in whom I exiſt.

But how, then, is my Brother to lay aſide his Anger againſt me?

Bring him to me, and I will tell *him*; but I have nothing to ſay to *you* about his Anger.

§. 2. Well; but I ſtill farther aſk, How am I to keep myſelf in a State of Mind conformable to Nature, though he ſhould not be reconciled to me?

No great Thing is brought to Perfection ſuddenly; when not ſo much as a Bunch of Grapes or a Fig is. If you tell me, that you would at this Minute have a Fig, I will anſwer you, that there muſt be Time. Let it firſt (*a*) bloſſom, then bear Fruit, then ripen. Is then the Fruit of

(*a*) The Philoſopher had forgot that Fig-trees do not bloſſom: and is leſs excuſable than the *Engliſh* Tranſlators of the Bible, *Hab.* iii. 17. to whom Fig-trees were not ſo familiar. But the *Hebrew* Word uſed there ſignifies rather in general to ſhoot out, thrive, than in particular to flower. The LXX have Καρποφορησει; reading, perhaps, תפרה for תפרח. This Note was given to the Tranſlator by a Friend.

of a Fig-tree not brought to Perfection ſuddenly, and in one Hour; and would you poſſeſs the Fruit of the human Mind in ſo ſhort a Time, and without Trouble? I tell you, expect no ſuch thing.

CHAP. XVI.

Of Providence.

§. 1. BE not ſurpriſed, if other Animals have all Things neceſſary to the Body ready provided for them, not only Meat and Drink but Lodging: that they want neither Shoes, nor Bedding, nor Clothes: while we ſtand in need of all theſe. For they not being made for themſelves, but for Service, it was not fit that they ſhould be formed ſo as to need the Help of others. For, conſider what it would be for us to take care, not only for ourſelves, but for Sheep and Aſſes too: how they ſhould be clothed, how ſhod, and how they ſhould eat and drink. But as Soldiers are ready for their Commander, ſhod, clothed, and armed (for it would be a grievous thing for a Colonel to be obliged to go through his Regiment to put on their Shoes and Clothes): ſo Nature likewiſe has formed the Animals made for Service, ready provided, and ſtanding in need of no further Care. Thus one little Boy, with only a Crook, drives a Flock.

§. 2.

§. 2. But now we, inſtead of being thankful for this, complain of God, that there is not the ſame kind of Care taken of us likewiſe. And yet, good Heaven! any one Thing in the Creation is ſufficient to demonſtrate a Providence, to a modeſt and grateful Mind. Not to inſtance at preſent in great Things: but only in the very Production of Milk from Graſs, Cheeſe from Milk, and Wool from Skins: who formed and contrived theſe Things? No one, ſay you. O ſurpriſing Stupidity, and want of Shame! But come; let us omit the *Works* of Nature. Let us contemplate what ſhe hath done, as it were, by-the-bye. What is more uſeleſs than the Hairs which grow on the Chin? And yet hath ſhe not made uſe even of theſe, in the moſt becoming manner poſſible? Hath ſhe not by theſe diſtinguiſhed the Sexes? Doth not Nature in each of us call out, even at a Diſtance, I am a Man; approach and addreſs me as ſuch; enquire no farther; ſee the Characteriſtic. On the other hand, with regard to Women, as ſhe hath mixed ſomething ſofter in their Voice, ſo ſhe hath deprived them of a Beard. But no: to be ſure, the Animal ſhould have been left undiſtinguiſhed, and each of us obliged to proclaim, *I am a Man!* But why is not this Characteriſtic beautiful and becoming, and venerable? How much more beautiful than the Comb of Cocks; how much more noble than the Mane of Lions!

Therefore,

Therefore, we ought to have preſerved the divine Characteriſtics: we ought not to have rejected them; nor confounded, as much as in us lay, the diſtinct Sexes.

§. 3. Are theſe the only Works of Providence, with regard to us . . . . . (*a*). And what Words can proportionably expreſs our Applauſes and Praiſe? For, if we had any Underſtanding, ought we not both, in public and in private, inceſſantly to ſing Hymns, and ſpeak well of the Deity, and rehearſe his Benefits? Ought we not, whether we are digging, or ploughing, or eating, to ſing the Hymn [due] to God? Great is God, who has ſupplied us with theſe Inſtruments to till the Ground: Great is God, who has given us Hands, a Power of Swallowing, a Stomach: who has given us to grow inſenſibly, to breathe in Sleep. [Even] theſe Things we ought upon every Occaſion to celebrate; but to make it the Subject of the greateſt and moſt divine Hymn, that he has given us the Faculty of apprehending them, and uſing them in a proper Way. Well then: becauſe the moſt of you are blind and inſenſible, was it not neceſſary, that there ſhould be ſome one to fill this Station, and give out, for all Men, the Hymn to God? For what elſe can I, a lame old Man, do, but ſing Hymns to God? If I was a Nightingale, I would act the Part of a Nightingale:

(*a*) Something here ſeems to be loſt.

Nightingale: if a Swan (*b*), the Part of a Swan. But, ſince I am a reaſonable Creature, it is my Duty to praiſe God. This is my Buſineſs. I do it. Nor will I ever deſert this Poſt, as long as it is vouchſafed me: and I exhort you to join in the ſame Song (*c*).

CHAP. XVII.

That the Art of Reaſoning is neceſſary.

§. 1. SINCE it is Reaſon which ſets in Order and finiſhes all other Things, it ought not itſelf to be left in Diſorder. But by what ſhall it be ſet in Order?

Evidently, either by itſelf, or by ſomething elſe.

Well: either *that* too is Reaſon, or there is ſomething elſe ſuperior to Reaſon (which is impoſſible): and, if it be Reaſon, what, again, ſhall ſet that in Order? For, if Reaſon can ſet itſelf in Order in one Caſe, it can in another: and, if we will ſtill require any thing further, it will be infinite, and without End.

But, the more urgent Neceſſity is to cure [our Opinions, Paſſions], and the like (*a*).

Would

(*b*) The Ancients imagined Swans could ſing very melodiouſly.

(*c*) Beautiful and affecting Examples of ſuch Praiſe and Exhortation, ſee in *Pſal.* xxxiv. civ. cxlv. and other Parts of the ſacred Writings.

(*a*) The Senſe here is ſupplied from a Conjecture of *Wolfius*.

Would you hear about theſe, therefore? Well: hear. But then, if you ſhould ſay to me, "I "cannot tell whether your Arguments are true "or falſe;" and if I ſhould happen to expreſs myſelf doubtfully, and you ſhould ſay, "diſtin-"guiſh [which Senſe you mean]," I will bear with you no longer; but will retort your own Words upon you; *the more urgent Neceſſity is*, &c. Therefore, I ſuppoſe, the Art of Reaſoning is firſt ſettled: juſt as, before the Meaſuring of Corn, we ſettle the Meaſure. For, unleſs we firſt determine what a Buſhel, and what a Balance, is, how ſhall we be able to meaſure or weigh? Thus, in the preſent Caſe: unleſs we have firſt learnt, and accurately examined, that which is the Criterion of other Things, and by which other Things are learnt, how ſhall we be able accurately to learn any thing elſe? And how is it poſſible? Well: a Buſhel, however, is only Wood, a Thing of no Value [in itſelf]: but it meaſures Corn. And Logic [you ſay] is of no Value in itſelf. That we will conſider hereafter. Let us, for the preſent, then, make the Conceſſion. It is enough that it diſtinguiſhes and examines, and, as one may ſay, meaſures and weighs all other Things. Who ſays this? Is it only *Chryſippus*, and *Zeno*, and *Cleanthes*? And doth not *Antiſthenes* ſay it? And who is it, then, who has written, That the Beginning of a right Edu-

cation is the Examination of Words? Doth not *Socrates* ſay it? Of whom, then, doth *Xenophon* write, That he began by the Examination of Words; what each ſignified (*b*).

§. 2. Is this, then, the great and admirable Thing, to underſtand or interpret *Chryſippus?*

Who ſays that it is? But what, then, is the admirable Thing?

To underſtand the Will of Nature.

Well then: do you apprehend it of yourſelf? In that Caſe, what Need have you for any one elſe? For, if it be true, that Men never err but involuntarily; and you have learnt the Truth, you muſt neceſſarily act right.

But, indeed, I do not apprehend the Will of Nature.

Who, then, ſhall interpret *that?*

They ſay, *Chryſippus* (*c*). I go and enquire what this Interpreter of Nature ſays. I begin not to underſtand his Meaning. I ſeek one to interpret that. Here explain how this is expreſſed, and as if it were put into *Latin.* How, then, doth a ſupercilious Self-opinion belong to the Interpreter!

Indeed,

(*b*) So the Stoics were remarkably exact in tracing the Etymology of Words: a Study, certainly, of very great Uſe: but, by too great Subtlety and Refinement, they were often led by it into much Trifling and Abſurdity.

(*c*) See the *Enchiridion*, ch. xlix.

Indeed, it doth not juſtly belong to *Chryſippus* himſelf, if he only interprets the Will of Nature, and doth not follow it: and much leſs to his Interpreter. For we have no need of *Chryſippus*, on his own Account; but that, by his Means, we may apprehend the Will of Nature: nor do we need a Diviner on his own Account; but that, by his Aſſiſtance, we hope to underſtand future Events, and what is ſignified by the Gods: nor the Entrails of the Victims, on their own Account; but, on the Account of what is ſignified by them: neither is it the Raven, or the Crow, that we admire; but the God, who delivers his Significations by their Means. I come, therefore, to the Diviner and Interpreter of theſe Things; and ſay, "Inſpect the Entrails for me: "what is ſignified to me?" Having taken, and laid them open, he thus interprets them. You have a Choice, Man, incapable of being reſtrained or compelled. This is written here in the Entrails. I will ſhow you this firſt, in the Faculty of Aſſent. Can any one reſtrain you from aſſenting to Truth?—"No one."—Can any one compel you to admit a Falſhood?—"No one."—You ſee, then, that you have in this Topic, a Choice incapable of being reſtrained, or compelled, or hindered. Well: is it any otherwiſe with regard to *Purſuit* and *Deſire*? What can conquer one Purſuit?—"Another Purſuit."—"What,

"Deſire and Averſion? Another Deſire and "another Averſion." If you *ſet Death before me* (ſay you) *you compel me.* No: not what is ſet before you doth it: but your Principle, that it is better to do ſuch or ſuch a thing, than to die. Here, again, you ſee it is your own Principle which compels you: that is, Choice compels Choice. For, if God had conſtituted that Portion which he hath ſeparated from his own Eſſence, and given to us, capable of being reſtrained or compelled, either by himſelf, or by any other, he would not have been God; nor have taken care of us, in a due manner.

§. 3. Theſe Things, ſays the Diviner, I find in the Victims. Theſe Things are ſignified to you. If you pleaſe, you are free. If you pleaſe, you will have no one to complain of; no one to accuſe. All will be equally according to your own Mind, and to the Mind of God.

§. 4. For the Sake of this Oracle, I go to the Diviner and the Philoſopher: admiring not *him* merely on the Account of his Interpretation, but the *Things* which he interprets.

CHAP.

CHAP. XVIII.

That we are not to be angry with the Errors of others.

§. 1. (*a*) IF what the Philoſophers ſay be true, That all Mens Actions proceed from one Source: that, as they aſſent, from a Perſuaſion that a Thing is ſo, and diſſent, from a Perſuaſion that it is not; and ſuſpend their Judgment, from a Perſuaſion that it is uncertain; ſo, likewiſe, they exert their Purſuits, from a Perſuaſion that ſuch a Thing is for their Advantage: and it is impoſſible to eſteem one Thing advantageous, and deſire another; to eſteem one Thing a Duty, and purſue another: why, after all, ſhould we be angry at the Multitude?

They are Thieves and Pilferers.

What do you mean by Thieves and Pilferers? They are in an Error concerning Good and Evil. Ought you, then, to be angry, or to pity them?

(*a*) The moſt ignorant Perſons often practiſe what they know to be evil: and they, who voluntarily ſuffer, as many do, their Inclinations to blind their Judgment, are not juſtified by following it. The Doctrine of *Epictetus*, therefore, here, and elſewhere, on this Head, contradicts the Voice of Reaſon and Conſcience: nor is it leſs pernicious, than ill grounded. It deſtroys all Guilt and Merit, all Puniſhment and Reward, all Blame of ourſelves or others, all Senſe of Miſbehaviour towards our Fellow-creatures, or our Creator. No wonder that ſuch Philoſophers did not teach Repentance towards God.

Do but ſhow them their Error, and you will ſee, that they will amend their Faults: but, if they do not ſee it, the Principles they form, are to them their ſupreme Rule.

What, then, ought not this Thief and this Adulterer to be deſtroyed?

By no means [aſk that]: but ſay rather (*b*), "Ought not he to be deſtroyed, who errs and is "deceived in Things of the greateſt Importance; "blinded, not in the Sight that diſtinguiſhes White "from Black, but in the Judgment, that diſtin-"guiſhes Good from Evil?" By ſtating your Queſtion thus, you ſee how inhuman it is; and juſt as if you would ſay, "Ought not this blind, "or that deaf Man, to be deſtroyed?" For, if the greateſt Hurt be a Deprivation of the moſt valuable Things, and the moſt valuable Thing to every one is a right Judgment in chuſing; when any one is deprived of this, why, after all, are you angry? You ought not to be affected, Man, contrary to Nature, by the Ills of another. Pity (*c*) him rather. Do not be angry; nor ſay, as

(*b*) Several Words are wanting in different Places of ſome of the following Lines of the *Greek*; which are conjecturally ſupplied in the Tranſlation from Mr. *Upton*'s Verſion.

(*c*) See *Gal.* vi. 1. and many other Parts of the New Teſtament, in which all the Humanity and Tenderneſs preſcribed by the Stoics are enjoined; and the dangerous Notions, on which they found them, are avoided.

as many do, What! ſhall theſe execrable and odious Wretches dare to act thus! Whence have you ſo ſuddenly learnt Wiſdom? Becauſe we admire thoſe Things which ſuch People take from us. Do not admire your Clothes, and you will not be angry with the Thief. Do not admire the Beauty of your Wife, and you will not be angry with an Adulterer. Know, that a Thief and an Adulterer have no Place in the Things that are properly your own: but in thoſe that belong to others; and which are not in your Power. If you give up theſe Things, and look upon them as nothing, with whom will you any longer be angry? But, while you admire them, be angry with yourſelf, rather than with others. Conſider only: you have a fine Suit of Clothes; your Neighbour has not. You have a Caſement; you want to air them. He knows not in what the Good of Man conſiſts; but imagines it is in a fine Suit of Clothes: the very Thing which you imagine too. Muſt not he, then, of courſe, come and take them away? When you ſhow a Cake to greedy People, and are devouring it all yourſelf; would not you have them ſnach it from you? Do not provoke them. Do not have a Caſement. Do not air your Clothes. I, too, the other Day, had an Iron Lamp burning before my Houſhold Deities. Hearing a Noiſe at the Window, I ran. I found my Lamp was

ſtolen. I conſidered, that he who took it away, did nothing unaccountable. What then? To-morrow, ſays I, you ſhall find an Earthen one: for a Man loſes only what he hath. *I have loſt my Coat.* Ay: becauſe you had a Coat. *I have a Pain in my Head.* Why, can you have a Pain in your Horns (*d*)? Why, then, are you out of Humour? For Loſs and Pain can be only of ſuch Things as are poſſeſſed.

§. 2. But the Tyrant will chain—What?—A Leg—He will take away—What?—A Head.—What is there, then, that he can neither chain, nor take away?—The Will, and Choice. Hence the Advice of the Ancients—*Know thyſelf.*

What ought to be done, then?

Exerciſe yourſelf, for Heaven's ſake, in little Things; and thence proceed to greater. "I have "a Pain in my Head."—Do not cry, alas!—"I have a Pain in my Ear."—Do not cry, alas! I do not ſay, you may not groan; but do not groan inwardly: or, if your Servant is a long while in bringing you ſomething to bind your Head, do not bawl, and diſtort yourſelf; and ſay, "Every body hates me." For, who would not hate ſuch a one?

§. 3. Relying for the future on theſe Principles, walk upright, and free; not truſting to Bulk of Body,

(*d*) This alludes to a famous Quibble among the Stoics. *What you have not loſt, you have: but you have not loſt a Pair of Horns; therefore you have a Pair of Horns.* UPTON.

Body, like a Wreſtler: for one ſhould not be unconquerable in the Senſe that an Aſs is.

Who then is unconquerable? He whom nothing, independent on Choice, diſconcerts. Then I run over every Circumſtance, and conſider [ſuch a one in each. As they ſay] of an athletic Champion. He has been victorious in the firſt Encounter: What will he do in the Second? What, if the Heat ſhould be exceſſive? What, if he were to appear at *Olympia*? So I ſay in this Caſe. What, if you throw Money in his Way? He will deſpiſe it. What, if a Girl? What, if in the dark? What, if he be tried by popular Fame, Calumny, Praiſe, Death? He is able to overcome them all. What, then, if he be placed in the Heat, or in the Rain (*e*)? What, if he be hypo-

 chondriac,

(*e*) Mr. *Upton* obſerves, That *Epictetus* here applies to the wiſe Man, what he had juſt been ſaying of the athletic Champion: and he propoſes a Change in one Word; by which, inſtead of the Heat, or the Rain, the Tranſlation will be, in a Fever, or in Drink. For the Stoics held their wiſe Man to be a perfect Maſter of himſelf in all theſe Circumſtances. The Paſſages which Mr. *Upton* produces from L. ii. c. 17. towards the End, and L. iii. c. 2. towards the Beginning, makes the Conjecture of οινωμενος for ὑομενος as probable as it is ingenious. But yet the τι ουν αν καυμα η one would imagine to have crept in by a Repetition of the Tranſcriber, from the Deſcription, a few Lines before; as it is ſcarcely probable, that the ſame Word ſhould be uſed by *Epictetus* in two different Senſes, at ſo ſmall a Diſtance, in the ſame Diſcourſe.

chondriac, or aſleep? [Juſt the ſame.] This is my unconquerable athletic Champion.

CHAP. XIX.

Of the Behaviour to be obſerved towards Tyrants.

§. 1. WHEN a Perſon is poſſeſſed of ſome either real or imaginary Superiority, unleſs he hath been well inſtructed, he will neceſſarily be puffed up with it. A Tyrant, for Inſtance, ſays; "I am ſupreme over All."—And what can you do for *Me?* Can you exempt my Deſires from Diſappointment? How ſhould you? For do you never incur your own Averſions? Are your own Purſuits infallible? Whence ſhould *You* come by that Privilege? Pray, on Ship-board, do you truſt to yourſelf, or to the Pilot? In a Chariot, to whom but to the Driver? And to whom in all other Arts? Juſt the ſame. In what, then, doth your Power conſiſt?—"All Men pay "Regard to me."

So do I to my Deſk. I waſh it, and wipe it; and drive a Nail, for the Service of my Oil Flaſk. —"What, then, are theſe Things to be valued "beyond *Me?*"—No: but they are of ſome Uſe to *me*, and therefore I pay Regard to them. Why, Do not I pay Regard to an Aſs? Do I not waſh his Feet? Do not I clean him? Do not you know, that every one pays Regard to himſelf; and

to

to you, juſt as he doth to an Aſs? For who pays Regard to you as a Man? Show that. Who would wiſh to be like *You?* Who would deſire to imitate *You*, as he would *Socrates?*—"But I can take off "your Head?"—You ſay right. I had forgot, that one is to pay Regard to you as to a Fever, or the Cholic; and that there ſhould be an Altar erected to you, as there is to the Goddeſs *Fever* at *Rome*.

§. 2. What is it, then, that diſturbs and ſtrikes Terror into the Multitude? The Tyrant, and his Guards? By no means. What is by Nature free, cannot be diſturbed, or reſtrained, by any thing but itſelf. But its own Principles diſturb it. Thus, when the Tyrant ſays to any one; "I "will chain your Leg:" he who values his Leg, cries out for Pity: while he, who ſets the Value on his own Will and Choice, ſays; "If "you imagine it for your Intereſt, chain it."—"What! do not you care?"—No: I do not care.—"I will ſhow you that I am Maſter."—*You?* How ſhould *You? Jupiter* has ſet me free. What! do you think he would ſuffer his own Son to be enſlaved? You are Maſter of my Carcaſe. Take it.—"So that, when you come into "my Preſence, you pay no Regard to me?"—No: but to myſelf: or, if you will have me ſay, to you alſo: I tell you; the ſame to you as to a Pipkin. This is not ſelfiſh Vanity: for every

Animal is ſo conſtituted, as to do every thing for its own Sake. Even the Sun doth all for his own Sake: nay; and to name no more, even *Jupiter* himſelf. But when he would be ſtiled the Diſpenſer of Rain and Plenty, and the Father of Gods and Men, you ſee that he cannot attain theſe Offices and Titles, unleſs he contributes to the common Utility. And he hath univerſally ſo conſtituted the Nature of every reaſonable Creature, that no one can attain any of its own proper Advantages, without contributing ſomething to the Uſe of Society. And thus it becomes not unſociable to do every thing for one's own Sake. For, do you expect, that a Man ſhould deſert himſelf, and his own Intereſt? How, then, can all Beings have one and the ſame original Inſtinct, Attachment to themſelves? What follows then? That where thoſe abſurd Principles, concerning Things independent on Choice, as if they were either good or evil, are at the Bottom, there muſt neceſſarily be a Regard paid to Tyrants: and I wiſh it were to Tyrants only, and not to the very Officers of their Bed-chamber too. And how wiſe doth a Man grow on a ſudden, when *Cæſar* has made him Clerk of the Cloſe-ſtool? How immediately we ſay, "*Felicio* talked very "ſenſibly to me!" I wiſh he were turned out of the Bed-chamber, that he might once more appear to you the Fool he is.

§. 3.

§. 3. *Epaphroditus* had [a Slave, that was] a Shoemaker; whom, becauſe he was good for nothing, he ſold. This very Fellow being, by ſome ſtrange Luck, bought by a Courtier, became Shoemaker to *Cæſar*. Then you might have ſeen how *Epaphroditus* honoured him. "How doth good "*Felicio* do, pray?" And, if any of us aſked, what the great Man himſelf was about, it was anſwered; "He is conſulting about Affairs with "*Felicio*." Did not he ſell him, as good for nothing? Who, then, hath, all on a ſudden, made a wiſe Man of him? This it is to honour any thing, beſides what depends on Choice.

§. 4. Is any one exalted to the Office of Tribune? All that meet him congratulate him. One kiſſes his Eyes, another his Neck, and the Slaves his Hands. He goes to his Houſe; finds it illuminated. He aſcends the Capitol. Offers a Sacrifice. Now, who ever offered a Sacrifice for having good Deſires? For exerting Purſuits conformable to Nature? For we thank the Gods for that wherein we place our Good.

§. 5. A Perſon was talking with me To-day about the Prieſthood (*a*) of *Auguſtus*. I ſay to him, Let the Thing alone, Friend: you will be

(*a*) When Temples began to be erected to the Emperors, as to Gods, the Office of Prieſt was purchaſed by vile Flatterers, at a very great Expence. UPTON *from* CASAUBON.

at great Expence for nothing. "But my Name, "ſays he, will be written in the Annals." Will you ſtand by, then, and tell thoſe who read them; "*I am the Perſon whoſe Name is written there?*" But, if you could tell every one ſo now, what will you do when you are dead?—"My Name "will remain."—Write it upon a Stone, and it will remain juſt as well. But, pray what Remembrance will there be of you out of *Nicopolis*? —"But I ſhall wear a Crown (*b*) of Gold."—If your Heart is quite ſet upon a Crown, take and put on one of Roſes; for it will make the prettier Appearance.

CHAP. XX.

In what manner Reaſon contemplates itſelf.

EVERY Art, and every Faculty, contemplates ſome Things as its principal Objects. Whenever, therefore, it is of the ſame Nature with the Objects of its Contemplations, it neceſſarily contemplates itſelf too. But, where it is of a different Nature, it cannot contemplate itſelf. The Art of Shoemaking, for Inſtance, is exerciſed upon Leather; but is itſelf intirely diſtinct from the Materials it works upon: therefore it doth not

(*b*) Which was the Ornament of the Prieſts, while they were offering Sacrifice. *Nicopolis* was built by *Auguſtus*, in Memory of the Victory at *Actium*.

not contemplate itſelf. Again: Grammar is exerciſed on articulate Speech. Is the Art of Grammar itſelf, then, articulate Speech?

By no means.

Therefore it cannot contemplate itſelf. To what Purpoſe, then, is Reaſon appointed by Nature?

To a proper Uſe of the Appearances of Things.

And what is Reaſon?

A Compoſition of certain Appearances to the Mind: and, thus, by its Nature, it becomes contemplative of itſelf too. Again: what Subjects of Contemplation belong to Prudence?

Good, and Evil, and Indifferent.

What, then, is Prudence itſelf?

Good.

What, Imprudence?

Evil.

You ſee, then, that it neceſſarily contemplates both itſelf and its contrary. Therefore, the firſt and greateſt Work of a Philoſopher is, to try and diſtinguiſh the Appearances; and to admit none untried. Even in Money, where our Intereſt ſeems to be concerned, you ſee what an Art we have invented; and how many Ways an Aſſayer uſes to try its Value. By the Sight; the Touch; the Smell; and, laſtly, the Hearing. He throws the Piece down, and attends to the Jingle; and is not contented with its Jingling only once;

but, by frequent Attention to it, becomes quite muſical. In the ſame manner, whenever we think it of Conſequence, whether we are deceived or not, we uſe the utmoſt Attention to diſtinguiſh thoſe Things, which may poſſibly deceive us. But, yawning and ſlumbering over the poor miſerable ruling Faculty, we admit every Appearance that offers. For here the Miſchief does not ſtrike us. When you would know, then, how very languidly you are affected by Good and Evil, and how vehemently by Things indifferent; conſider how you are affected with regard to being blinded; and how with regard to being deceived; and you will find, that you are far from being moved, as you ought, in relation to Good and Evil.

But much previous Qualification, and much Labour, and Learning, are wanted.

What, then? Do you expect the greateſt of Arts is to be acquired by ſlight Endeavours? And yet the principal Doctrine of the Philoſophers, of itſelf, is ſhort. If you have a Mind to know it, read *Zeno*, and you will ſee (*a*). For what Prolixity

(*a*) *Zeno*, the Founder of the Stoic Sect, was born at *Citium*, a Sea-port Town, in the Iſland of *Cyprus*. He was originally a Merchant; and very rich. On a Voyage from *Tyre*, where he had been trading in Purple, he was ſhipwrecked, near the *Piræum*. During his Stay at *Athens*, he happened to meet, in a Bookſeller's Shop, with the Second

lixity is there in ſaying, *Our End is to follow the Gods?* And, *The Eſſence of Good conſiſts in the proper Uſe of the Appearances of Things.* Indeed, if you ſay, What, then, is *God?* What is *an Appearance?* What is particular, what univerſal Nature? Here the Affair becomes prolix. And ſo, if *Epicurus* ſhould come and ſay, that Good muſt be placed in Body; here, too, it will be prolix: and it will be neceſſary to hear, what is the principal, and ſubſtantial, and eſſential Part in us. It is unlikely, that the Good of a Snail ſhould be placed in the Shell: and, is it likely, that the Good of a Man ſhould? You yourſelf, *Epicurus*, have

Second Book of *Xenophon*'s Memoirs; with which he was extremely delighted; and aſked the Bookſeller, where ſuch kind of Perſons, as the Author mentioned, were to be found. The Bookſeller anſwered, pointing to *Crates*, the Cynic, who was luckily paſſing by; Follow him: which *Zeno* did, and became his Diſciple. But his Diſpoſition was too modeſt to approve of the Cynic Indecency: and, forſaking *Crates*, he applied himſelf to the Academics; whom he attended for ten Years, and then formed a School of his own. There was a conſtant Severity, or, perhaps, Auſterity, in his Manners, his Dreſs, and his Diſcourſe; except at an Entertainment, when he uſed to appear with Chearfulneſs and Eaſe. His Morals were irreproachable: and he was preſented by the *Athenians* with a golden Crown; becauſe his Life was a public Example of Virtue, by its Conformity with his Words and Doctrines. He lived Ninety-eight Years, and then ſtrangled himſelf; becauſe, in going out of his School, he happened to fall down, and break his Finger. DIOG. LAERT. *in* ZENO.

have ſomething ſuperior to this. What is That in you, which deliberates, which examines, which forms the Judgment, concerning Body itſelf, that it is the principal Part? And why do you light your Lamp, and labour for us, and write ſo many Books? That we may not be ignorant of the Truth? What are *We?* What are we to *You?* Thus the Doctrine becomes prolix.

CHAP. XXI.

Of the Deſire of Admiration.

WHEN a Perſon maintains his proper Station in Life, he doth not gape after Externals. What would you have, Man?

"I am contented, if my Deſires and Averſions "are conformable to Nature: if I manage my "Powers of Purſuit and Avoidance, my Purpoſes, "and Intentions and Aſſent, in the Manner I was "formed to do."

Why, then, do you walk as if you had ſwallowed a Spit?

"I could wiſh moreover to have all who meet "me, admire me, and all who follow me, cry "out, What a great Philoſopher!"

Who are thoſe, by whom you would be admired? Are they not the very People, who, you uſed to ſay, were mad? What, then, would you be admired by Madmen?

CHAP.

CHAP. XXII.

Of Pre-conceptions.

§. 1. PRe-conceptions (*a*) are common to all Men: and one Pre-conception doth not contradict another. For, who of us doth not lay it down as a Maxim, That Good is advantageous and eligible, and at all Events, to be purſued and followed: that Juſtice is fair and becoming? Whence, then, ariſes the Diſpute? —In adapting theſe Pre-conceptions to particular Caſes. As, when one cries; "Such a Perſon "hath acted well: he is a gallant Man:" and another; "No; he hath acted like a Fool." Hence ariſes the Diſpute among Men. This is the Diſpute between *Jews*, and *Syrians*, and *Egyptians*, and *Romans*: not whether Sanctity be preferable to all Things, and in every Inſtance to be purſued; but whether the eating Swine's Fleſh be conſiſtent with Sanctity, or not. This, too, you will find to have been the Diſpute between *Achilles* and *Agamemnon*. For, call them forth. What ſay you, *Agamemnon*? Ought not that to be done, which is fit and right?—Yes, ſurely.—*Achilles*, what ſay you? Is it not agreeable to you, that what is right ſhould be done?—Yes: beyond every other thing. Adapt your Pre-conceptions,

(*a*) See Introduction, §. 10.

conceptions, then. Here begins the Diſpute. One ſays; "It is not fit, that I ſhould reſtore *Chryſeis* "to her Father." The other ſays; "Yes; but "it is." One, or the other of them, certainly makes a wrong Adaptation of the Pre-conception of *Fitneſs*. Again: one ſays; "If it be fit, that "I ſhould give up *Chryſeis*; it is fit, too, that I "ſhould take ſome one of your Prizes." The other: "What, that you ſhould take my Miſ-"treſs?" "Ay; yours." "What, *mine* only? "Muſt *I* only, then, loſe my Prize?"

§. 2. What, then, is it to be properly educated? To learn how to adapt natural Pre-conceptions to particular Caſes, conformably to Nature: and, for the future, to diſtinguiſh, that ſome Things are in our own Power; others not. In our own Power, are Choice, and all Actions dependent on Choice: not in our Power, the Body, the Parts of the Body, Property, Parents, Brothers, Children, Country; and, in ſhort, all with whom we are engaged in Society. Where, then, ſhall we place Good? To what kind of Things ſhall we adapt the Pre-conception of it? To that in our own Power.

§. 3. So, then! is not Health, and Strength, and Life, good? And are not Children, nor Parents, nor Country? Who will have Patience with you?

Let

Let us transfer it, then, to the other Sort of Things. Can he who ſuffers Harm, and is diſappointed of good Things, be happy?

He cannot.

And can he preſerve a right Behaviour with regard to Society? How is it poſſible he ſhould? For I am naturally led to my own Intereſt. If, therefore, it is for my Intereſt, to have an Eſtate, it is for my Intereſt likewiſe to take it away from my Neighbour. If it is for my Intereſt to have a Suit of Clothes; it is for my Intereſt likewiſe to ſteal it wherever I find it (*b*). Hence Wars, Seditions, Tyranny, unjuſt Invaſions. How ſhall I, if this be the Caſe, be able, any longer, to preſerve my Duty towards *Jupiter*? If I ſuffer Harm, and am diſappointed, he takes no care of me. And, what is *Jupiter* to me, if he cannot help me: or, again; what is he to me, if he chuſes I ſhould be in the Condition I am? Henceforward I begin to hate him. What, then, do we build Temples, do we raiſe Statues, to *Jupiter*, as to evil Demons, as to the Goddeſs *Fever*? How, at this rate, is he the Preſerver; and how the Diſpenſer of Rain and Plenty? If we place the Eſſence of Good any-where here, all this will follow.—What, then, ſhall we do?

§. 4.

(*b*) *Wars and Fightings* are aſcribed to the ſame Cauſes, by St. *James*, iv. 1.

§. 4. This is the Enquiry of him who philoſophizes in reality, and labours to bring forth [Truth]. "Do (*c*) not I now ſee what is good, "and what is evil?" Surely I am in my Senſes. Ay: but ſhall I place Good any-where on this other Side; in Things dependent [only] on my own Chioce? Why, every one will laugh at me. Some grey-headed old Fellow will come, with his Fingers covered with Gold Rings, and ſhake his Head, and ſay; "Hark ye, Child, it is fit "you ſhould learn Philoſophy; but it is fit, too, "you ſhould have Brains. This is Nonſenſe. "You learn Syllogiſms from Philoſophers: but "how you are to act, you know better than "they." "Then, why do you chide me, Sir, "if I do know." What can I ſay to this Wretch? If I make no Anſwer, he will burſt. I muſt e'en anſwer thus: "Forgive me, as they do "People in Love. I am not myſelf. I have "loſt my Senſes.

CHAP.

(*c*) This ſeems intended to expreſs the Perplexity of a Perſon convinced, that Good is not to be found in Externals; and afraid of popular Raillery, if he places it in ſuch Things only, as depend on our own Choice.

CHAP. XXIII.

Againſt EPICURUS.

§. 1. EVEN *Epicurus* is ſenſible, that we are by Nature ſociable: but having once placed our Good in the mere Shell, he can ſay nothing afterwards different from that. For, again, he ſtrenuouſly maintains, that we ought not to admire, or receive, any thing ſeparated from the Nature of Good. And he is in the right to maintain it. But how, then, came (*a*) any ſuch Suſpicions [as your Doctrines imply, to ariſe], if we have no natural Affection towards an Offſpring? Why do you, *Epicurus*, diſſuade a wiſe Man from bringing up Children? Why are you afraid, that, upon their Account, he may fall into Uneaſineſſes? Doth he fall into any for a Mouſe, that feeds within his Houſe? What is it to him, if a little *Mouſe* bewails itſelf there? But *Epicurus* knew, that, if once a *Child* is born, it is no longer in our Power not to love and be ſolicitous for it. For the ſame Reaſon, he ſays, a wiſe Man will not engage himſelf in public Buſineſs: for he knew very well, what ſuch an Engagement would oblige him to do: for what ſhould

(*a*) This Paſſage is obſcure; and variouſly read, and explained by the Commentators. It is here tranſlated conjecturally.

ſhould reſtrain any one from Affairs, if we may behave among Men, as we would among a Swarm of Flies?

§. 2. And doth He, who knows all this, dare to bid us not bring up Children? Not even a Sheep, or a Wolf, deſerts its Offspring; and ſhall Man? What would you have? That we ſhould be as ſilly as Sheep? Yet even theſe do not deſert their Offspring. Or as ſavage as Wolves? Neither do theſe deſert them. Pray, who would mind *you*, if he ſaw his Child fallen upon the Ground, and crying? For my Part, I am of Opinion, that your Father and Mother, even if they could have foreſeen, that you would have been the Author of ſuch Doctrines, would not, however, have thrown you away.

CHAP. XXIV.

How we are to ſtruggle with Difficulties.

§. 1. DIfficulties are the Things that ſhew what Men are. For the future, on any Difficulty, remember, That God, like a (*a*) Maſter of Exerciſe, has engaged you with a rough Antagoniſt.

For

(*a*) The *Greek* Word ſignifies, a Perſon who uſed to anoint the Body of the Combatants: and prepare them, by proper Exerciſes, for the Olympic Games.

For what End?

That you may be a Conqueror, like one in the Olympic Games: and it cannot be without Toil. No Man, in my Opinion, has a more advantageous Difficulty on his Hands than you have; provided you will but uſe it, as an athletic Champion doth his Antagoniſt. We are now ſending (*b*) a Spy to *Rome*: but no one ever ſends a timorous Spy, who, when he only hears a Noiſe, or ſees a Shadow, runs back, frighted out of his Wits, and ſays; "The Enemy is juſt at hand." So now, if you ſhould come and tell us; "Things "are in a fearful Way at *Rome*: Death is terri- "ble; Baniſhment, terrible; Calumny, terrible; "Poverty, terrible: run, good People, the Ene- "my is at hand:" we will anſwer; Get you gone, and propheſy for yourſelf; our only Fault is, that we have ſent ſuch a Spy. *Diogenes* (*c*) was

(*b*) Probably, according to Mr. *Upton*'s Conjecture, it ſhould be ἀπ. *We ſend you.*

Wolfius imagines this Paſſage to allude to the Commotions after the Death of *Nero*; when there were many Competitors for the Empire; and every one was eager to take the Part of him who appeared to have the greateſt Probability of Succeſs.

(*c*) *Diogenes*, paſſing through the Camp of *Philip*, at the Time that he was on his March againſt the *Greeks*, was taken, and brought before the King; who, not knowing him, aſked, if he was a Spy. Yes, certainly, *Philip* (anſwered the Philoſopher), I am a Spy of your Inconſiderateneſs,

was ſent a Spy before *you*: but he told us other Tidings. He ſays, That Death is no Evil; for it is nothing baſe: that Defamation is only the Noiſe of Madmen. And what Account did this Spy give us of Pain? Of Pleaſure? Of Poverty? He ſays, that, to be naked is better than a Purple Robe: to ſleep upon the bare Ground the ſofteſt Bed: and gives a Proof of all he ſays, by his own Courage, Tranquillity, and Freedom; and, moreover, by a healthy and robuſt Body. There is no Enemy near, ſays he. All is profound Peace.—How ſo, *Diogenes?* Look upon *me*, ſays he. Am *I* hurt? Am *I* wounded? Have *I* run away from any one? This is ſuch a Spy as he ought to be. But you come, and tell us one Thing after another. Go back again, and examine Things more exactly, and without Fear.

§. 2. What ſhall I do, then?

What do you do when you come out of a Ship? Do you take away the Rudder, or the Oars, along with you? What do you take, then? Your own, your Bottle, and your Bundle. So, in the preſent Caſe, if you will but remember what is your own, you will not claim what belongs to others. Are you bid to put off your Conſular Robe?—Well:

I

rateneſs, and Folly, in riſquing your Kingdom and Perſon, without any Neceſſity, upon the Hazard of a ſingle Hour. UPTON. The Story is thus told by *Plutarch*; but is related ſomething differently by other Authors.

I am in my Equeſtrian. Put off that too.—I have only my Coat.—Put off that too.—Well: I am naked.—Still you raiſe my Envy.—Then e'en take my whole Body. If I can throw off a paultry Body, am I any longer afraid of a Tyrant (*d*)?

§. 3. But ſuch a one will not leave me his Heir. What, then, have I forgot, that none of theſe Things is mine? How, then, do we call them *mine?* As a Bed, in an Inn. If the Landlord when he dies, leaves you the Beds; well and good: but, if to another, they will be his; and you will ſeek one elſewhere: and, conſequently, if you do not find one, you will ſleep upon the Ground: only ſleep quiet, and ſnore ſoundly; and remember, that Tragedies have no other Subjects, but the Rich, and Kings, and Tyrants. No poor Man fills any other Place in one, than as Part of the Chorus: whereas Kings begin, indeed, with Proſperity. "*Crown the Palace with feſtive Garlands* (*e*)."—But, then, about the third or fourth Act; "*Alas*, Citheron! *Why didſt thou receive me!*" Where are thy Crowns, Wretch; where is thy Diadem? Cannot thy Guards help thee?

Whenever you approach any of theſe then, remember, that you meet a Tragic Player; or, rather, not an Actor, but *Oedipus* himſelf.—But

(*d*) The Tranſlation follows Mr. *Upton*'s Reading.
(*e*) An Alluſion to the *Oedipus* of *Sophocles*.

ſuch a one is happy. He walks with a numerous Train. Well: I join myſelf with the Croud, and I too walk with a numerous Train.

§. 4. But, remember the principal Thing; That the Door is open. Do not be more fearful than Children; but, as they, when the Play doth not pleaſe them, ſay; "I will play no longer:" ſo do you, in the ſame Caſe, ſay; "I will play "no longer;" and go: but, if you ſtay, do not complain.

CHAP. XXV.

On the ſame Subject.

§. 1. IF theſe Things are true; and we are not ſtupid, or acting a Part, when we ſay, that the Good or Ill of Man conſiſts in Choice, and that all beſides is nothing to us; why are we ſtill troubled? Why do we ſtill fear? What hath been *our* Concern, is in no one's Power: what is in the Power of others, *we* do not regard. What Embarraſſment have we left?

But direct me.

Why ſhould *I* direct you? Hath not *Jupiter* directed you? Hath he not given you what is your *own*, incapable of Reſtraint, or Hindrance; and what is *not* your own, liable to both? What Directions, then, what Orders, have you brought from him? "By all Methods keep what is your own:

" own: what belongs to others, do not covet. " Honeſty, is your own: a Senſe of virtuous " Shame is your own. Who, then, can deprive " you of theſe? Who can reſtrain you from " making uſe of them, but yourſelf? And how " do you do it? When you make that your Con- " cern which is not your own, you loſe what is." Having ſuch Precepts and Directions from *Jupiter*, what Sort do you ſtill want from me? Am *I* better than *He?* More worthy of Credit? If you obſerve theſe, what others do you need? Or are not theſe Directions *his?* Produce your natural Pre-conceptions: produce the Demonſtrations of Philoſophers: produce what you have often heard, and what you have ſaid yourſelf; what you have read, and what you have ſtudied.

How long is it right to obſerve theſe Things, and not break up the Game?

As long as it goes on agreeably. A King is choſen at the *Saturnalian* Feſtival (for it was agreed to play at that Game): he orders; " Do " you drink: you mix the Wine: you ſing: " you go: you come." I obey; that the Game may not be broken up by my Fault.—" Well: " but I bid you think yourſelf to be unhappy." I do not think ſo: and who ſhall compel me to think ſo? Again: we agreed to play *Agamemnon* and *Achilles*. He who is appointed for *Agamemnon*,

ſays to me; "Go to *Achilles*, and force away "*Briſeis*." I go. "Come." I come.

§. 2. We ſhould converſe in Life as we do in hypothetical Arguments. "Suppoſe it to be "Night."—Well: ſuppoſe it.—"Is it Day, "then?" No: for I admitted the Hypotheſis, that it is Night.—"Suppoſe, that you think it "to be Night."—Well: ſuppoſe it.—"But think "alſo, in reality, that it is Night."—That doth not follow from the Hypotheſis. Thus, too, in the other Caſe. Suppoſe you have ill Luck.—Suppoſe it.—"Are you, then, unlucky?"—Yes.—"Have you ſome croſs Demon."—Yes.—"Well: but think too [in earneſt], that you "are unhappy."—This doth not follow from the Hypotheſis: and there is one who forbids me [to think ſo].

How long, then, are we to obey ſuch Orders?

As long as it is worth while: that is, as long as I preſerve what is becoming and fit.

§. 3. Further: ſome are peeviſh and faſtidious; and ſay, I cannot dine with ſuch a Fellow, to be obliged to hear him all Day recounting, how he fought in *Myſia*. "I told you, my Friend, how "I gained the Eminence. There I am beſieged "again. But another, ſays, "I had rather get "a Dinner, and hear him prate as much as he "pleaſes."

Do

Do you compare the Value of theſe Things, and judge for yourſelf: but do not let it be with Depreſſion, and Anxiety; and with a Suppoſition, that you are unhappy: for no one compels you to that. Is the Houſe in a Smoke? If it be a moderate one, I will ſtay: if a very great one, I will go out. For you muſt always remember, and hold to this, that the Door is open. "Well: "do not live at *Nicopolis*."—I will not live there. —"Nor at *Athens*."—Well: nor at *Athens*.— "Nor at *Rome*."—Nor at *Rome* neither.—"But "you ſhall live at *Gyaros* (*a*)."—I will live there. But living at *Gyaros* ſeems to me like living in a great Smoke. I will retire where no one can forbid me to live; (for that Abode is open to all) and put off my laſt (*b*) Garment, this paultry Body of mine: beyond this, no one hath any Power over me. Thus *Demetrius* ſaid to *Nero*; "You ſentence *me* to Death; and Nature,

(*a*) An Iſland in the *Ægean* Sea, to which the *Romans* uſed to baniſh Criminals.

(*b*) The Body, which *Epictetus* here compares to a Garment, is, by the ſacred Writers, repreſented under the Figure of a Houſe, or Tabernacle, *Job* iv. 19. 2 *Pet.* i. 13, 14. St. *Paul*, with a ſublime Rapidity of Expreſſion, joins the two Metaphors together, 2 *Cor.* v. 2—4. as, indeed, the one is but a looſer, the other a cloſer Covering. The ſame Apoſtle hath made uſe of the Figure of Clothing, in another Place, in a ſtrikingly beautiful Manner, 1 *Cor.* xv. 53, 54.

"*you* (*c*);" If I place my Admiration on Body, I give myſelf up for a Slave: if on an Eſtate, the ſame: for I immediately betray myſelf, how I may be taken. Juſt as when a Snake pulls in his Head, I ſay ſtrike that Part of him which he guards: and be you aſſured, that whatever you ſhew a Deſire to guard, there your Maſter will attack you. Remember but this, whom will you any longer flatter, or fear?

But I want to ſit where the Senators do.

Do not you ſee, that by this you ſtraiten yourſelf? You ſqueeze yourſelf?

Why, how elſe ſhall I ſee the Show, in the Amphitheatre cleverly?

Do not ſee it [at all], Man; and you will not be ſqueezed. Why do you give yourſelf Trouble? Or wait a little while; and when the Show is over, go ſit in the Senators Places, and ſun yourſelf. For remember, that this holds univerſally; we ſqueeze ourſelves; we ſtraiten ourſelves: that is; our own Principles ſqueeze and ſtraiten us. What is it to be reviled, for Inſtance? Stand by a Stone, and revile it; and what will you get? If you, therefore, would hear like a Stone,

(*c*) *Anaxagoras* is ſaid, by ſome, and *Socrates*, by others, to have made the ſame Speech, on receiving the News of his being condemned to Death by the Judges of *Athens*: and from one of them, probably, *Demetrius* borrowed it. *Demetrius* was a Cynic Philoſopher; and is mentioned with high Approbation by *Seneca*.

Stone, what would your Reviler be the better? But, if the Reviler hath the Weakneſs of the Reviled for an Advantage-ground, then he carries his Point.—"Strip him." "What do you mean by "*him?*" "Take my Clothes; ſtrip off *them* [if "you will]."—"I have put an Affront upon you."—"Much Good may it do you."

§. 4. Theſe Things were the Study of *Socrates*; and, by this Means, he always preſerved the ſame Countenance. But *we* had rather exerciſe and ſtudy any thing, than how to become unreſtrained and free.

The Philoſophers talk Paradoxes.

And are there not Paradoxes in other Arts? What is more paradoxical, than the pricking any one's Eye, to make him ſee? If a Perſon was to tell this to one ignorant of Surgery, would not he laugh at him? Where is the Wonder then, if, in Philoſophy too, many Truths appear Paradoxes to the Ignorant?

CHAP. XXVI.

What the Law of Life is.

§. 1. AS one [of his Scholars] was reading hypothetical Syllogiſms; it is likewiſe a Law in theſe, ſays *Epictetus*, to admit what follows from the Hypotheſis: but much more is it a Law in Life, to do what follows from Nature. For, if

we deſire in every Subject of Action, and in every Circumſtance, to keep up to Nature; we muſt, on every Occaſion, evidently make it our Aim, neither to let Conſequences eſcape our Obſervation, nor to admit Contradictions. Philoſophers, therefore, firſt exerciſe us in Theory, which is the more eaſy Taſk, and then lead us to the more difficult: for in Theory, there is nothing to oppoſe our following what we are taught; but in Life, there are many Things to draw us aſide. It is ridiculous then, to ſay, we muſt begin from theſe; for it is not eaſy to begin from the moſt difficult: and this Excuſe muſt be made to thoſe Parents, who diſlike that their Children ſhould learn philoſophical Speculations.— "Am I to "blame then, Sir, and ignorant of my Duty, "and of what is incumbent on me? If this is "neither to be learnt, nor taught, why do you "find fault with me? If it is to be taught, pray "teach me yourſelf: or, if you cannot, give me "Leave to learn it from thoſe who profeſs to un-"derſtand it. Beſides: do you think that I vo-"luntarily fall into Evil, and miſs of Good? "Heaven forbid! What then, is the Cauſe of "my Faults?" Ignorance. "Are you not will-"ing then, that I ſhould get rid of my Ignorance? "Who was ever taught the Art of Muſic, or "Navigation, by Anger? Do you expect then, "that your Anger ſhould teach me the Art of "Living?"

"Living?"—This however, is allowed to be ſaid only by one who really hath that Intention. But he who reads theſe Things, and applies to the Philoſophers, merely for the ſake of ſhewing, at an Entertainment, that he underſtands hypothetical Syllogiſms; what doth he do it for, but to be admired by ſome Senator, who happens to ſit near him (*a*) . . . . .

§. 2. . . . . I once ſaw a Perſon weeping and embracing the Knees of *Epaphroditus*; and deploring his hard Fortune, that he had not 50,000*l.* left. What ſaid *Epaphroditus*, then? Did he laugh at him, as we ſhould do? No: but cried out with Aſtoniſhment, Poor Man! How could you be ſilent? How could you bear it?

§. 3. . . . . The firſt Step, therefore, towards becoming a Philoſopher, is, being ſenſible in what State the ruling Faculty of the Mind is: for, when a Perſon knows it to be in a weak one, he will not immediately employ it in great Attempts. But, for want of this, ſome, who can ſcarce get down a Morſel, buy, and ſet themſelves to ſwallow, whole Treatiſes; and ſo they throw them up again, or cannot digeſt them: and then come Cholics, Fluxes, and Fevers. Such Perſons ought to conſider what they can bear. Indeed, it is

(*a*) The Text is ſo very corrupt in ſome Parts of this Chapter, that the Tranſlation muſt have been wholly conjectural; and therefore is omitted.

eaſy to convince an ignorant Perſon in Theory; but in Matters relating to Life, no one offers himſelf to Conviction; and we hate thoſe who have convinced us. *Socrates* uſed to ſay, that we ought not to live a Life unexamined.

CHAP. XXVII.

Of the ſeveral Appearances of Things to the Mind: and what Remedies are to be provided for them.

§. 1. APPEARANCES to the Mind are of Four Kinds. Things are either what they appear to be: or they neither are, nor appear to be: or they are, and do not appear to be: or they are not, and yet appear to be. To form a right Judgment in all theſe Caſes, belongs only to the completely Inſtructed. But whatever preſſes, to that a Remedy muſt be applied. If the Sophiſtries of *Pyrrhoniſm* (*a*), or the Academy,

(*a*) *Pyrrho*, the Founder of the Sect of the *Pyrrhoniſts*, was born at *Elis*, and flouriſhed about the Time of *Alexander*. He held, that there is no Difference between Juſt and Unjuſt, Good and Evil: that all Things are equally indifferent, uncertain, and undiſtinguiſhable: that neither our Senſes or Underſtanding give us either a true or a falſe Information: therefore, that we ought to give them no Credit; but to remain without Opinion; without Motion; without Inclination; and to ſay of every thing, that it no more *is*, than it is *not*; that it is no more one thing than another; and that againſt one Reaſon, there is always an equal

Academy, preſs us, the Remedy muſt be applied *there:* If ſpecious Appearances, by which Things ſeem to be good which are not ſo, let us ſeek for a Remedy *there.* If it be Cuſtom which preſſes us, we muſt endeavour to find a Remedy againſt that.

What Remedy is to be found againſt Cuſtom?

A contrary Cuſtom. You hear the Vulgar ſay, "Such a one, poor Soul! is dead."—Why, his Father died: his Mother died.—"Ay: but he "was cut off in the Flower of his Age, and in a "foreign Land."—Hear the contrary Ways of Speaking: withdraw yourſelf from theſe Expreſſions. Oppoſe to one Cuſtom, a contrary Cuſtom; to Sophiſtry, the Art of Reaſoning, and the frequent Uſe and Exerciſe of it. Againſt ſpecious Appearances, we muſt have clear Pre-conceptions,

 brightened,

equal Reaſon to be oppoſed. His Life is ſaid to have been conformable to his Principles; for that he never avoided any thing: and his Friends were obliged to follow him, to prevent his running under the Wheels of a Coach, or walking down a Precipice. But theſe Stories, perhaps, are nothing but mere Invention; formed to expoſe the Abſurdities of his Syſtem. Once, when he ſaw his Maſter *Anaxarchus* fallen into a Ditch, he paſſed by him, without offering him any Aſſiſtance. *Anaxarchus* was conſiſtent enough with his Principles, not to ſuffer *Pyrrho* to be blamed for this tranquil Behaviour: which he juſtified, as a laudable Inſtance of Indifference, and Want of Affection. A fine Picture this, of ſceptical Friendſhip!

For a more complete Account of the Syſtem of *Pyrrho*, ſee DIOG. LAERT. in his Life. And LIPSIUS *Manuduct. ad Stoic. Philoſoph.* L. ii. Diſ. 3.

brightened up, and ready. When Death appears as an Evil, we ought immediately to remember, that Evils may be avoided, but Death is Neceſſity. For what can I do, or where can I fly from it? Let me ſuppoſe myſelf to be *Sarpedon*, the Son of *Jove*, that I may ſpeak in the ſame gallant Way.

Brave tho' we die, and honour'd if we live;
Or let us Glory gain, or Glory give. POPE.

If I can atchieve nothing myſelf, I will not envy another the Honour of doing ſome gallant Action. But ſuppoſe this to be a Strain too high for *us*; are not we capable [at leaſt] of arguing thus?— Where ſhall I fly from Death? Shew me the Place; ſhew me the People, to whom I may have Recourſe, whom Death doth not overtake. Shew me the Charm to avoid it. If there be none, what would you have me do? I cannot eſcape Death: but (*b*) cannot I eſcape the Dread of it? Muſt I die trembling, and lamenting? For the Origin of the Diſeaſe is, wiſhing for ſomething that is not obtained. In conſequence of this, if I can bring over Externals to my own Inclination, I do it: if not, I want to tear out the Eyes of whoever hinders me. For it is the Nature of Man, not to bear the being deprived of Good; not to bear the falling into Evil. And ſo, at laſt, when

(*b*) The Tranſlation follows Mr. *Upton*'s Reading, φεύγεσθαι.

when I can neither bring over Things [to my own Inclination], nor tear out the Eyes of him who hinders me, I ſit down, and groan, and revile him whom I can; *Jupiter*, and the reſt of the Gods (*c*). For what are they to me, if they take no care of me?

Oh! but you will be guilty of Impiety.

What then? Can I be in a worſe Condition than I am now? In general, remember this, That unleſs Piety and Intereſt be placed in the ſame Thing, Piety cannot be preſerved in any mortal Breaſt.

§. 2. Do not theſe Things ſeem to have Force (*d*)? Let a *Pyrrhoniſt*, or an Academic, come and oppoſe them. For my Part, I am not at Leiſure; nor able to ſtand up as an Advocate for general Conſent. Even if the Buſineſs were concerning an Eſtate, I ſhould call in another Advocate. With what Advocate, then, am I contented [in the preſent Caſe]? With any that may be upon the Spot. I may be at a Loſs, perhaps, to give a Reaſon, how Senſation is performed: whether it be diffuſed univerſally, or reſide in a particular Part:

(*c*) The blaſphemous Impatience, here introduced, reſembles that which is ſtrongly deſcribed, in a few Words, *Iſa.* viii. 21.—*When they ſhall be hungry, they ſhall fret themſelves; and curſe their King, and their God, and look upward.*

(*d*) This is ſpoken in Oppoſition to the Sceptics, who are alluded to in the Beginning of the Chapter; and who ſay, that no Argument hath any Force.

Part: for I find Difficulties that ſhock me, in each Caſe: but, that you and I are not the ſame Perſon, I very exactly know.

How ſo?

Why, I never, when I have a Mind to ſwallow any thing, carry it to *your* Mouth; but my *own*. I never, when I wanted to take a Loaf, took a Bruſh: but went directly to the Loaf, as fit to anſwer my Purpoſe. And do you yourſelves, who deny all Evidence of the Senſes, act any otherwiſe? Who of you, when he intended to go into a Bath, ever went into a Mill?

What, then, muſt not we, to the utmoſt, defend theſe Points? ſupport the general Conſent [of Mankind]? be fortified againſt every thing that oppoſes it (*e*)?

Who denies that? But it muſt be done by him who hath Abilities; who hath Leiſure: but he, who is full of Trembling and Perturbation, and inward Diſorders of Heart, muſt employ his Time about ſomething elſe.

CHAP.

(*e*) This ſeems to be ſaid by one of the Hearers, who wanted to have the Abſurdities of the Sceptics confuted, and guarded againſt, by regular Argument. *Epictetus* allows this to be right, for ſuch as have Abilities and Leiſure: but recommends to others, the more neceſſary Taſk, of curing their own moral Diſorders: and inſinuates, that the mere common Occurrences of Life are ſufficient to overthrow the Notions of the *Pyrrhoniſts*.

CHAP. XXVIII.

That we are not to be angry with Mankind. What Things are little, what great, among Men.

§. 1. WHAT is the Cauſe of Aſſent to any thing?

Its appearing to be true.

It is not poſſible, therefore, to aſſent to what appears to be not true.

Why?

Becauſe it is the very Nature of the Underſtanding to agree to Truth; to be diſſatisfied with Falſhood; and to ſuſpend its Belief, in doubtful Caſes.

What is the Proof of this?

Purſuade yourſelf, if you can, that it is now Night.

Impoſſible.

Unperſuade yourſelf that it is Day.

Impoſſible.

Perſuade yourſelf, that the Stars are, or are not, even.

Impoſſible.

§. 2. When any one, then, aſſents to what is falſe, be aſſured, that he doth not wilfully aſſent to it, as falſe (for, as *Plato* affirms, the Soul is never voluntarily deprived of Truth): but what is falſe, appears to him to be true. Well, then: Have

Have we, in Actions, any thing correſpondent to True and Falſe, in Propoſitions?

Duty, and contrary to Duty: Advantageous, and Diſadvantageous: Suitable, and Unſuitable; and the like.

A Perſon then, cannot think a Thing advantageous to him, and not chuſe it.

He cannot. But how ſays *Medea?*

"*I know what Evils wait my dreadful Purpoſe;*
"*But vanquiſh'd Reaſon yields to powerful Rage.*"

Becauſe ſhe thought, that very Indulgence of her Rage, and the puniſhing her Huſband, more advantageous than the Preſervation of her Children.

Yes: but ſhe is deceived.

Shew clearly to her, that ſhe is deceived, and ſhe will forbear: but, till you have ſhewn it, what is ſhe to follow, but what appears to herſelf?

Nothing.

Why, then, are you angry (*a*) with her, that the unhappy Woman is deceived, in the moſt important Points; and inſtead of a human Creature, becomes a Viper? Why do not you rather, as we pity the Blind and Lame, ſo likewiſe pity thoſe who are blinded and lamed, in their ſuperior Faculties? Whoever, therefore, duly remembers, that the Appearance of Things to the Mind is the Standard of every Action to Man: that this

(*a*) See Note *a*, c. 18. §. 1.

this is either right or wrong: and, if right, he is without Fault; if wrong, he himſelf bears the Puniſhment: for that one Man cannot be the Perſon deceived, and another the Sufferer: will not be outrageous and angry at any one; will not revile, or reproach, or hate, quarrel with, any one.

§. 3. So then, Have all the great and dreadful Deeds, that have been done in the World, no other Original than *Appearance?*

Abſolutely, no other. The *Iliad* conſiſts of nothing but the Appearances [of Things to the Mind]; and the Uſe of thoſe Appearances. It *appeared* [right] to *Paris*, to carry off the Wife of *Menelaus*. It *appeared* [right] to *Helen*, to follow him. If, then, it had *appeared* [right] to *Menelaus*, to perſuade himſelf, that it was an Advantage to be robbed of ſuch a Wife, what could have happened? Not only the *Iliad* had been loſt, but the *Odyſſey* too.

Do theſe great Events then, depend on ſo ſmall a Cauſe?

What are theſe Events, which you call great?

Wars, and Seditions; the Deſtruction of Numbers of Men; and the Overthrow of Cities.

And what great Matter is there in all this? Nothing. What great Matter is there in the Death of Numbers of Oxen, Numbers of Sheep, or in the burning or pulling down Numbers of Neſts of Storks or Swallows?

Are

Are theſe like Caſes, then?

Perfectly like. The Bodies of Men are deſtroyed, and the Bodies of Sheep and Oxen. The Houſes of Men are burnt, and the Neſts of Storks. What is there great or dreadful in all this? Pray, ſhew me what Difference there is between the Houſe of a Man, and the Neſt of a Stork, ſo far as it is a Habitation (*b*), excepting that Houſes are built with Beams, and Tiles, and Bricks; and Neſts, with Sticks and Clay?

What, then, is a Stork and a Man a like Thing? What do you mean?

With regard to Body, extremely like.

Is there no Difference, then, between a Man and a Stork?

Yes, ſurely: but not in theſe Things.

In what then?

Enquire; and you will find, that the Difference conſiſts in ſomething elſe. See whether it be not, in acting with Diſcernment: whether it be not, in a ſocial Diſpoſition; in Fidelity, Honour, Steadineſs, Judgment.

§. 4. Where then, is the great Good or Evil of Man?

Where his Difference is. If this is preſerved, and remains well fortified, and neither Honour, Fidelity, or Judgment, is deſtroyed, then he himſelf

(*b*) The Order of the following Words is diſturbed in the Original. The Tranſlation follows Mr. *Upton*'s Correction.

ſelf is preſerved likewiſe: but, when any of theſe is loſt and demoliſhed, he himſelf is loſt alſo. In this do all great Events conſiſt. *Paris*, they ſay, was undone, becauſe the *Greeks* invaded *Troy*, and laid it waſte; and his Family were ſlain in Battle. By no means: for no one is undone by an Action, not his own. All *that* was only laying waſte the Neſts of Storks. But his true Undoing was, when he loſt the modeſt, the faithful, the hoſpitable, and the decent Character. When was *Achilles* undone? When *Patroclus* died? By no means. But when he gave himſelf up to Rage; when he wept over a Girl; when he forgot, that he came there, not to get Miſtreſſes, but to fight. This is human Undoing; this is the Siege; this the Overthrow: when right Principles are ruined; when theſe are deſtroyed.

But, when Wives and Children are led away Captives, and the Men themſelves killed, are not theſe Evils?

Whence do you conclude them ſuch? Pray inform me, in my Turn.

Nay: but whence do you affirm, that they are not Evils?

§. 5. Let us recur to the Rules. Produce the Pre-conceptions. One cannot ſufficiently wonder at what happens, in this Reſpect. When we would judge of Light and Heavy, we do not judge by Gueſs: when of Strait and Crooked, not

not by Gueſs: and, in general, when it concerns us to know the Truth of any Particular, no one of us will do any thing, by Gueſs. But, where the firſt and principal Cauſe is concerned, of acting either right or wrong; of being proſperous or unproſperous, happy or unhappy; there only do we act raſhly, and by Gueſs. No-where any thing like a Balance; no-where any thing like a Rule: but ſome Fancy ſtrikes me, and I inſtantly act conformably to it. For am I better than *Agamemnon* or *Achilles*; that they, by following their Fancies, ſhould do and ſuffer ſo many Things, and Fancy not ſuffice *me?* And what Tragedy hath any other Original? The *Atreus* of *Euripides*, what is it? Fancy. The *Oedipus* of *Sophocles?* Fancy. The *Phœnix?* The *Hippolytus?* All Fancy. To what Character, then, doth it belong, think you, to take no care of this Point? What are they called who follow every Fancy?

Madmen.

Do *we*, then, behave any otherwiſe?

CHAP. XXIX.

Of Intrepidity.

§. 1. THE Eſſence of Good and Evil, is a certain Diſpoſition of the Choice.

What are Externals, then?

Materials

Materials to the Faculty of Choice: in the Management of which, it will attain its own Good or Evil.

How, then, will it attain Good?

If it doth not admire the Materials themſelves: for right Principles, concerning theſe Materials, conſtitute a good Choice: but perverſe and diſtorted Principles, a bad one. This Law hath God ordained, who ſays; "If you wiſh for Good, "receive it from yourſelf." You ſay, No: but from another.—"Nay; but from yourſelf." In conſequence of this, when a Tyrant threatens, and ſends for me; I ſay, Againſt what is your Threatning pointed? If he ſays, "I will chain "you;" I anſwer, It is my *Hands* and *Feet* that you threaten. If he ſays, "I will cut off your "Head;" I anſwer, It is my *Head* that you threaten. If he ſays, "I will throw you into "Priſon;" I anſwer, It is the Whole of this paultry *Body* that you threaten: and, if he threatens Baniſhment, juſt the ſame.

Doth not he threaten *you*, then?

If I am perſuaded, that theſe Things are nothing to me, he doth not: but, if I fear any of them, it is *me* that he threatens. Whom, after all, is it that I fear? The Maſter of what? Of Things in my own Power? Of theſe no one is the Maſter. Of Things not in my Power? And what are theſe to *me*?

§. 2.

§. 2. What, then! do you Philoſophers teach us a Contempt of Kings?

By no means. Who of us teaches any one to contend with them, about Things of which they have the Command? Take my Body; take my Poſſeſſions; take my Reputation; take thoſe who are about me. If I perſuade any one to contend for theſe Things, as his own, accuſe me, with Juſtice.—"Ay: but I would command your "*Principles* too."—And who hath given you that Power? How can you conquer the Principle of another?—By applying Terror, I will conquer it.—Do not you ſee, that (*a*) what conquers itſelf, is not conquered by another? And nothing but itſelf can conquer the Choice. Hence, too, the moſt excellent and equitable Law of God; that the Better ſhould always prove ſuperior to the Worſe. Ten are better than one.

To what Purpoſe?

For chaining, killing, dragging where they pleaſe; for taking away an Eſtate. Thus Ten conquer One, in the Inſtance wherein they are better.

In what, then, are they worſe?

When the one hath right *Principles*, and the others have not. For can they conquer in this Point? How ſhould they? If we were weighed in a Scale, muſt not the Heavier outweigh?

§. 3.

(*a*) The Senſe of this Paſſage ſeems to require that the firſt αυτο ſhould be read ὁ.

§. 3. That ever *Socrates* ſhould ſuffer ſuch Things from the *Athenians!*

Wretch! what do you mean by (*b*) *Socrates?* Expreſs the Fact as it is. That ever the poor paultry *Body* of *Socrates* ſhould be carried away, and dragged to Priſon, by ſuch as were ſtronger [than itſelf]: that ever any one ſhould give Hemlock to the *Body* of *Socrates*; and that it ſhould expire! Do *theſe* Things appear wonderful to you? *Theſe* Things unjuſt? Is it for ſuch Things as *theſe* that you accuſe God? Had *Socrates*, then, no Equivalent for them? In what, then, to him, did the Eſſence of Good conſiſt? Whom ſhall we mind; you, or him? And what doth he ſay? "*Anytus* and *Melitus* (*c*) may indeed kill; but "hurt me they cannot." And again: "If it ſo "pleaſes God, ſo let it be."

§. 4. But ſhew me, that he who hath the worſe Principles, gets the Advantage over him, who hath the better. You never will ſhew it, nor any thing like

(*b*) *Socrates*, being aſked by *Crito*, in what Manner he would be buried? anſwered, As you pleaſe; if you can lay hold on me, and I do not eſcape from you. Then, ſmiling, and turning to his Friends, I cannot, ſays he, perſuade *Crito*, that I, who am now diſputing, and ranging the Parts of my Diſcourſe, am *Socrates*: but he thinks the Corpſe, which he will ſoon behold, to be *me*; and, therefore, aſks how he muſt bury *me*. PLATO, *in Phæd.* §. 64. FORSTER's *Edition*.

(*c*) The two principal Accuſers of *Socrates*.

like it: for the Law of Nature and of God, is this; Let the Better be always ſuperior to the Worſe.

In what?

In that, wherein it is better. One Body is ſtronger than another: Many than one; and a Thief, than one who is not a Thief. Thus I, too, loſt my Lamp; becauſe the Thief was better at keeping awake, than I. But he bought a Lamp, at the Price of being a Thief, a Rogue, and a wild Beaſt. This ſeemed to him a good Bargain: and much Good may it do him!

§. 5. Well: but one takes me by the Coat, and draws me to the Forum; and then all the reſt bawl out—"Philoſopher, what Good do your *Princi-* "*ples* do you? See, you are dragging to Priſon: "ſee, you are going to loſe your Head!"—And, pray what Rule of Philoſophy could I contrive, that, when a ſtronger than myſelf lays hold on my Coat, I ſhould not be dragged? Or that, when ten Men pull me at once, and throw me into Priſon, I ſhould not be thrown there? But have I learnt nothing, then? I have learnt to know, whatever happens, that, if it is not a Matter of Choice, it is nothing to *me*. Have my Principles, then, done me no Good (*d*)! What,

(*d*) This is evidently a Continuation of the Philoſopher's Anſwer to thoſe who reproached him, that his Principles had done him no Good; and, therefore, is tranſlated in the firſt Perſon, though it is ωφελησαι and ζητεις in the *Greek*.

What, then! do I ſeek for any thing elſe to do me Good, but what I have learnt? Afterwards, as I ſit in Priſon, I ſay: He, who makes this Outcry, neither hears what Signal is given, nor underſtands what is ſaid; nor is it any Concern to him, to know what Philoſophers ſay, or do. Let him alone.—[Well: but I am bid] to come out of Priſon again.—If you have no further Need for me, in Priſon, I will come out: if you want me again, I will return.—"For how long [will "you go on thus?]"—Juſt as long as (*e*) Reaſon requires I ſhould continue in this paultry Body: when that is over, take it, and fare ye well. Only let not this be done inconſiderately; nor from Cowardice; nor upon every ſlight Pretence: for that, again, would be contrary to the Will of God: for he hath Need of ſuch a World, and ſuch [Creatures] to live on Earth. But, if he ſounds

Greek. This ſudden Change of the Perſon, is very frequent in *Epictetus*; but would often diſturb the Senſe, if it was preſerved in a Tranſlation. Perhaps ωφελησαι is a Miſtake, for ωφελημαι; as M, Σ are the ſame Letters differently turned.

(*e*) The Meaning of *Epictetus*, in this Paſſage, is not clear. If he is ſpeaking of a voluntary Death, which ſome of his Expreſſions plainly imply, the Inſtance of *Socrates* ſeems improperly choſen: for he did not kill himſelf; but was ſentenced by the Laws of his Country: to which, indeed, he paid ſo great a Reverence, as to refuſe all the Aſſiſtance which was offered by his Friends, in order to his Eſcape.

a Retreat, as he did to *Socrates*, we are to obey him, when he ſounds it, as our General.

§. 6. Well: but are theſe Things to be ſaid to the World?

For what Purpoſe? Is it not ſufficient to be convinced one's ſelf? When Children come to us, clapping their Hands, and ſaying; "To-morrow "is the good Feaſt of *Saturn*:" do we tell them, that *Good* doth not conſiſt in ſuch Things? By no means: but we clap our Hands along with them. Thus, when you are unable to convince any one, conſider him as a Child, and clap your Hands with him: or, if you will not do that, at leaſt hold your Tongue. Theſe Things we ought to remember; and, when we are called to any Difficulty, to know, that an Opportunity is come, of ſhewing whether we have been well taught. For he who goes from a philoſophical Lecture to a difficult Point of Practice, is like a young Man who has been ſtudying to ſolve Syllogiſms. If you propoſe an eaſy one, he ſays; Give me rather a fine intricate one, that I may try my Strength. Even athletic Champions are diſpleaſed with a ſlight Antagoniſt. He cannot lift me, ſays one. This is a Youth of Spirit. No: but, I warrant you, when the Occaſion calls upon him, he muſt fall a crying, and ſay; "I "wanted to learn a little longer firſt."—Learn what? If you did not learn theſe Things to ſhew them

them in Practice, why did you learn them at all? I am perſuaded there muſt be ſome one among you who ſit here, that feels ſecret Pangs of Impatience, and ſays; "When will ſuch a Diffi-"culty come to *my* Share, as hath now fallen to "his? Muſt I ſit waſting my Life in a Corner, "when I might be crowned at *Olympia*? When "will any one bring the News of ſuch a Combat, "for *me*?" Such ſhould be the Diſpoſition of you all. Even among the Gladiators of *Cæſar*, there are ſome who bear it very ill, that they are not brought upon the Stage, and match'd; and who offer Vows to God, and addreſs the Officers, begging to fight. And will none among *you*, appear ſuch? I would willingly take a Voyage, on purpoſe to ſee how a Champion of mine acts; how he treats his Subject.—"I do not chuſe ſuch "a Subject," ſay you.—Is it in your Power, then, to take what Subject you chuſe? Such a Body is given you; ſuch Parents, ſuch Brothers, ſuch a Country, and ſuch a Rank in it; and, then, you come to me, and ſay, "Change my Subject." Beſides, have not you Abilities to manage that which is given you? It is your Buſineſs, [we ſhould ſay] to propoſe; mine, to treat the Subject well.—"No. But do not propoſe *ſuch* an "Argument to me; but *ſuch* a one: do not offer "*ſuch* an Objection to me; but *ſuch* a one."—There will be a Time, I ſuppoſe, when Trage-

dians will fancy themſelves to be mere Maſks, and Buſkins, and long Train. Theſe Things are your Materials, Man, and your Subject. Speak ſomething; that we may know, whether you are a Tragedian, or a Buffoon: for both have all the reſt, in common. If any one, therefore, ſhould take away his Buſkins, and his Maſk, and bring him upon the Stage, in his (*f*) common Dreſs, is the Tragedian loſt, or doth he remain? If he hath a Voice, he remains. "Here, this Inſtant, "take upon you the Command." I take it; and, taking it, I ſhew how a Perſon, who hath been properly inſtructed, behaves.—"Lay aſide your "Robe; put on Rags, and come upon the Stage "in that Character."—What then? Is it not in my Power to bring a good Voice [and Manner] along with me?—"In what Character do you "now appear?" As a (*g*) Witneſs cited by God. "Come you, then, and bear witneſs for me; "for you are a Witneſs worthy of being produced "by me. Is any thing, external to the Choice, "either Good or Evil? Do I hurt any one? "Have

(*f*) Φαινολη. Lord SHAFTESBURY.

(*g*) This imaginary Witneſs, firſt extolled, then failing in his Teſtimony, brings to one's Mind with unſpeakable Advantage, that *true and faithful Witneſs*, who hath ſo fully atteſted the far more important Doctrines of Pardon, Grace, and everlaſting Life: and taught Men, on this Foundation, not *to be afraid of them that kill the Body; and, after that, have no more that they can do.*

"Have I placed the Good of each Individual in "any one, but in himſelf? What Evidence do "you give for God?"—*I am in a miſerable Condition, O Lord* (*b*); *I am undone: no Mortal cares for me: no Mortal gives me any thing: all blame me; all ſpeak ill of me.*—Is *this* the Evidence you are to give? And will you bring Diſgrace upon his Citation, who hath conferred ſuch an Honour upon you, and thought you worthy of being produced as a Witneſs in ſuch a Cauſe?

§. 7. But he who hath the Power, hath given Sentence. "*I judge you to be impious and profane.*"—What hath befallen you?—I have been judged to be impious and profane—Any thing elſe?—Nothing.—Suppoſe he had paſſed his Judgment upon any hypothetical Propoſition, and pronounced it to be a falſe Concluſion, that, if it be Day, it is light; what would have befallen the Propoſition? In this Caſe, who is judged; who condemned; the Propoſition, or he who is deceived, concerning it? Doth he, who hath the Power of pronouncing any thing, concerning you, know, what Pious, or Impious, mean? Hath he made it his Study, or learned it? Where? From whom? A Muſician would not regard him, if he pro-

 nounced

(*b*) It hath been obſerved, that this Manner of Expreſſion is not to be met with in the Heathen Authors before Chriſtianity: and, therefore, it is one Inſtance of Scripture Language coming early into common Uſe.

nounced Baſs to be Treble; nor a Mathematician, if he paſſed Sentence, that Lines drawn from the Center to the Circumference, are not equal. And ſhall He, who is truly learned, regard an unlearned Man, when he pronounces upon Pious and Impious, Juſt and Unjuſt?

§. 8. "Oh the Injuries to which the Learned "are expoſed!" Is it *here* that you have learned this? Why do not you leave ſuch pitiful Reaſonings to idle pitiful Fellows (*i*); and let them ſit in a Corner, and receive ſome little ſorry Pay; or grumble, that nobody gives them any thing? But do *you* appear, and make uſe of what you have learned. It is not *Reaſonings* that are wanted now. On the contrary, Books are ſtuffed full of Stoical Reaſonings.

What is wanted, then?

One to apply them; whoſe Actions may bear Teſtimony to his Doctrines. Aſſume me this Character, that we may no longer make uſe of the Examples of the Ancients, in the Schools; but may have ſome Example of our own.

§. 9. To whom, then, doth the Contemplation of theſe [ſpeculative Reaſonings] belong?

To him, that hath Leiſure. For Man is an Animal fond of Contemplation. But it is ſhameful to take a View of theſe Things, as run-away Slaves do of a Play. We are to ſit quietly, and liſten,

(*i*) The mercenary Profeſſors of Philoſophy, at that Time.

liſten, ſometimes to the Actor, and ſometimes to the Muſician: and not do like thoſe, who come in and praiſe the Actor, and at the ſame time look round them every Way: then, if any one happens to name their Maſter, are frighted out of their Wits, and run off. It is ſhameful for a Philoſopher, thus to contemplate the Works of Nature. Now, what, in this Caſe, is the Maſter? Man is not the Maſter of Man; but Death, and Life, and Pleaſure, and Pain: for without theſe, bring *Cæſar* to me, and you will ſee how intrepid I ſhall be. But, if he comes thundering and lightening with *theſe*; and *theſe* are the Objects of my Terror; what do I elſe, but, like the run-away Slave, acknowledge my Maſter? While I have any Reſpite from theſe, as the Fugitive comes into the Theatre, ſo I bathe, drink, ſing; but all, with Terror and Anxiety. But, if I free myſelf from my Maſters, that is, from ſuch Things as render a Maſter terrible, what Trouble, what Maſter have I remaining?

§. 10. What, then, are we to publiſh theſe Things to all Men?

No. But humour the Vulgar, and ſay; This poor Man adviſes me to what he thinks good for himſelf. I excuſe him: for *Socrates*, too, excuſed the Jailer, who wept when he was to drink the Poiſon: and ſaid, "How heartily he ſheds Tears "for us." Was it to *him* that *Socrates* ſaid, "For

"this Reaſon we ſent the Women out of the "Way?" No: but to his *Friends*; to ſuch, as were capable of hearing it: while he humoured the other, as a Child.

CHAP. XXX.

What we ought to have ready, in difficult Circumſtances.

WHEN you are going to any of the Great, remember, that there is Another, who ſees from Above, what paſſes; and whom you ought to pleaſe, rather than Man. He, therefore, aſks you:

In the Schools, what did you uſe to call Exile, and Priſon, and Chains, and Death, and Defamation?

I? Indifferent Things.

What, then, do you call them *now?* Are they at all changed?

No.

Are *you* changed, then?

No.

Tell me, then, what Things are indifferent.

Things independent on Choice.

Tell me the Conſequence too.

Things independent on Choice, are nothing to *me*.

Tell me, likewiſe, what appeared to us, to be the Good of Man.

A

A right Choice, and a [right] Uſe of the Appearances of Things.

What his End?

To follow Thee.

Do you ſay the ſame Things *now*, too?

Yes. I do ſay the ſame Things, even now.

Well, go in, then, boldly, and mindful of theſe Things; and he [to whom you are going] will ſee, what a Youth, who hath ſtudied what he ought, is among Men, who have not. I proteſt, I imagine you will have ſuch Thoughts as theſe: "Why do we provide ſo many and great "Qualifications, for nothing? Is the Power, "the Antichamber, the Attendants, the Guards, "no more than this? Is it for theſe, that I have "liſtened to ſo many Diſſertations? Theſe are "nothing: and I had qualified myſelf as for "ſome great Encounter."

END *of the* FIRST BOOK.

THE DISCOURSES OF *EPICTETUS.*

BOOK II.

CHAP. I.

That Courage is not inconſiſtent with Caution.

§. 1. HAT is aſſerted by the Philoſophers, may, perhaps, appear à Paradox to ſome: let us, however, examine, as well as we can, whether this be true; That it is poſſible in all Things, to act at once with Caution and Courage. For Caution ſeems, in ſome meaſure, contrary to Courage: and Contraries are by no means conſiſtent. The Ap-

pearance of a Paradox to many, in the preſent Caſe, ſeems to me to ariſe from ſomething like this: If, indeed, we aſſert, that Courage and Caution are to be uſed, in the ſame Inſtances, we ſhould juſtly be accuſed of uniting Contradictions: but, in the Way that we affirm it, where is the Abſurdity? For, if what hath been ſo often ſaid, and ſo often demonſtrated, be certain, that the Eſſence of Good and Evil conſiſts in the Uſe of the Appearances; and that Things independent on Choice, are not of the Nature either of Good or Evil; what Paradox do the Philoſophers aſſert, if they ſay: "Where Things are not dependent on "Choice, be courageous: where they are, be "cautious?" For in theſe only, if Evil conſiſts in a bad Choice, is Caution to be uſed. And if Things independent on Choice, and not in our Power, are nothing to us, in theſe we are to make uſe of Courage. Thus we ſhall be at once cautious and courageous: and, indeed, courageous on the Account of this very Caution; for by uſing Caution, with regard to Things really evil, we ſhall gain Courage, with regard to what are not ſo.

§. 2. But we are in the ſame Condition as [hunted] Deer: when theſe, in a Fright, fly from the Feathers (*a*), where do they turn, and to what

(*a*) This was a Kind of Scare-crow, formed of different coloured Feathers, by which the Animal was terrified, and ſo driven into the Net: which was the ancient Manner of Hunting.

what do they retire for Safety? To the Toils. And thus they are undone, by inverting the Objects of Fear and Confidence. Thus we, too. In what Inſtances do we make uſe of Fear? In Things independent on Choice. In what, on the other hand, do we behave with Courage, as if there were nothing to be dreaded? In Things dependent on Choice. To be deceived then, or to act raſhly or impudently, or to indulge a ſcandalous Deſire, is of no Importance to us, if we do but take a good Aim, in Things independent on Choice. But where Death, or Exile, or Pain, or Ignominy, are concerned, there is the Retreat, there, the Flutter and Fright. Hence, as it muſt be with thoſe who err in Matters of the greateſt Importance, what is naturally Courage, we render bold, deſperate, raſh, and impudent: and what is naturally Caution, timid and baſe, and full of Fears and Perturbations. For if a Perſon was to transfer Caution to Choice, and the Actions of Choice, by a Willingneſs to be cautious, he will, at the ſame time, have it in his Power to avoid [what he guards againſt:] but if he transfers it to Things not in our Power, or Choice, by fixing his Averſion on what is not in our own Power, but dependent on others, he will neceſſarily fear; he will be hurried; will be diſturbed. For it is not Death, or Pain, that is to

be feared; but the *Fear* of Pain or Death. Hence we commend him who ſays:

Death is no Ill, but ſhamefully *to die.*

Courage, then, ought to be oppoſed to Death, and Caution to the Fear of Death: whereas *we*, on the contrary, oppoſe to Death, Flight; and to our Principle concerning it, Careleſſneſs, and Deſperateneſs, and Indifference.

§. 3. *Socrates* uſed, very properly, to call theſe Things Vizards: for, as Maſks appear ſhocking and formidable to Children, from their Inexperience; we are affected in like manner, with regard to Things, for no other Reaſon, than as Children are, with regard to Vizards. For what is a Child? Ignorance. What is a Child? Want of Learning: for, ſo far as the Knowledge of Children extends, they are not inferior to us. What is Death? A Vizard. Turn it, and be convinced. See, it doth not bite. This little Body and Spirit muſt be ſeparated (as they formerly were) either now, or hereafter: why, then, are you diſpleaſed if it be now? For if not *now*, it will be hereafter. Why? To complete the Revolution of the World: for that hath need of ſome Things preſent, others to come, and others already completed. What is Pain? A Vizard. Turn it, and be convinced.

This

This paultry Fleſh is ſometimes affected by harſh, ſometimes by ſmooth Impreſſions. If ſuffering be not worth your while, the Door is open; if it be, bear it: for it was fit the Door ſhould be open, againſt all Accidents. And thus we have no Trouble.

§. 4. What, then, is the Fruit of theſe Principles? What it ought to be; the moſt noble, and the moſt becoming the Truly Educated (*b*), Tranquillity, Security, Freedom. For in this Caſe, we are not to give Credit to the Many, who ſay, that none ought to be educated but the Free; but rather to the Philoſophers, who ſay, that the Well-educated alone are free.

How ſo?

Thus:

(*b*) Παιδεια, in *Greek*, means nearly the ſame Thing, as what we now call *liberal Education*. It was that Sort of Education peculiar to Gentlemen; that is, ſuch as were free; and of which the Slaves, or lower Sort of People, were forbid to partake, according to the Syſtems of ſome Legiſlators. Such (as well as I can remember) was the Caſe among the *Lacedemonians*, and amongſt the ancient *Perſians*, till the Time of *Cyrus*.

It muſt be obſerved, that the Words Educated, Free, King, and many others, were taken by the Stoics from common Life; and by them applied ſolely to the Character of their wiſe, and perfect Man.

The Tranſlator is obliged for this Note, as well as for many other valuable Hints, to Mr. HARRIS; ſo well known for many Works of Literature and Genius.

Thus: Is Freedom any thing elſe, than the Power of Living as we like?

Nothing elſe.

Well: tell me then, do you like to live in Error?

We do not. No one, ſure, that lives in Error, (*c*) is free.

Do you like to live in Fear? Do you like to live in Sorrow? Do you like to live in Perturbation?

By no means.

No one, therefore, in a State of Fear, or Sorrow, or Perturbation, is free: but whoever is delivered from Sorrow, Fear, and Perturbation, by the ſame means is delivered likewiſe from Slavery. How ſhall we believe you, then, good Legiſlators, when you ſay; "We allow none to be educated "but the Free?" For the Philoſophers ſay; "We "allow none to be free, but the Liberally-edu-"cated:" that is, God doth not allow it.

What, then, when any Perſon hath turned his Slave (*d*) about before the Conſul, hath he done nothing? Yes,

(*c*) *And ye ſhall know the Truth, and the Truth ſhall make you free.* John viii. 32. This is one, among many other Paſſages to the ſame Purpoſe, in that *perfect Law of Liberty*, the New Teſtament.

(*d*) When a Slave was to be preſented with his Freedom, he was brought before the Conſul; and his Maſter, taking him by the Hand, pronounced a certain Form of Words, and

Yes, he hath.

What?

He hath turned his Slave about, before the Conſul.

Nothing more?

Yes. He pays a (*d*) Fine for him.

Well then: is not the Man, who hath gone through this Ceremony, rendered free?

No more than [he is rendered] exempt from Perturbation. Pray, have you, who are able to give this Freedom to others, no Maſter of your own? Are not you a Slave to Money? To a Girl? To a Boy? To a Tyrant? To ſome Friend of a Tyrant? Elſe, why do you tremble when *any* of theſe is in queſtion? Therefore, I ſo often repeat to you, Let this be your Study; have this always at hand; in what it is neceſſary to be courageous, and in what cautious: courageous, in what doth not depend on Choice; cautious, in what doth.

§. 5. (*e*) But have not I read my Papers to to you? Do not you know what I am doing?

In what?

In my Eſſays.

Show me in what State you are, as to Deſire an Averſion. Whether you do not fail of what you

and then turned the Slave about, who was thus rendered free. The Fine which the Maſter was to pay on this Occaſion, was applied to the public Uſe. UPTON.

(*d*) See Note (*d*) in the preceding Page.

(*e*) This ſeems to be ſpoken by one of the Scholars.

you wiſh, and incur what you would avoid: but, as to theſe common-place Eſſays, if you are wiſe, you will take them, and obliterate them.

Why, did not *Socrates* write?

Yes: who *(f)* ſo much? But how? As he had not always one at hand, to argue againſt his Principles, or be argued againſt in his Turn, he argued with, and examined, himſelf; and always treated, at leaſt, ſome one natural Notion, in a manner fitted for the Uſe of Life. Theſe are the Things which a Philoſopher writes: but for ſuch *(g)* common-place Eſſays as thoſe I am ſpeaking of, he leaves to the Inſenſible, or to the happy Creatures whom Idleneſs *(h)* furniſhes with Leiſure;

(f) No other ancient Author mentions *Socrates*, as having written any Thing, excepting a Hymn to *Apollo*, and a Tranſlation of ſome Fables of *Æſop* into Verſe. Many Authors of Credit affirm, that he wrote nothing. Therefore *Wolfius* doubts, whether ſome other Name ſhould not be put here, inſtead of *Socrates*. Yet the Deſcription moſt properly belongs to him. And, perhaps, *Epictetus* doth not mean to intimate here, that *Socrates* had publiſhed any thing: but that he wrote, when he had no Opportunity of diſcourſing, for his own Improvement. But ſtill, living conſtantly at *Athens*, the Seat of philoſophical Diſputation, he cannot be ſuppoſed, often to have had that Reaſon for Writing.

(g) The Original here ſeems corrupt, or inaccurate. I hope the Tranſlation is not far from the true Senſe.

(h) The *Greek* is Αταραξια, Tranquillity: but it ſeems to be a falſe Reading for Ανραξια. Αταραξια is the very Thing

ſure; or to ſuch as are too weak to regard Conſequences. And will you, when you are gone from hence (*i*), which the Time now calls for, be fond of ſhowing, and reading, and be ridiculouſly conceited, of theſe Things?

Pray ſee, how I compoſe Dialogues.

Talk not of that, Man; but rather be able to ſay; See, how I avoid being diſappointed of my Deſire: ſee, how I ſecure myſelf againſt incurring my Averſion. Set Death before me; ſet Pain, ſet a Priſon, ſet Ignominy, ſet Condemnation before me; and you will know me. This is the [proper] Oſtentation of a young Man come out from the Schools. Leave the reſt to others. Let no one ever hear you utter a Word about them: nor ſuffer it, if any one commends you for them: but think that you are nobody, and that you know nothing. Appear to know only this, how you may never be diſappointed of your Deſire; never incur your Averſion. Let others ſtudy Cauſes, Problems, and Syllogiſms. Do *you* ſtudy

Thing which *Epictetus* had been recommending through the whole Chapter, and which makes the Subject of the next; and, therefore, cannot be well ſuppoſed to be the true Reading in a Place, where it is mentioned with Contempt.

(*i*) For ἐπελθὼν, perhaps, the Reading, ſhould be ἀπελθὼν; and it is ſo tranſlated. The Perſon to whom *Epictetus* ſpeaks, was a young Man juſt leaving the philoſophical School.

ſtudy Death, Chains, Torture, Exile (*k*): and all theſe, with Courage, and Reliance upon Him, who hath called you to them, and judged you worthy a Poſt, in which you may ſhow, what the rational governing Faculty can do, when ſet in Array, againſt Powers independent on the Choice. And thus, this Paradox becomes neither impoſſible, nor a Paradox, that we muſt be at once cautious and courageous: courageous, in what doth not depend upon Choice; and cautious, in what doth.

CHAP. II.

Of Tranquillity.

§. 1. CONSIDER, you who are going to take your Tryal, what you wiſh to preſerve, and in what to ſucceed. For if you wiſh to preſerve a Choice conformable to Nature, you are intirely ſafe: every thing goes well; you have no Trouble on your Hands. While you wiſh to preſerve what is in your own Power, and which is

(*k*) Some *Engliſh* Readers, too happy to comprehend how Chains, Torture, Exile, and ſudden Executions, can be ranked among the common Accidents of Life, may be ſurprized to find *Epictetus* ſo frequently endeavouring to prepare his Hearers for them. But it muſt be recollected, that he addreſſed himſelf to Perſons, who lived under the *Roman* Emperors; from whoſe Tyranny, the very beſt of Men were perpetually liable to ſuch Kind of Dangers.

is naturally free, and are contented with that, whom have you longer to care for? For who is the Maſter of Things like theſe? Who can take them away? If you wiſh to be a Man of Honour and Fidelity, who ſhall prevent you? If you wiſh not to be reſtrained, or compelled, who ſhall compel you to Deſires, contrary to your Principles; to Averſions, contrary to your Opinion? The Judge, perhaps, will paſs a Sentence againſt you, which he thinks formidable: but how can he likewiſe make you receive it with Averſion? Since, then, Deſire and Averſion are in your own Power, what have you elſe to care for? Let this be your Introduction; this your Narration; this your Proof; this your Victory; this your Concluſion; and this your Applauſe. Thus *Socrates*, to one who put him in mind to prepare himſelf for his Tryal; "Do not you think, ſays he, that "I have been preparing myſelf for this very "Thing my whole Life?" — By what kind of Preparation? — "I have preſerved what was in "my own Power." — What do you mean? — "I have done nothing unjuſt, either in public, or "in private Life."

§. 2. But if you wiſh to preſerve Externals too; your paultry Body, your Eſtate, or Dignity; I adviſe you immediately to prepare yourſelf by every poſſible Preparation; and beſides, conſider the Diſpoſition of your Judge, and of your Adverſary.

ſary. If it be neceſſary to fall down at his Feet; fall down at his Feet: if to weep, weep: if to groan; groan. For when you have ſubjected what is in your own Power to Externals, ſubmit to Slavery at once, and do not ſtruggle; and at one time, be willing to be a Slave, and at another, not willing: but ſimply, and with your whole Intention, be one or the other; free, or a Slave; well-educated, or not; a Game Cock, or a Craven: either bear to be beat till you die, or give out at once; and do not be ſoundly beat firſt, and then give out at laſt. If both theſe be ſhameful, make the Diſtinction immediately.

§. 3. Where is the Nature of Good and Evil? Where Truth likewiſe is. Where Truth and where Nature are (*a*), there is Caution: where Truth and where Nature are not, there is Courage. Why, do you think, that if *Socrates* had wiſhed to preſerve Externals, that he would have ſaid, when he appeared at his Tryal, "*Anytus* "and *Melitus* may indeed kill; but hurt me they "cannot?" Was he ſo fooliſh, as not to ſee that this Way doth not lead to that End, but the contrary;

(*a*) This Paſſage is perplexed in the *Greek*, and the Tranſlation conjectural. The Meaning ſeems to be, that where our moral Conduct is concerned, Caution is neceſſary; and Courage is neceſſary in Things not dependent on our own Choice; and with which, according to the Stoic Principle, Truth and Nature have nothing to do.

trary? What, then, is the Reaſon, that he not only diſregards, but provokes his Judges? Thus my Friend *Heraclitus*, in a trifling Suit, about a little Eſtate at *Rhodes*, after having proved to the Judges that his Cauſe was good, when he came to the Concluſion of his Speech; "I will not in-"treat you, ſays he; nor care what Judgment "you give: for it is rather *you* who are to be "judged, than *I*." And thus he loſt his Suit. What need was there of this? Be content not to intreat: do not *tell* them too, that you will not intreat; unleſs it be a proper Time to provoke the Judges deſignedly; as in the Caſe of *Socrates*. But if you too are preparing ſuch a Speech, what do you wait for? Why do you ſubmit to be tried? For if you wiſh to be hanged, have Patience, and the Gibbet will come. But if you chuſe rather to ſubmit, and make your Defence as well as you can, all the reſt is to be ordered accordingly: with a due Regard, however, to the Preſervation of your own Character.

§. 4. For this Reaſon it is ridiculous too to ſay, "Suggeſt to me what is to be done." How ſhould I know what to ſuggeſt to you? [You ſhould rather ſay] inform my Underſtanding to accommodate itſelf to whatever may be the Event. The former is juſt as if an illiterate Perſon ſhould ſay, "Tell me what to write, when any Name "is

" is propoſed to me;" and I direct him to write *Dion*; and then another comes, and propoſes to him the Name not of *Dion*, but of *Theon*; what will be the Conſequence? What will he write? Whereas, if you had made Writing your Study, you would be ready prepared for whatever Word might occur: if not, how can I ſuggeſt to you? For, if the Circumſtances of the Affair ſhould ſuggeſt ſomething elſe, what will you ſay, or how will you act? Remember, then, the general Rule, and you will need no Suggeſtion: but if you gape after Externals, you muſt neceſſarily be toſſed up and down, according to the Inclination of your Maſter.

And who is my Maſter?

He in whoſe Power, is placed whatever you ſtrive to acquire, or would avoid.

CHAP. III.

Concerning ſuch as recommend Perſons to the Philoſophers.

§. 1. DIOGENES rightly anſwered one, who deſired Letters of Recommendation from him, " At firſt ſight he will know you to " be a Man; and whether you are good or a bad " Man, if he hath any Skill in diſtinguiſhing, he " will know likewiſe: and, if he hath not, he " will never know it, though I ſhould write a " thouſand

"thouſand times (*a*)." Juſt as if you were a Piece of Coin, and ſhould deſire to be recommended to any Perſon as good, in order to be tried; if it be to an Aſſayer, he will know your Value; for you will recommend yourſelf.

§. 2. We ought, therefore, in Life alſo, to have ſomething analogous to this Skill in Gold: that one may be able to ſay, like the Aſſayer, Bring me whatever Piece you will, and I will find out its Value: or, as I would ſay with regard to Syllogiſms, Bring me whomever you will, and I will diſtinguiſh for you, whether he knows how to ſolve Syllogiſms, or not. Why? Becauſe I can ſolve Syllogiſms myſelf, and have that Faculty, which is neceſſary for one who knows how to find out Perſons ſkilled in the Solution of Syllogiſms. But how do I act in Life? I at ſometimes call a Thing good; at others, bad. What is the Cauſe of this? The contrary to what happens in Syllogiſms; Ignorance, and Inexperience.

(*a*) This is one of the many extravagant Refinements of the Philoſophers; and might lead Perſons into very dangerous Miſtakes, if it was laid down as a Maxim, in ordinary Life.

CHAP. IV.

Concerning a Perſon, who had been guilty of Adultery.

§. 1. AS he was ſaying, that Man is made for Fidelity; and that whoever ſubverts this, ſubverts the peculiar Property of Man; one of thoſe who paſs for Men of Literature happened to come in, who had been found guilty of Adultery, in that City. But, continues *Epictetus*, if, laying aſide that Fidelity for which we were born, we form Deſigns againſt the Wife of our Neighbour, what do we do? What elſe but deſtroy and ruin — What? Fidelity, Honour, and Sanctity of Manners. — Only theſe? And do not we ruin Neighbourhood? Friendſhip? Our Country? In what Rank do we place ourſelves? How am I to conſider you, Sir? As a Neighbour? A Friend? What Sort of one? As a Citizen? How ſhall I truſt you? Indeed, if you were ſome ſorry Veſſel, ſo noiſome that no Uſe could be made of you; you might be thrown on a Dunghill, and no Mortal would take the Trouble to pick you up: but if, being a *Man*, you cannot fill any one Place in human Society, what ſhall we do with you? For, ſuppoſe you cannot hold the Place of a Friend, can you hold even that of a Slave? And who will truſt you? Why, then, ſhould not you alſo be contented to be thrown upon ſome Dunghill,

Dunghill, as a uſeleſs Veſſel, and indeed as mere Dung? Will you ſay, after this, Hath no one any Regard for *me*, a Man of Letters? Why, you are wicked, and fit for no Uſe. Juſt as if Waſps ſhould take it ill that no one hath any Regard for them; but all ſhun, and whoever can, beats them down. You have ſuch a Sting, that whoever you ſtrike with it, is thrown into Troubles and Pangs. What would you have us do with you? There is no where to place you.

§. 2. What, then, are not Women, by Nature, common?

I admit it: and ſo is a Pig at Table common to thoſe who are invited. But, after it is diſtributed, go, if you think proper, and ſnatch away the Share of him who ſits next you; or ſlily ſteal it, or ſtretch out your Hand, and taſte; and, if you cannot tear away any of the Meat, dip your Fingers and lick them. A fine Companion! A *Socratic* Gueſt indeed! Again: Is not the Theatre common to all the Citizens? Therefore come, when all are ſeated, if you think proper, and turn any one of them out of his Place. Thus Women are common by Nature: but when the Legiſlator, like the Maſter of an Entertainment, diſtributes them, will not you, like the reſt of the Company, be contented with deſiring a Share for yourſelf; but muſt you pilfer, and taſte what belongs to another?

But I am a Man of Letters, and underſtand *Archedemus* (*a*).

With all your Underſtanding of *Archedemus*, then, be an Adulterer, or a Rogue: And, inſtead of a Man, a Wolf, or an Ape. For where is the Difference?

CHAP. V.

How Magnanimity may be conſiſtent with Care.

§. 1. THE *Materials* of Action are indifferent: but the *Uſe* of them is not indifferent.

How, then, ſhall one preſerve Intrepidity and Tranquillity; and at the ſame time be careful, and neither raſh, nor indolent?

By imitating thoſe who play at Tables. The Dice are indifferent; the Pieces are indifferent. How do I know what will fall out? But it is my Buſineſs, to manage carefully and dextrouſly whatever doth fall out. Thus in Life too, this is the chief Buſineſs: diſtinguiſh, and ſeparate Things; and ſay, "Externals are not in my "Power; Choice is. Where ſhall I ſeek Good "and Evil? Within; in what is my own." But in what belongs to others, call nothing Good, or Evil, or Profit, or Hurt, or any thing of that Sort.

§. 2. What

(*a*) A Stoic Philoſopher, of *Tarſus*, in *Cilicia*. UPTON.

§. 2. What then, are we to treat theſe, in a careleſs Way?

By no means: for this, on the other hand, is an evil Exerciſe of the Faculty of Choice: and on that (*b*) account, againſt Nature. But we are to act with Care, becauſe the *Uſe* of the Materials [of Action] is not indifferent; and at the ſame time with Intrepidity and Tranquillity, becauſe the *Materials* themſelves are indifferent. For where a Thing is not indifferent, there no one can reſtrain or compel me. Where I am capable of being reſtrained, or compelled, the Acquiſition doth not depend upon me; nor is either good or evil. The *Uſe* of it, indeed, is either good or evil; but that *doth* depend upon me. It is difficult, I own, to blend and unite [in one Character] the Carefulneſs of one who is affected by the Materials of Action, and the Intrepidity of one who diſregards them; but it is not impoſſible: if it be, it is impoſſible to be happy. How do we act in a Voyage? What is in my Power? To chuſe the Pilot, the Sailors, the Day, the Time of Day. Afterwards comes a Storm. What have I to care for? My Part is performed. The Subject belongs to another, to the Pilot. But the Ship is ſinking: What then have I to do? That which alone I can do; I am drowned, without Fear, without Clamour, or

(*b*) The Tranſlation follows Mr. *Upton* Conjecture.

accuſing God; but as one who knows, that what is born, muſt likewiſe die. For I am not Eternity, but a Man; a Part of the Whole, as an Hour is of the Day. I muſt come like an Hour, and like an Hour muſt paſs away. What ſignifies it whether by Drowning, or by a Fever? For, in ſome Way or other, paſs I muſt.

§. 3. This you may ſee to be the Practice of thoſe, who play ſkilfully at Ball. No one contends for the Ball [itſelf], as either a Good or an Evil; but how he may throw, and catch it again. Here lies the Addreſs, here the Art, the Nimbleneſs, the Sagacity; that I may not be able to catch it, even if I hold up my Lap for it; another may catch it, whenever I throw it. But if we catch or throw it, with Fear or Perturbation, what Kind of Play will this be? How ſhall we keep ourſelves ſteady; or how ſee the Order of the Game? One will ſay, Throw: another, Do not throw: a Third, You have thrown once already. This is a mere Quarrel; not a Play. Therefore *Socrates* well underſtood playing at Ball.

What do you mean?

Uſing Pleaſantry at his Trial. "Tell me, "ſays he, *Anytus*, how can you ſay, that I do "not believe a God? What do you think De"mons are *(c)*? Are they not either the Off"ſpring

(c) *Socrates* profeſſed himſelf to have a good Demon; and argues here jocularly from thence, that he muſt believe the

"ſpring of the Gods, or compounded of Gods "and Men?"—"Yes."—"Do you think, then, "that one can believe there are Mules; and not "believe, that there are Aſſes?" This was juſt as if he had been playing at Ball. And what was the Ball he had to play with? Life, Chains, Exile, a Draught of Poiſon, Separation from a Wife, and the Deſertion of Orphan Children. Theſe were what he had to play with; and yet, nevertheleſs, he did play, and threw the Ball with Addreſs. Thus we ſhould be careful how we play; but indifferent, as to the Ball itſelf. We are by all means to manage external Materials with Art; not taking them for ourſelves; but ſhowing our Art about them, whatever they may happen to be. Thus a Weaver doth not make the Wool: but employs his Art upon what is given him. It is another who gives you Food, and a Property: and may take them away, and your paultry Body too.

the Exiſtence of a Deity: as he who believes there are Mules, muſt believe there are Aſſes; becauſe that Species enters into the Compoſition of the other. But there is a Play upon the Words in the Original, which cannot be preſerved in the Tranſlation. One cannot, I think, help regretting, that *Plato* ſhould relate, and *Epictetus* approve, a Witticiſm unworthy of the *Attic* Genius; and an Inſtance of Levity, on ſo awful a Subject, unbecoming the Character of the wiſe and pious *Socrates*. It may, however, be ſome Excuſe, that he thought neither his Accuſer, nor his Judges deſerved, or were likely to be influenced by, a more ſerious Anſwer.

too. Do you, however, work upon the Materials you have received; and then, if you come off unhurt, others, no doubt, who meet you, will congratulate you on your Eſcape. But he who hath a clearer Inſight into ſuch Things, if he ſees [indeed] you have behaved in a becoming Manner, will praiſe and congratulate you: but if you owe your Eſcape to any unbecoming Action, the contrary. For where there is a reaſonable Cauſe of Rejoicing, there is likewiſe [a reaſonable Cauſe] of Congratulation.

§. 4. How, then, are ſome external Things ſaid to be according to Nature; others contrary to it?

When we are conſidered as unconnected Individuals. I will allow it is natural for the Foot, [for Inſtance,] to be clean. But if you take it as a Foot, and not as an unconnected individual Thing, it will be fit that it ſhould walk in the Dirt, and tread upon Thorns; and ſometimes that it ſhould even be cut off, for the Good of the Whole: otherwiſe it is no longer a Foot. We ſhould reaſon in ſome ſuch manner concerning ourſelves. What are you? A Man. If then, indeed, you conſider yourſelf, as an unconnected Individual, it is natural that you ſhould live to old Age; be rich, and healthy: but if you conſider yourſelf as a Man, and as a Part of the Whole, it will be fit, on the Account of that Whole,

Whole, that you ſhould at one time be ſick; at another, take a Voyage, and be expoſed to Danger: ſometimes be in Want; and poſſibly it may happen, die before your Time. Why, then, are you diſpleaſed? Do not you know, that elſe, as the other is no longer a Foot, ſo you are no longer a Man? For what is a Man? A Part of a Commonwealth; principally of that which conſiſts of Gods and Men; and next, of that to which you immediately belong, which is a Miniature of the univerſal City.

§. 5. What then, muſt I, at one Time, be called to a Trial; muſt another, at another Time, be ſcorched by a Fever; another be expoſed to the Sea; another die; another be condemned?

Yes: for it is impoſſible, in ſuch a Body, in ſuch a World, and among ſuch Companions, but that ſome or other of us, muſt fall into ſuch Circumſtances (*d*). Your Buſineſs, when you come into them, is, to ſay what you ought, to order Things as you can. Then ſays one, "I decide "that you have acted unjuſtly." Much Good may it do you; I have done *my* Part. You are to look to it, whether you have done *yours*: for there is ſome Danger of that too, let me tell you.

(*d*) See B. I. c. 1. §. 4. Note *c*.

CHAP. VI.

Of Indifference.

§. 1. A Hypothetical Propoſition is an indifferent Thing; but the Judgment concerning it, is not indifferent: but is either Knowledge, or Opinion, or Miſtake. Thus Life is indifferent; the *Uſe* of it not indifferent. When you are told, therefore, that theſe Things are indifferent, do not, upon that account, ever be careleſs; nor, when you are excited to Carefulneſs, be abject, and ſtruck by an Admiration of the Materials of Action. It is good to know your own Qualifications and Powers; that, where you are not qualified, you may be quiet, and not angry that others have the Advantage of you, in ſuch Things. For you too, [in your Turn], will think it reaſonable, that you ſhould have the Advantage in the Art of Syllogiſms: and, if others ſhould be angry at it, you will tell them, by way of Conſolation, "*I* have learned it, and *you* have "not." Thus too, where-ever Practice is neceſſary, do not pretend to what can be attained no other Way; but leave the Matter to thoſe who are practiſed in it, and do you be contented with a compoſed Firmneſs of Mind. "Go, for In-"ſtance, and pay your Compliments to ſuch a "Perſon." "How?" "Not meanly." — "But

"But I have been ſhut out; for I have not "learned to get in at the Window: and, finding "the Door ſhut, I muſt neceſſarily either go "back, or get in at the Window." "But ſpeak "to him too." "I will ſpeak to him." "In "what manner?" "Not meanly." But you have not ſucceeded; for this was not *your* Buſineſs, but *his*. Why do you claim what belongs to another? Always remember what is your own, and what is another's; and you will never be diſturbed.

§. 2. Hence *Chryſippus* rightly ſays; While Conſequences are uncertain, I will keep to thoſe Things which are beſt adapted to the Attainment of what is conformable to Nature: for God himſelf hath formed me to chuſe this. If I knew, that it was now deſtined for me to be ſick, I would even exert my Purſuits towards it: for even the Foot, if it had Underſtanding, would exert itſelf to get into the Dirt. For why are Ears of Corn produced, if it be not to ripen? and why do they ripen, if not to be reaped? For they are not ſeparate Individuals. If they were capable of Senſe, do you think they would wiſh never to be reaped? It would be a Curſe upon Ears of Corn, not to be reaped: and we ought to know, that it would be a Curſe upon Man, not to die; like that of not ripening, and not being reaped. Since, then, it is neceſſary for us to be reaped,

and we have, at the ſame time, Underſtanding to know it, are we angry at it? This is only becauſe we neither know what we are, nor have ſtudied what belongs to Man, as Jockies do, what belongs to Horſes. Yet *Chryſantas*, when he was about to ſtrike an Enemy, on hearing the Trumpet ſound a Retreat, drew back his Hand: for he thought it more eligible to obey the Command of his General, than his own Inclination (*a*). But not one of *us*, even when Neceſſity calls, is ready and willing to obey it: but we ſuffer, whatever Things we do ſuffer, weeping and groaning, and calling them our Circumſtances (*b*). What Circumſtances, Man? For if you call what ſurrounds you, *Circumſtances*, every thing is a *Circumſtance*: but, if you apply this Name to Hardſhips, where is the Hardſhip, that whatever is born muſt die. The Inſtrument is either a Sword, or a Wheel, or the Sea, or a Tile, or a Tyrant. And what doth it ſignify to you, by what Way you deſcend to Hades? All are equal: but, if you would hear the Truth, the ſhorteſt is that by which

(*a*) In a Speech which *Cyrus* made to his Soldiers, after the Battle with the *Aſſyrians*, he mentions *Chryſantas*, one of his Captains, with particular Honour, for this Inſtance of his Obedience. XENOPH. L. iv.

(*b*) Περιστατικὸς, in *Greek*, hath a double Meaning, which cannot be preſerved in a Tranſlation. It ſignifies both in general Circumſtances, and in particular, hard Circumſtances, or Difficulties.

which a Tyrant ſends you. No Tyrant was ever ſix Months, in cutting any Man's Throat: but a Fever is often a Year [in killing.] All theſe Things are mere Sound, and the Pomp of empty Names.

My Life is in Danger from *Cæſar*.

And am not *I* in Danger, who dwell at *Nicopolis*, where there are ſo many Earthquakes? And when you yourſelf croſs the *Adriatic* (*c*), what is then in Danger? Is not your Life?

Ay: but I am in Danger, with reſpect to Opinion.

What, your own? How ſo? Can any one compel you to have any Opinion, contrary to your own Inclination?

But the Opinions of others too.

And what Danger is it of *yours*, if others have falſe Opinions?

But I am in Danger of being baniſhed.

What is it to be baniſhed? To be ſome-where elſe than at *Rome*.

Yes: but what if I ſhould be ſent to *Gyaros*?

If it be worth your while, you will go: if not, you have another Place to go to; where he, who now ſends you to *Gyaros*, muſt go likewiſe, whether

(*c*) *Epictetus* probably means, in the Way Home, from *Nicopolis* to *Rome*; whence this Perſon had come to hear him.

ther he will or not (*d*). Why, then, do you come to theſe, as to great Trials? They are not equal to your Qualifications. So that an ingenuous young Man would ſay, It was not worth while for this, to have read, and writ, ſo much, and to have ſat ſo long, liſtening to a good-for-nothing old Fellow. Only remember, that Diviſion, by which your *own*, and *not* your own, is diſtinguiſhed, and you will never claim what belongs to others. A Tribunal, and a Priſon, is, each of them, a Place; one high, the other low: but Choice is equal: and if you have a mind to keep it equal for both Places, it may be kept. We ſhall then become Imitators of *Socrates*, when even in a Priſon, we are able to write Hymns (*e*) of Praiſe: but, as we now are, conſider whether we could bear, that even another ſhould ſay to us in a Priſon, "Shall I read you a Hymn of "Praiſe?"

(*d*) How gloomy, how empty the Stoic Conſolation! How differently would the Chriſtian anſwer. "Well, and "can he baniſh you from the Preſence of your true Sove-"reign, your indulgent Father, your beſt Friend? And "what, then, is *Gyaros* worſe than *Rome?* You, behaving "well in Adverſity, are the Object of Almighty Protection "and future Reward: he, amidſt his Tyranny, accounta-"ble to an offended Judge."

(*e*) *Socrates* writ a Hymn to *Apollo*, when he was in Priſon; of which *Diogenes Laertius* recites the firſt Line. See the Behaviour of *Paul* and *Silas* on a parallel Occaſion. *Acts* xvi. 25.

" Praiſe?"—" Why do you trouble me: do " you know in what a ſad Situation I am?" " In ſuch Circumſtances, am I able to hear " Hymns?"—" What Circumſtances?"—I am " going to die." — " And are all other Men to " be immortal?"

CHAP. VII.

Of Divination.

§. 1. FROM an unſeaſonable Regard to Divination, we omit many Duties (*a*). For what can the Diviner ſee, beſides Death, or Danger, or Sickneſs, or, in ſhort, Things of this Kind? When it is neceſſary, then, to expoſe one's ſelf to Danger for a Friend, or even a Duty to die for him, what Occaſion have I for Divination? Have not I a Diviner within, who hath told me the Eſſence of Good and Evil; and who explains to me the Indications of both? What further Need, then, have I of the Entrails [of Victims], or [the Flight] of Birds? Can I bear with the other Diviner, when he ſays, " This is for your " Intereſt?" For doth *he* know what is for my Intereſt? Doth he know what Good is? Hath he learned the Indications of Good and Evil, as he

(*a*) The Stoics were Advocates for Divination; though they condemned, what they deemed, the Abuſes of it. The 32d Chapter of the *Enchiridion* is on the ſame Subject.

he hath thoſe of the Victims? If ſo, he knows the Indications likewiſe of Fair and Baſe, Juſt and Unjuſt. Do you tell me, Sir, what is indicated to me; Life or Death; Riches or Poverty. But whether theſe Things are for my Intereſt, or not, I ſhall not inquire of *you*. "Why?" Becauſe you do not give your Opinion about Grammar [or any eſtabliſhed Point of Knowledge]; and do you give it here, in Things about which we all take different Ways, and diſpute with one another? Therefore the Lady, who was going to ſend a Month's Proviſion to *Gratilla* (*b*), in her Baniſhment, made a right Anſwer to one, who told her *Domitian* would ſeize it: I had rather, ſays ſhe, that he ſhould ſeize it, than I not ſend it.

§. 2. What, then, is it that leads us ſo often to Divination? Cowardice; the Dread of Events. Hence we flatter the Diviners. "Pray, Sir, "ſhall I inherit my Father's Eſtate?"—"Let "us ſee: let us ſacrifice upon the Occaſion."—"Nay, Sir, juſt as Fortune pleaſes." Then, if he ſays, You ſhall inherit it, we give him Thanks, as if we received the Inheritance from *him*. The Conſequence of this is, that they play upon us.

§. 3. What, then, is to be done?

We ſhould come without previous Deſire or Averſion: as a Traveller inquires the Road of

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(*b*) A Lady of high Rank at *Rome*, baniſhed from *Italy*, among many other noble Perſons, by *Domitian*.

the Perſon he meets, without any Deſire for that which turns to the right Hand, more than to the Left: for he wiſhes for neither of theſe; but that only which leads him properly. Thus we ſhould come to God, as to a Guide. Juſt as we make uſe of our Eyes: not perſuading them to ſhow us one Object rather than another; but receiving ſuch as they preſent to us. But now we hold the Bird with Fear and Trembling: and, in our Invocations to God, intreat him; "Lord have "Mercy upon me: ſuffer me to come off ſafe." You Wretch! would you have any thing then, but what is beſt? And what is beſt but what pleaſes God? Why do you, as far as in you lies, corrupt your Judge, and ſeduce your Adviſer?

CHAP. VIII.

Wherein conſiſts the Eſſence of Good.

§. 1. GOD is beneficial. Good is alſo beneficial. It ſhould ſeem, then, that where the Eſſence of God is, there too is the Eſſence of Good. What then is the Eſſence of God? Fleſh? —By no means. An Eſtate? —Fame? —By no means. Intelligence? Knowledge? Right Reaſon? —Certainly. Here then, without more ado, ſeek the Eſſence of Good. For, do you ſeek it in a Plant? —No. —Or in a Brute? —No. —If then you ſeek it only in a rational Subject, why

why do you ſeek it any where but in what is diſtinct from Irrationals? Plants have not the Uſe of the Appearances of Things; and therefore you do not apply the Term of *Good* to them. — *Good*, then, requires the Uſe of theſe Appearances. And nothing elſe? If ſo, you may ſay, that Good, and Happineſs, and Unhappineſs, belong to mere Animals. But this you do not ſay; and you are right: for, how much ſoever they have the Uſe of the Appearances of Things, they have not the Faculty of underſtanding that Uſe; and with good Reaſon: for they are made to be ſubſervient to others, and not Principals themſelves. Why was an Aſs made? Was it as a Principal? No: but becauſe we had need of a Back able to carry Burthens. We had need too that he ſhould walk; therefore he had the Uſe of the Appearances of Things added; otherwiſe he could not have walked. But here his Endowments end: for, if an Underſtanding of that Uſe had been likewiſe added, he would not, in Reaſon, have been ſubject to us, nor have done us theſe Services; but would have been like, and equal to ourſelves. Why will you not, therefore, ſeek the Eſſence of Good in that, without which, you will not ſay, there can be Good in any thing?

§. 2. What then? Are not theſe likewiſe the Works of the Gods? They are: but not Principals, nor Parts of the Gods. But you are a Principal.

cipal. You are a diſtinct Portion of the Eſſence of God; and contain a certain Part of him in yourſelf (*a*). Why then are you ignorant of your noble Birth? Why do not you conſider, whence you came? why do not you remember, when you are eating, who you are who eat; and whom you feed? When you are in the Company of Women; when you are converſing; when you are exerciſing; when you are diſputing; do not you know, that it is a God you feed; a God you exerciſe? You carry a God about with you, Wretch, and know nothing of it. Do you ſuppoſe I mean ſome God without you of Gold or Silver? It is within yourſelf you carry him; and profane him, without being ſenſible of it, by impure Thoughts, and unclean Actions. If even the Image of God were preſent, you would not dare to act as you do: and when God himſelf is within you, and hears and ſees all, are not you aſhamed

(*a*) See Introduction, §. 19.

See 1 *Cor.* vi. 19. 2 *Cor.* vi. 16. 2 *Tim.* i. 14. 1 *John* iii. 24. iv. 12, 13. But though the ſimple Expreſſion of carrying God about with us, may ſeem to have ſome nearly Parallel to it in the New Teſtament, yet thoſe repreſent the Almighty in a more venerable Manner; as taking the Hearts of Good Men for a Temple to dwell in. But the other Expreſſions here of Feeding and Exerciſing God, and the Whole of the Paragraph, and indeed of the Stoic Syſtem, ſhew the real Senſe of even its more decent Phraſes to be vaſtly different from that of Scripture.

aſhamed to think and act thus; inſenſible of your own Nature, and hateful to God?

§. 3. After all, why are we afraid, when we ſend a young Man from the School, into Action, that he ſhould behave indecently, eat indecently, converſe indecently with Women: that he ſhould either debaſe himſelf by a ſhabby Dreſs, or clothe himſelf too finely? Doth not he know the God within him? Doth not he know with whom he ſets out? Have we Patience to hear him ſay, "I "wiſh to have *you* with me."

Have you not *God?* Do you ſeek any other, while you have *him?* Or will He tell you any other than theſe things? If you were a Statue of *Phidias*, either *Jupiter* or *Minerva*, you would remember both yourſelf and the Artiſt; and, if you had any Senſe, you would endeavour to do nothing unworthy of him who formed you, or of yourſelf: nor to appear in an unbecoming Manner, to Spectators. And are you now careleſs how you appear, becauſe you are the Workmanſhip of *Jupiter?* And yet, what Compariſon is there, either between the Artiſts, or the Things they have formed? What Work of any [human] Artiſt contains in itſelf, thoſe Faculties which are ſhown, in forming it? Is it any thing but Marble, or Braſs, or Gold, or Ivory? And the *Minerva* of *Phidias*, when its Hand is once extended, and a *Victory* placed in it, remains in that

that Attitude, for ever. But the Works of God are indued with Motion, Breath, the Uſe of the Appearances of Things, Judgment. Being, then, the Formation of ſuch an Artiſt, will you diſhonour him; eſpecially, when he hath not only formed, but intruſted, and given the Guardianſhip of you, to yourſelf? Will you not only be forgetful of this, but, moreover, diſhonour the Truſt? If God had committed ſome Orphan to your Charge, would you have been thus careleſs of him? He hath delivered yourſelf to your Care; and ſays, "I had no one fitter to be truſted than "you: preſerve this Perſon for Me, ſuch as he "is by Nature; modeſt, faithful, ſublime, un-"terrified, diſpaſſionate, tranquil:" And will you not preſerve him?

§. 4. But it will be ſaid; "Whence this ſuper-"cilious Look, and Gravity of Face?" [in our young Philoſopher]—"I have not yet ſo much "Gravity, as the Caſe deſerves. I do not yet "truſt to what I have learned, and aſſented to. "I ſtill fear my own Weakneſs. Let me but "take Courage a little, and then you ſhall ſee "ſuch a Look, and ſuch an Appearance, as I "ought to have. Then I will ſhow you the "Statue, when it is finiſhed, when it is poliſhed. "Do you think I will ſhow you a ſupercilious "Countenance? Heaven forbid! For *Olympian* "*Jupiter* doth not lift up his Brow; but keeps a

"ſteady

" ſteady Countenance, as becomes him who is " about to ſay,

——————*Th' immutable Decree*
No Force can ſhake: what is, that ought to be.
POPE.

" Such will I ſhow myſelf to you: faithful, " modeſt, noble, tranquil." — " What, and im- " mortal too, and exempt from Age and Sick- " neſs?" No. But ſickening and dying as becomes a God. This is in my Power; this I can do. The other is not in my Power, nor can I do it. Shall I ſhow you the (*b*) Nerves of a Philoſopher?

" What Nerves are thoſe?"

A Deſire undiſappointed; an Averſion unincurred; Purſuits duly exerted; a careful Reſolution; an unerring Aſſent. Theſe you ſhall ſee.

CHAP. IX.

That when we are unable to fulfil what the Character of a Man promiſes, we aſſume that of a Philoſopher.

§. 1. IT is no common Attainment, merely to fulfil what the Nature of Man promiſes. For what is Man?

A rational

(*b*) An Alluſion to the Combatants in the public Exerciſes, who uſed to ſhow their Shoulders, Muſcles, and Nerves, as a Proof of their Strength. See B. I. c. 4. §. 4. B. II. c. 18. §. 5. B. III. c. 22. §. 5.

A rational and mortal Being.

Well: from what are we diſtinguiſhed by Reaſon?

From wild Beaſts.

From what elſe?

From Sheep, and the like.

Take care, then, to do nothing like a wild Beaſt; otherwiſe, you have deſtroyed the Man; you have not fulfilled what your Nature promiſes. Take care too, to do nothing like Cattle: for thus likewiſe the Man is deſtroyed.

In what do we act like Cattle?

When we act gluttonouſly, lewdly, raſhly, ſordidly, inconſiderately, into what are we ſunk?

Into Cattle.

What have we deſtroyed?

The rational Being.

When we behave contentiouſly, injuriouſly, paſſionately, and violently, into what have we ſunk?

Into wild Beaſts.

§. 2. And farther; ſome of us are wild Beaſts of a larger Size: others, little miſchievous Vermin; whence there is room to ſay, Let me rather be eat by a Lion. By all theſe Means, is deſtroyed what the Nature of Man promiſes. For, when is a conjunctive Propoſition preſerved?

When it fulfils what its Nature promiſes.

So then the Preſervation of ſuch a Propoſition conſiſts

conſiſts in this; that its ſeveral Parts are a Conjunction of Truths.

When is a disjunctive Propoſition preſerved?

When it fulfils what its Nature promiſes.

When is a Flute, a Harp, a Horſe, or a Dog, preſerved?

When each fulfils what its Nature promiſes.

Where is the Wonder then, that Man ſhould be preſerved, and deſtroyed, in the ſame Manner? All are preſerved and improved by Operations correſpondent [to their ſeveral Faculties]; as a Carpenter, by Building; a Grammarian, by Grammar: but if he accuſtom himſelf to write ungrammatically, his Art will neceſſarily be ſpoiled and deſtroyed. Thus modeſt Actions preſerve the modeſt Man, and immodeſt ones deſtroy him: faithful Actions, the faithful Man: and the contrary deſtroy him. On the other hand, contrary Actions heighten contrary Characters. Thus Impudence, an impudent one; Knavery, a knaviſh one; Slander, a ſlanderous one; Anger, an angry one; and unequitable Dealings, a covetous one.

§. 3. For this Reaſon, Philoſophers adviſe us, not to be contented with mere Learning; but to add Meditation likewiſe, and then Practice. For we have been long accuſtomed to contrary Actions, and have practiſed upon wrong Opinions. If therefore, we do not likewiſe habituate ourſelves

to

to practiſe upon right Opinions, we ſhall be nothing more than Expoſitors of the Principles of others. For who among us is not already able to diſcourſe, according to the Rules of Art, upon Good and Evil? *That ſome Things are good, ſome evil, and others indifferent: the Good, Virtue, and whatever partakes of Virtue; the Evil, the contrary; and the Indifferent, Riches, Health, Reputation:* and then, if, while we are ſaying all this, there ſhould happen ſome more than ordinary Noiſe, or one of the By-ſtanders ſhould laugh at us, we are diſconcerted. Philoſopher, what is become of what you were ſaying? Whence did it proceed? Merely from your Lips? Why then, do you pollute the Aids which others have provided? Why do you trifle on the moſt important Subjects? It is one thing to hoard up Proviſion in a Store-houſe, and another to eat it. What is eaten is concocted, digeſted, and becomes Nerves, Fleſh, Bones, Blood, Colour, Breath. Whatever is hoarded up is ready indeed, whenever you have a Mind to ſhow it; but of no further Uſe to you than the mere Notion, that you have it. For what Difference is there, whether you explain *theſe* Doctrines, or thoſe of Perſons of oppoſite Principles? Sit down now, and comment, according to the Rules of Art, upon the Principles of *Epicurus:* and perhaps you may comment more practically than he could have done himſelf. Why

then do you call yourſelf a *Stoic?* Why do you act a *Jew*, when you are a *Greek?* Do not you ſee on what Terms each is called a *Jew*, a *Syrian*, an *Egyptian?* And when we ſee any one wavering, we are wont to ſay, This is not a *Jew*; but acts one. But, when he aſſumes the Sentiments of one who hath been baptized and circumciſed (*a*), then he both really is, and is called, a *Jew*. Thus we, falſifying our Profeſſion, are *Jews* in Name, but in reality ſomething elſe. Our Sentiments are inconſiſtent with our Diſcourſe; far from practiſing what we teach, and what we pride ourſelves in the Knowledge of. Thus, while we are unable to fulfil what the Character of a Man promiſes, we aſſume, beſides, ſo vaſt a Weight as that of a Philoſopher. As if a Perſon, incapable of lifting ten Pounds, ſhould endeavour to heave the ſame Stone with *Ajax*.

CHAP. X.

How we may inveſtigate the Duties of Life from the Names which we bear.

§. 1. EXAMINE who you are. In the firſt Place, A Man: that is, one who hath nothing ſuperior to the Faculty of Choice; but all Things ſubject to this; and this itſelf unenſlaved, and unſubjected, to any thing. Conſider then,

(*a*) The Tranſlation follows Mr. *Upton*'s Conjecture.

then, from what you are diſtinguiſhed by Reaſon. You are diſtinguiſhed from wild Beaſts: you are diſtinguiſhed from Cattle. Beſides: you are a Citizen of the World, and a Part of it: not a ſubſervient, but a principal Part. You are capable of comprehending the divine Oeconomy; and of conſidering the Connexions of Things. What then doth the Character of a Citizen promiſe? To hold no private Intereſt; to deliberate of nothing as a ſeparate Individual, but like the Hand or the Foot; which, if they had Reaſon, and comprehended the Conſtitution of Nature, would never purſue, or deſire, but with a Reference to the Whole. Hence the Philoſophers rightly ſay, That, if a wiſe and good Man could foreſee what was to happen, he would help forward Sickneſs, and Death, and Mutilation, to himſelf; being ſenſible, that theſe Things are appointed from the Order of the Univerſe; and that the Whole is ſuperior to a Part, and the City to the Citizen. But, ſince we do not foreknow what is to happen, it becomes our Duty to adhere to what is more naturally adapted to our Option: for, amongſt other Things, we were born for this.

§. 2. Remember next, that perhaps you are a Son: and what doth this Character promiſe? To eſteem every thing that is his, as belonging to his Father: in every Inſtance to obey him: not to revile him to another: not to ſay or do any thing injurious

rious to him: to give way and yield in every thing; co-operating with him to the utmoſt of his Power.

§. 3. After this, know likewiſe, that you are a Brother too: and that to this Character it belongs, to make Conceſſions; to be eaſily perſuaded; to uſe gentle Language: never to claim, for yourſelf, any of the Things independent on Choice; but chearfully to give theſe, that you may have the larger Share of what is dependent on that. For conſider what it is, inſtead of a Lettuce, for Inſtance, or a Chair, to procure for yourſelf a good Temper? How great an Advantage gained!

§. 4. If, beſides this, you are a Senator of any City, conſider yourſelf as a Senator: if a Youth, as a Youth: if an old Man, as an old Man. For each of theſe Names, if it comes to be conſidered, always points out the proper Duties. But, if you go and revile your Brother, I tell you, you have forgot who you are, and what is your Name. For even if you were a Smith, and made an ill Uſe of the Hammer, you would have forgot the Smith: and, if you have forgot the Brother, and are become, inſtead of a Brother, an Enemy, do you imagine you have made no Change of one Thing for another, in that Caſe? If, inſtead of a Man, a gentle, ſocial Creature, you are become a wild Beaſt, miſchievous, inſidious, biting; have you loſt nothing? But muſt you loſe Money,

Money, in order to ſuffer Damage; and is there no other Thing, the Loſs of which endamages a Man? If you were to part with your Skill in Grammar, or in Muſic, would you think the Loſs of theſe a Damage? And, if you part with Honour, Decency, and Gentleneſs, do you think *that* no Matter? Yet the firſt are loſt by ſome Cauſe external, and independent on Choice; but the laſt, by our own Fault. There is no Shame either in not (*a*) having, or in loſing the one; but either not to have, or to loſe, the other is equally ſhameful, and reproachful, and unhappy. What doth the Pathic loſe? The Man. What doth the ſmooth effeminate Fellow loſe? (*b*) Many other Things? but however the Man alſo. What doth an Adulterer loſe? The Modeſt, the chaſte Character; the Neighbour. What doth an angry Perſon loſe? Something elſe. A Coward? Something elſe. No one is wicked without ſome Loſs, or Damage. Now, if, after all, you have made the Loſs of Money the only Damage, all theſe [Wretches] are unhurt and undamaged. Nay, it may be, even Gainers; as, by ſuch Practices, their Money might poſſibly be increaſed. But conſider: if you refer every thing to *Money*,

(*a*) The true Reading of the *Greek* is ουτ' ουκ εχειν.

(*b*) It hath been ſuggeſted to me, that διατιλθεις, not διατιθεις, is the true Reading; and I have ventured ſo to tranſlate it. See L. III. c. 1. p. 352, 353. of Mr. *Upton*'s Edition.

the Man who loſes his Noſe is not hurt. Yes, ſay you; he is maimed in his Body. Well: but doth he who loſes his Smell itſelf, loſe nothing? Is there, then, no Faculty of the Soul, which he who poſſeſſes it is the better for; and he who parts with it, the worſe?

What Sort do you mean?

Have we not a natural Senſe of Honour?

We have.

Doth he, who loſes this, ſuffer no Damage? Is he deprived of nothing? Doth he part with nothing that belongs to him? Have we no natural Fidelity? No natural Affection? No natural Diſpoſition to mutual Uſefulneſs, to mutual Forbearance? Is he, then, who careleſsly ſuffers himſelf to be damaged in theſe Reſpects, unhurt and undamaged?

§. 5. What, then, ſhall not I hurt him, who hath hurt me?

Conſider firſt what *Hurt* is; and remember what you have heard from the Philoſophers. For, if both Good and Evil conſiſts in Choice, ſee whether what you ſay, doth not amount to this: "Since he hath hurt himſelf, by injuring me; "ſhall not I hurt myſelf by injuring him?" Why do we not make ſome ſuch Repreſentation to ourſelves, as this? Are we hurt, when any Detriment happens to our bodily Poſſeſſions; and are we not at all hurt, when any happens to our Faculty

Faculty of Choice? He who is deceived, or hath done an Injury, hath no Pain in his Head; nor loſes an Eye, a Leg, or an Eſtate: and we wiſh for nothing beyond theſe. Whether we have a modeſt and faithful, or a ſhameleſs and unfaithful, Will and Choice, we make not the ſmalleſt Difference; except only in the Schools, as far as a few Words go. Therefore all the Improvement we make, reaches only to Words; and beyond them is abſolutely nothing.

CHAP. XI.

What the Beginning of Philoſophy is.

§. 1. THE Beginning of Philoſophy, at leaſt to ſuch as enter upon it in a proper Way, and by the Door, is a Conſciouſneſs of our own Weakneſs, and Inability, in neceſſary Things. For we came into the World without any natural Idea of a right angled Triangle; of a Dieſis, or a Hemitone, in Muſic: but we learn each of theſe Things by ſome Inſtruction of Art. Hence, they who do not underſtand them, do not form any Conceit of underſtanding them. But who ever came into the World, without an innate Idea of Good and Evil; Fair and Baſe; Becoming and Unbecoming; Happineſs and Miſery; Proper and Improper; what ought to be done, and what not to be done? Hence we all make uſe

of the Names, and endeavour to apply our Pre-conceptions to particular Caſes. "Such a one "hath acted well; not well: right; not right: "is unhappy; is happy: is juſt; is unjuſt." Who of us refrains from theſe Names? Who defers the Uſe of them, till he had learnt it; as thoſe do, who are ignorant of Lines and Sounds? The Reaſon of this is, that we (*a*) come inſtructed, in ſome degree, by Nature upon theſe Subjects; and from this Beginning, we go on to add Self-conceit. "For why, ſay you, ſhould "not I know what Fair and Baſe is? Have not "I the Idea of it?" You have. "Do not I ap-"ply this Idea to Particulars?" You do. "Do "not I apply it right, then?" Here lies the whole Queſtion; and here ariſes the Self-conceit. For, beginning from theſe acknowledged Points, Men proceed to what is in Diſpute, by means of their unſuitable Application. For, if they poſſeſt a right Method of Application, what would reſtrain them from being perfect? Now, ſince you think, that you make a ſuitable Application, of your Pre-conceptions to particular Caſes, tell me whence you derive this.

From its ſeeming ſo to me.

But it doth not ſeem ſo to another: and doth not he too form a Conceit, that he makes a right Application?

He

(*a*) For τινας in the *Greek*, the Senſe ſeems to require ἡμας.

He doth.

It is poſſible, then, that each of you ſhould apply your Pre-conceptions right, on the very Subjects about which you have contradictory Opinions?

It is not.

Have you any thing to ſhow us, then, for this Application, preferable to its *ſeeming* ſo to you? And doth a Madman act any otherwiſe than ſeems to him, right? Is this then a ſufficient Criterion to him too?

It is not.

Come therefore, to ſomething preferable to what *ſeems*.

What is that?

§. 2. The Beginning of Philoſophy is this: The being ſenſible of the Diſagreement of Men with each other: an Inquiry into the Cauſe of this Diſagreement; and a Diſapprobation, and Diſtruſt of what merely *ſeems*: a certain Examination into what ſeems, whether it ſeem rightly: and an Invention of ſome Rule, like a Balance, for the Determination of Weights; like a Square, for ſtrait and crooked.

Is this the Beginning of Philoſophy, that all Things which ſeem right to all Perſons, are ſo?

Why; is it poſſible, that Contradictions can be right?

Well then, not all Things; but all that ſeem ſo to *us*.

And why more to *you*, than to the *Syrians*, or *Egyptians*? Than to me, or to any other Man?

Not at all more.

§. 3. Therefore [merely] what *ſeems* to each Man, is not ſufficient to determine the Reality of a Thing. For even in Weights and Meaſures we are not ſatisfied with the bare Appearance; but for every thing we find ſome Rule. And is there, in the preſent Caſe then, no Rule, preferable to what *ſeems*? Is it poſſible, that what is of the greateſt Neceſſity in human Life, ſhould be left incapable of Determination and Diſcovery?

There is, then, ſome Rule.

And why do we not ſeek, and diſcover it; and, when we have diſcovered, make uſe of it, without fail, ever after, ſo as not even to move a Finger, without it. For this, I conceive, is what, when found, will cure (*b*) thoſe of their Madneſs, who make uſe of no other Meaſure, but their own perverted Way of Thinking. That afterwards, beginning from certain known and determinate Points, we may make uſe of Pre-conceptions, properly applied to Particulars. What is the Subject that falls under our Inquiry?

Pleaſure.

Bring

(*b*) The Senſe requires, that the Reading ſhould be απαλλαττοι αν, or απαλλαξει.

Bring it to the Rule. Throw it into the Scale. Muſt Good be ſomething in which it is fit to confide? and to which we may truſt?

Yes.

Is it fit to truſt to any thing unſteady?

No.

Is Pleaſure then, a ſteady Thing?

No.

Take it, then, and throw it out of the Scale, and drive it far diſtant from the Place of good Things. But, if you are not quick-ſighted, and one Balance is inſufficient, bring another. Is it fit to be elated by Good?

Yes.

Is it fit, then, to be elated by a preſent Pleaſure? See that you do not ſay it is; otherwiſe I ſhall not think you ſo much as worthy to uſe a Scale. Thus are Things judged, and weighed, when we have the Rules ready. This is the Part of Philoſophy, To examine, and fix the Rules: and to make uſe of them, when they are known, is the Buſineſs of a wiſe and good Man.

CHAP. XII.

Of Diſputation.

§. 1. WHAT Things are to be learn'd, in order to the right Uſe of Reaſon, the Philoſophers of our Sect have accurately taught:

but we are altogether unpractiſed in the due Application of them. Only give any of us, that you pleaſe, ſome illiterate Perſon, for an Antagoniſt, and he will not find out, how to treat him. But when he hath a little moved the Man, if he happens to anſwer beſide the Purpoſe, he knows not how to deal with him any further; but either reviles, or laughs at him; and ſays, "He is an illiterate Fellow: there is no making "any thing of him." Yet a Guide, when he perceives his Charge going out of the Way, doth not revile, and ridicule, and then leave him; but leads him into the right Path. Do you alſo ſhow your Antagoniſt the Truth, and you will ſee, that he will follow. But till you do ſhow it, do not ridicule him; but rather be ſenſible of your own Incapacity.

§. 2. How then, did *Socrates* uſe to act? He obliged his Antagoniſt himſelf to bear Teſtimony to him; and wanted no other Witneſs. Hence he might well ſay, "I give up all the reſt; and "am always ſatisfied with the Teſtimony of my "Opponent: and I call in no one to vote, but "my Antagoniſt alone." For he rendered the Arguments drawn from natural Notions ſo clear, that every one ſaw, and avoided the Contradiction. — "Doth an envious Man rejoice?"—"By "no means. He rather grieves." (This he moved him to ſay, by propoſing the contrary.)— "Well:

" Well: and do you think Envy to be a Grief, " for Miſery?" — And who ever envied Miſery? " — (Therefore he makes the other ſay, that " Envy is a Grief, for Happineſs.) — Doth any " one envy thoſe who are nothing to him?" — " No, ſurely." Having thus drawn [from his Opponent] a full and diſtinct Idea, he then left that Point; and doth not ſay, " Define to me " what Envy is:" And after he had defined it; " You have defined it wrong; for the Definition " doth not reciprocate to the Thing defined." Technical Terms, and therefore grievous, and ſcarcely to be made intelligible to the Illiterate, which yet *We*, it ſeems, cannot part with. But we have no Capacity at all to move them, by ſuch Arguments, as might induce them, in following the Track of the Appearances in their own Minds, to allow, or diſprove, any Point. And, from a Conſciouſneſs of this Incapacity, thoſe among us, who have any Modeſty, give the Matter intirely up: but the greater Part, raſhly entering upon theſe Debates, mutually confound, and are confounded; and, at laſt, reviling, and reviled, walk off. Whereas it was the principal and moſt peculiar Characteriſtic of *Socrates*, never to be provoked, in a Diſpute; nor to throw out any reviling or injurious Expreſſion: but to bear patiently with thoſe who reviled him; and to put an End to the Controverſy. If you would know how

how great Abilities he had in this particular, read *Xenophon's Banquet*, and you will ſee, how many Controverſies he ended. Hence, even among the Poets, that Perſon is juſtly mentioned with the higheſt Commendation,

Whoſe lenient Art attentive Crowds await,
To ſtill the furious Clamours of Debate.

HESIOD.

But what then? This is no very ſafe Affair now, and eſpecially at *Rome*. For he who doth it, muſt not do it in a Corner; but go to ſome rich Conſular Senator, for Inſtance, and queſtion him. "Pray, Sir, can you tell me to whom you "intruſt your Horſes?" — "Yes certainly." — "Is it then, to any one indifferently, though "he be ignorant of Horſemanſhip?" — "By no "means." — "To whom do you intruſt your "Gold, or your Silver, or your Clothes?" — "Not to any one indifferently." — "And "did you ever conſider, to whom you committed "the Care of your Body?" — "Yes, ſurely." — "To one ſkilled in Exerciſe, or Medicine, I "ſuppoſe." — "Without doubt." — "Are theſe "Things your chief Good; or are you poſſeſſed "of ſome thing better than all of them?" — "What do you mean?" — "Something which "makes uſe of theſe; and proves, and delibe-"rates about each of them?" — "What then,

"do

" do you mean the Soul?" — " You have " gueſs'd right; for indeed I do mean that." — " I do really think it a much better Poſſeſſion " than all the reſt." — Can you ſhow us, then, " in what manner you have taken care of this " Soul? For it is not probable, that a Perſon of " your Wiſdom, and approved Character in the " State, ſhould careleſsly ſuffer the moſt excel- " lent Thing that belongs to you, to be ne- " glected, and loſt." — " No certainly." — " But " do you take care of it yourſelf? And is it by " the Inſtructions of another, or by your own " Diſcovery [how it ought to be done?]" — Here, now, comes the Danger, that he may firſt ſay, Pray, good Sir, what Buſineſs is that of yours? What are you to me? Then, if you perſiſt to trouble him, he may lift up his Hand, and give you a Box on the Ear. I myſelf was once a great Admirer of this Method of Inſtruction, till I fell into ſuch kind of Adventures.

CHAP. XIII.

Of Solicitude.

§. 1. WHEN I ſee any one ſolicitous, I ſay, What doth this Man mean? Unleſs he wanted ſomething or other, not in his own Power, how could he ſtill be ſolicitous? A Muſician, for Inſtance, feels no Solicitude, while he

he is ſinging by himſelf: but when he appears upon the Stage he doth; even if his Voice be ever ſo good, or he plays ever ſo well. For what he wants is not only to ſing well, but likewiſe to gain Applauſe. But this is not, in his own Power. In ſhort, where his Skill lies, there is his Courage. (Bring any ignorant Perſon, and he doth not mind him.) But in the Point which he neither underſtands, nor hath ſtudied, there he is ſolicitous.

What Point is that?

He doth not underſtand what a Multitude is; nor what the Applauſe of a Multitude. He hath learnt, indeed, how to ſtrike Baſs and Treble; but what the Applauſe of the many is, and what Force it hath in Life, he neither underſtands, nor hath ſtudied. Hence he muſt neceſſarily tremble, and turn pale. I cannot, indeed, ſay, that a Man is no Muſician, when I ſee him afraid; but I can ſay ſomething elſe; and that not one, but many Things. And, firſt of all, I call him a Stranger; and ſay, This Man doth not know in what Country he is: and though he hath lived here ſo long, he is ignorant of the Laws and Cuſtoms of the State; and what is permitted, and what not: nor hath he ever conſulted any Lawyer, who might tell and explain to him the Laws. Yet no Man writes a Will, without knowing how it ought to be written, or conſulting ſome one

one who doth know: nor doth he raſhly ſign a Bond, or give Security. But he uſes his Deſire and Averſion, exerts his Purſuits, Intentions, and Reſolutions, without conſulting any Lawyer about the Matter.

How do you mean, without a *Lawyer?*

He knows not, that he chuſes what is not allowed him; and doth not chuſe what is neceſſary: and he knows not what is his own, and what belongs to others: for if he did know, he would never be hindered; would never be reſtrained; would never be ſolicitous.

How ſo?

Why: doth any one fear Things that are not Evils?

No.

Doth any one fear Things, that are Evils indeed, but which it is in his own Power to prevent?

No, ſurely.

§. 2. If, then, the Things independent on Choice, are neither good nor evil; and all that do depend on Choice, are in our own Power, and can neither be taken away from us, or given to us, unleſs we pleaſe; what room is there left for Solicitude? But we are ſolicitous about this paultry Body, or Eſtate, of ours; or about the Determination of *Cæſar*; and not at all about any thing internal. Are we ever ſolicitous not

to

to take up a falſe Opinion? No: for this is in our own Power. Or not to exert our Purſuits, contrary to Nature? No: nor this neither. When, therefore, you ſee any one pale with Solicitude, as the Phyſician pronounces from the Complexion, that ſuch a Patient is diſordered in the Spleen, another in the Liver; ſo do you likewiſe ſay, this Man is diſordered in his Deſires and Averſions: he cannot walk ſteady; he is in a Fermentation. For nothing elſe changes the Complexion, or cauſes a Trembling, or ſets the Teeth a chattering.

No Force, no Firmneſs, the pale Coward ſhows;
He ſhifts his Place; his Colour comes and goes.
Terror and Death in his wild Eye-balls ſtare;
With chatt'ring Teeth he ſtands, and ſtiffen'd Hair.
POPE's Homer.

Therefore (*a*) *Zeno*, when he was to meet *Antigonus*, felt no Solicitude. For over what he admired, *Antigonus* had no Power; and thoſe Things of which he had the Power, *Zeno* did not regard. But *Antigonus* felt a Solicitude when he was to meet

(*a*) *Antigonus Gonatas*, King of *Macedon*, had ſo great an Eſteem for *Zeno*, that he often took a Journey to *Athens* to viſit him; and endeavoured, by magnificent Promiſes, to allure him to his Court; but without Succeſs. He gave it as a Reaſon, for the diſtinguiſhed Regard which he paid him, that, though he had made him many, and very conſiderable Offers, *Zeno* never appeared either mean or inſolent.

meet *Zeno*; and with Reaſon: for he was deſirous to pleaſe him; and this was external. But *Zeno* was not deſirous to pleaſe *Antigonus*: for no one ſkilful in any Art, is deſirous to pleaſe a Perſon unſkilful.

I am deſirous [ſays one of his Scholars] to pleaſe *You*.

For what? Do you know the Rules, by which one Man judges of another? Have you ſtudied to underſtand what a good, and what a bad Man is; and how each becomes ſuch? Why then are not you yourſelf a good Man;

On what Account am I not?

Becauſe no good Man laments, nor ſighs, nor groans: no good Man turns pale, and trembles, and ſays, "How will ſuch a one receive me; "how will he hear me?" — As he thinks fit, Wretch. Why do you trouble yourſelf about what belongs to others? Is it not *his* Fault, if he receives you ill?

Yes, ſurely.

And can one Perſon be in fault, and another the Sufferer (*b*)?

No.

Why

(*b*) This is a Stoic Extravagance. The very Thing that conſtitutes the Fault of the one in this Caſe is, that he makes the other ſuffer. However, if, inſtead of vainly affecting Inſenſibility, we extend our View, to the future Rewards of thoſe who bear ill Treatment as they ought, the Poſition is true and uſeful.

Why then are you ſolicitous, about what belongs to others?

Well: but I am ſolicitous how I ſhall ſpeak to him.

What then, cannot you ſpeak to him as you will?

But I am afraid I ſhall be diſconcerted.

If you were going to write the Name of *Dion*, ſhould you be afraid of being diſconcerted.

By no means.

What is the Reaſon? Is it becauſe you have ſtudied how to write?

Yes.

And if you were going to read, would it not be exactly the ſame?

Exactly.

What is the Reaſon?

Becauſe every Art hath a certain Aſſurance and Confidence, in the Subjects that belong to it.

Have you not ſtudied then, how to ſpeak? And what elſe did you ſtudy at School?

Syllogiſms, and convertible Propoſitions.

For what Purpoſe? Was it not in order to talk properly? And what is that, but to talk ſeaſonably, and cautiouſly, and intelligibly, and without Flutter and Heſitation; and, in conſequence of all this, with Courage?

Very true.

When,

When, therefore, you go into the Field on Horſeback, are you ſolicitous on being matched againſt one who is on Foot? Solicitous in a Point which you have ſtudied, and another hath not?

Ay, but the Perſon [with whom I am to talk] hath Power to kill me.

Then ſpeak the Truth, pitiful Wretch, and do not be arrogant; nor take the Philoſopher upon you; nor conceal from yourſelf who are your Maſters: but while you may thus be laid hold on by the Body, follow every one who is ſtronger than you. *Socrates*, indeed, had ſtudied how to ſpeak, who talked in ſuch a manner to Tyrants, and Judges, and in a Priſon. *Diogenes* (*c*) had ſtudied how to ſpeak, who talked in ſuch a manner to *Alexander*, to *Philip*, to the Pirates, to the Perſon who bought him. This belonged to them who had ſtudied the Point; who had Courage. But do *you* walk off about your own Affairs, and never ſtir from them. Retire into ſome Corner, and there ſit and weave Syllogiſms, and propoſe them

(*c*) When *Diogenes* was ſailing to *Ægina*, he was taken by Pirates, and carried to *Crete*; and there ſet to Sale. Being aſked what he could do; he anſwered, *Govern Men:* and pointing to a well-dreſs'd *Corinthian*, who was paſſing by, *Sell me* (ſaid he) *to him*; *for he wants a Maſter*. The *Corinthian*, whoſe Name was *Xeniades*, bought him, and appointed him the Tutor to his Children; and *Diogenes* perfectly well diſcharged his Truſt.

them to others. For there is not, in *you*, one able

To rule the ſacred Citadel within.

CHAP. XIV.

Concerning NASO.

§. 1. WHEN a certain *Roman* came to him with his Son, and had heard one Leſſon, This, ſaid *Epictetus*, is the Method of Teaching; and ſtopt. When the other deſired him to go on; Every Art, anſwered he, is tedious, when it is delivered to a Perſon ignorant and unſkilful in it. Indeed the Things performed by the common Arts, quickly diſcover the Uſe for which they were made; and moſt of them have ſomething engaging and agreeable. Thus the Trade of a Shoemaker, if one would ſtand by, and endeavour to comprehend it, is an unpleaſant Thing: but the Shoe is uſeful; and beſides, not diſagreeable to ſee. The Trade of a Smith is extremely uneaſy to an ignorant Perſon that chances to be preſent (*a*): but the Work ſhows the Uſefulneſs of the Art. You will ſee this much more ſtrongly in Muſic: for if you ſtand by, while a Perſon is learning, it will appear to you of all Sciences the moſt unpleaſant: but the Effects

(*a*) The Tranſlation follows Mr. *Upton*. Παρατυγχανοντι.

Effects are agreeable and delightful, even to thoſe who do not underſtand it.

§. 2. Now here, we imagine it to be the Work of one who ſtudies Philoſophy, to adapt his Will to whatever happens. So that none of the Things which happen, may happen againſt our Inclination; nor thoſe which do not happen, be wiſhed for by us. Hence they who have ſettled this Point, have it in their Power never to be diſappointed of their Deſire, or incur their Averſion; but to lead a Life exempt from Sorrow, Fear, and Perturbation, in themſelves; and in Society, preſerving all the natural and adventitious Relations of a Son, a Father, a Brother, a Citizen, a Huſband, a Wife, a Neighbour, a Fellow-Traveller, a Ruler, or a Subject. Something like this, is what we imagine to be the Work of a Philoſopher. It remains to inquire, how it is to be effected. Now we ſee, that a Carpenter by learning certain Things, becomes a Carpenter; and a Pilot, by learning certain Things, becomes a Pilot. Probably, then, it is not ſufficient, in the preſent Caſe, merely to be willing to be wiſe and good; but it is moreover neceſſary that certain Things ſhould be learned. What theſe Things are, is the Queſtion. The Philoſophers ſay, that we are firſt to learn that there is a God; and that his Providence directs the whole; and that it is impoſſible to conceal from him, not only

only our Actions, but even our Thoughts and Emotions. We are next to learn, what the Gods are: for ſuch as they are found to be, ſuch muſt *he*, who would pleaſe and obey them, to the utmoſt of his Power, endeavour to be. If the Deity is faithful, *he* too muſt be faithful: if free, beneficent, and exalted, he muſt be free, beneficent, and exalted, likewiſe: and in all his Words and Actions, behave as an Imitator of God.

§. 3. Whence, then, are we to begin?

If you will give me Leave, I will tell you. It is neceſſary, in the firſt place, that you ſhould underſtand Words.

So then! I do not underſtand them now?

No. You do not.

How is it, then, that I uſe them?

Juſt as the Illiterate do written Expreſſions; and Brutes, the Appearances of Things. For Uſe is one Thing, and Underſtanding another. But if you think you underſtand them, bring whatever Word you pleaſe, and let us ſee whether we underſtand it, or not.

Well: but it is a grievous Thing for a Man to be confuted who is grown old; and perhaps arrived, through a regular Courſe of Military Service, to the Dignity of a Senator.

I know it very well: for you now come to me, as if you wanted nothing. And how can it enter into

into your Imagination, that there ſhould be any thing in which you are defective? You are rich; and perhaps have a Wife and Children, and a great Number of Domeſtics. *Cæſar* takes Notice of you: you have many Friends at *Rome:* you render to all their Dues: you know how to requite a Favour, and revenge an Injury. In what are you deficient? Suppoſe then, I ſhould prove to you, that you are deficient, in what is moſt neceſſary and important to Happineſs; and that hitherto you have taken care of every Thing, rather than your Duty; and, to complete all, that you underſtand neither what God or Man, or Good or Evil, means? That you are ignorant of all the reſt, perhaps, you may bear to be told: but if I prove to you, that you are ignorant even of *yourſelf*, how will you bear with me, and how will you have Patience to ſtay and be convinced? Not at all. You will immediately be offended, and go away. And yet what Injury have I done you; unleſs a Looking-Glaſs injures a Perſon not handſome, when it ſhows him to himſelf, ſuch as he is? Or unleſs a Phyſician can be thought to affront his Patient, when he ſays to him; "Do "you think, Sir, that you ail nothing? You "have a Fever. Eat no Meat To-day, and "drink Water." Nobody cries out here, "What an intolerable Affront!" But, if you ſay to any one, Your Deſires are in a Fermenta-

tion; your Averſions are low; your Intentions, contradictory; your Purſuits, not conformable to Nature; your Opinions, raſh, and miſtaken; he preſently goes away, and complains, he is affronted.

§. 4. This is the Nature of our Proceedings. As, in a crowded Fair, the Horſes and Cattle are brought to be ſold, and the greateſt Part of Men come either to buy or ſell; but there are a few, who come only to look at the Fair, and inquire, How it is carried on; and why in that Manner; and who appointed it; and for what Purpoſe. Thus, in the Fair of the World, ſome, like Cattle, trouble themſelves about nothing but Fodder. For, as to all you, who buſy yourſelves about Poſſeſſions, and Farms, and Domeſtics, and public Poſts, theſe Things are nothing elſe but mere Fodder. But there are ſome few Men, among the Crowd, who are fond of looking on, and conſidering: "What then, after all, is the "World? Who governs it? Hath it no Gover-"nor? How is it poſſible, when neither a City "nor a Houſe can remain ever ſo ſhort a Time, "without ſome one to govern and take care of "it, that this vaſt and beautiful Syſtem ſhould "be adminiſtered, in a fortuitous and diſorderly "Manner? Is there then a Governor? What "ſort of one is he? And how doth he govern; "and what are we, who are under him? And

"for

" for what deſign'd? Have we ſome Connexion " and Relation to him; or none?" In this manner are the Few affected; and apply themſelves only to view the Fair, and then depart. Well: and are they laughed at by the Multitude? Why, ſo are the Lookers-on, by the Buyers and Sellers; and, if the Cattle had any Apprehenſion, they too would laugh at ſuch, as admired any thing but Fodder.

CHAP. XV.

Concerning Thoſe who obſtinately perſevere in whatever they have determined.

§. 1. SOME, when they hear ſuch Diſcourſes as theſe, *That we ought to be ſteady; that Choice is by Nature, free and uncompelled; and that all elſe is liable to Reſtraint, Compulſion, Slavery, and belongs to others*; imagine, that they muſt remain immutably fixed to every thing which they have determined. But it is firſt neceſſary, that the Determination ſhould be a ſound one. I agree, that there ſhould be a Tenſion of the Nerves in the Body; but ſuch as appears in a healthy, an athletic Body: for, if you ſhow me, that you have the Tenſion of a Lunatic, and value yourſelf upon that, I will ſay to you, Get yourſelf to a Phyſician, Man: this is not the Tenſion of the Nerves; but a Relaxation, of another kind.

Such is the Diſtemper of Mind, in thoſe who hear theſe Diſcourſes in a wrong Manner: like an Acquaintance of mine, who, for no Reaſon, had determined to ſtarve himſelf to Death. I went the third Day, and inquired what was the Matter. He anſwered, "I am determined."— Well: but what is your Motive? For, if your Determination be right, we will ſtay, and aſſiſt your Departure: but, if unreaſonable, change it. —"We ought to keep our Determinations."— What do you mean, Sir? Not all; but ſuch as are right. Elſe, if you ſhould juſt now take it into your Head, that it is Night, if you think fit, do not change; but perſiſt, and ſay, *We ought to keep our Determinations.* What do you mean, Sir? Not all. Why do not you begin, by firſt laying the Foundation, in an Inquiry, whether your Determination be a ſound one, or not; and then build your Firmneſs and Conſtancy, upon it. For, if you lay a rotten and crazy Foundation, you muſt not build (*a*): and the greater and more weighty the Superſtructure is, the ſooner will it fall. Without any Reaſon, you are withdrawing from us, out of Life, a Friend, a Companion, a Fellow-Citizen both of the ſame greater (*b*), and leſſer City: and while you are committing Murder, and deſtroying an innocent Perſon, you ſay, *We*

(*a*) Inſtead of οικοδομημα τι ον, the true Reading ſeems to be οικοδομητεον; and is ſo tranſlated.

(*b*) The World.

We muſt keep our Determinations. Suppoſe, by any means, it ſhould ever come into your Head to kill *me*; muſt you keep ſuch a Determination?

§. 2. With Difficulty this Perſon was, however, at laſt convinced: but there are ſome at preſent, whom there is no convincing. So that now I think I underſtand, what before I did not, the Meaning of that common ſaying, That a Fool will neither bend nor break. May it never fall to my Lot to have a wiſe, that is an untractable Fool, for my Friend (*c*). "It is all to no Purpoſe: I am determined." So are Madmen too; but the more ſtrongly they are determined upon Abſurdities, the more Need have they of Hellebore. Why will you not act like a ſick Perſon, and apply yourſelf to a Phyſician? "Sir, "I am ſick. Give me your Aſſiſtance: conſider "what I am to do. It is my Part to follow your "Directions." So, in the preſent Caſe: I know not what I ought to do; and I am come to learn. — "No: but talk to me other about Things: for upon *This* I am determined." What other Things? What is of greater Conſequence, than to convince you, that it is not ſufficient to be determined, and to perſiſt. This is the Tenſion of a Madman; not of one in Health. "I will die, "if you compel me to this." Why ſo, Man: what is the Matter? — "I am determined." I

(*c*) The Tranſlation here follows Mr. *Upton*'s Copy.

have a lucky Eſcape, that you are not determined to kill me. "I take no Money (*d*)." Why ſo? "I am determined." Be aſſured, that with that very Tenſion which you now make uſe of to refuſe it, you may, very poſſibly, hereafter, have as unreaſonable a Propenſity to take it; and again to ſay, "I am determined." As, in a diſtempered and rheumatic Body, the Humour tends ſometimes to one Part, ſometimes to another; thus it is uncertain which Way a ſickly Mind will incline. But if, to its Inclination and Bent, an obſtinate Tenſion be likewiſe added, the Evil then becomes deſperate and incurable.

CHAP. XVI.

That we do not ſtudy to make uſe of the Principles concerning Good and Evil.

§. 1. WHERE lies Good? In Choice. Where Evil? In Choice. Where neither Good nor Evil? In Things independent on Choice. What then? Doth any of us remember theſe Leſſons out of the Schools? Doth any of us ſtudy how to anſwer for himſelf in Things, as in Queſtions? "Is it Day?" "Yes." "Is it Night, "then?" "No." "Is the Number of Stars "even?" "I cannot tell." When (*a*) Money is offered

(*d*) This, probably, is ſpoken in the Perſon of one, who is offered Aſſiſtance neceſſary for his Support, and refuſes it.

(*a*) As a Bribe for bad Purpoſes.

offered you, have you ſtudied to make the proper Anſwer, That it is not a Good? Have you exerciſed yourſelf in ſuch Anſwers as theſe; or only in Sophiſtries? Why do you wonder then, that you improve in Points which you have ſtudied; and in thoſe which you have not ſtudied, there you remain the ſame? When an Orator knows, that he hath written well; that he hath committed to Memory what he hath written; and that he brings an agreeable Voice with him; why is he ſtill ſolicitous? Becauſe he is not contented, with what he hath ſtudied. What doth he want, then? To be applauded by the Audience. He hath ſtudied the Power of ſpeaking, then; but he hath not ſtudied Cenſure and Applauſe. For when did he hear from any one, what Applauſe, what Cenſure, is? What is the Nature of each? What kind of Applauſe is to be ſought, and what kind of Cenſure to be ſhunned? And when did he ever apply himſelf, to ſtudy what follows from theſe Leſſons? Why do you wonder then, if, in what he hath learned, he excels others; but, where he hath not ſtudied, he is the ſame with the reſt of the World? Juſt as a Muſician knows how to play, ſings well, and hath the proper Dreſs of his Profeſſion; yet trembles when he comes upon the Stage. For the firſt he underſtands: but what the Multitude is, or what the Clamour and Laughter of the Multitude is, he doth not underſtand.

Nor doth he even know, what Solicitude itſelf is: whether it be our own Affair, or that of others; or whether it be poſſible to ſuppreſs it, or not. Hence, if he is applauded, he is puffed up, when he makes his Exit: but, if he is laughed at, the Tumour is pricked, and ſubſides.

§. 2. Thus are we too affected. What do we admire? Externals. For what do we ſtrive? Externals. And are we then in any Doubt how we come to fear, and be ſolicitous? What is the Conſequence then, when we eſteem the Things that are brought upon us, to be Evils? We cannot but fear; we cannot but be ſolicitous. And then we ſay, "O Lord God, how ſhall I "avoid Solicitude!" Have you not Hands, Fool? (*b*) Hath not God made them for you? (*c*) Sit down now, and pray, that your Noſe may not run. Wipe it rather; and do not murmur. Well; and hath he given you nothing in the preſent Caſe? Hath not he given you Patience? Hath

(*b*) The Order of this Paſſage ſhould be—Sit down now, and pray, that your Noſe may not run. Have you not Hands, Fool? Hath not God made them for you, *&c.* But *Epictetus*, probably, might ſpeak extempore in this inverted manner: and *Arrian* propoſes to deliver what he ſaid, with the greateſt Exactneſs.

(*c*) Sitting, probably ſome particular Sort of it, was anciently (ſee *Judges* xx. 26. 1 *Chr.* xvii. 16.) one Poſture of Devotion. Our Anceſtors, in Queen *Elizabeth*'s Time, called Kneeling, *Sitting* on their Knees. A mixed Poſture of Sitting and Kneeling is now uſed, by ſome Nations in Prayer.

Hath not he given you Magnanimity? Hath not he given you Fortitude? When you have ſuch Hands as theſe, do you ſtill ſeek for Somebody to wipe your Noſe (*d*)? But we neither ſtudy nor regard theſe Things. For give me but one, who cares how he doth any thing, who doth not regard the Succeſs of any thing, but his own Manner of acting. Who, when he is walking, regards his own Action? Who, when he is deliberating, the Deliberation itſelf, and not the Succeſs that is to follow it? If it happens to ſucceed, he is elated; and cries, "How prudently have "we deliberated! Did not I tell you, my dear "Friend, that it was impoſſible, when we con- "ſidered about any thing, that it ſhould not "happen right?" But, if it miſcarries, the poor Wretch is dejected; and knows not what to ſay about the Matter. Who among us ever, upon this Account, conſulted a Diviner? Who of us ever ſlept in a Temple, to be informed concerning his Manner of acting (*e*)? I ſay, who? Show me one (that I may ſee what I have long ſought)

(*d*) See p. 29. Note *f*.

(*e*) The Heathens had certain Temples, in which it was uſual for Perſons to ſleep, in order to receive Oracles by Dreams. One of the moſt celebrated Places, appropriated to this Purpoſe, was the Temple of *Amphiarus*. See PHILOSTRATUS, p. 771.

who is truly noble and ingenuous. Show me either a young or an old Man (*f*).

§. 3. Why then are we ſtill ſurprized, if, when we waſte all our Attention on the Materials of Action, we are, in the Manner of Action itſelf, low, ſordid, worthleſs, fearful, wretched, and a mere Heap of Diſappointment and Miſery? For we do not care about theſe Things, nor make them our Study. If we had feared, not Death or Exile, but Fear itſelf, we ſhould have ſtudied not to fall into what appears to us to be evil. But, as the Caſe now ſtands, we are eager and loquacious in the Schools; and, when any little Queſtion ariſes about any of theſe Things, we are prepared to trace its Conſequences: but drag us into Practice, and you will find us miſerably ſhipwrecked. Let ſome alarming Appearance attack us; and you will perceive what we have been ſtudying, and in what we are exerciſed. Beſides this Negligence, we always accumulate ſomewhat elſe, and repreſent Things greater than the Reality. In a Voyage, for Inſtance, caſting my Eyes down

(*f*) It is obſervable, that this moſt practical of all the Philoſophers, owns his Endeavours met with little or no Succeſs, among his Scholars. The Apoſtles ſpeak a very different Language, in their Epiſtles to the firſt Converts to Chriſtianity: and the Acts of the Apoſtles, and all the Monuments of the primitive Ages, bear Teſtimony to the Reformation of Manners produced by the Goſpel. This Difference of Succeſs might indeed juſtly be expected, from the Difference of the two Syſtems.

down upon the Ocean below, and looking round me, and ſeeing no Land, I am out of my Wits; and imagine, that, if I ſhould be ſhipwrecked, I muſt ſwallow all that Ocean: nor doth it once enter my Head, that three Pints are enough to do my Buſineſs. What is it then, that alarms me? The Ocean? No: but my own *Principle*. Again: in an Earthquake, I imagine the City is going to fall upon me: but is not one little Stone enough, to knock my Brains out? What is it then, that oppreſſes, and puts us out of our Wits? Why, what elſe, but our *Principles*? For what is it, but mere *Principle*, that oppreſſes him, who leaves his Country, and is ſeparated from his Acquaintance, and Friends, and Place, and uſual Manner of Life? When Children cry, if their Nurſe happens to be abſent for a little while, give them a Cake, and they forget their Grief. Shall we compare you to theſe Children then?

No, indeed. For I do not deſire to be pacified by a Cake; but by right *Principles*. And what are they?

Such as a Man ought to ſtudy all Day long, ſo as not to be attached to what doth not belong to him; neither to a Friend, to a Place, an Academy; nor even to his own Body: but to remember the Law, and to have that conſtantly before his Eyes. And what is the divine Law? To preſerve inviolate what is properly our own: not

to claim what belongs to others: to uſe what is given us; and not deſire what is not given us: and, when any thing is taken away, to reſtore it readily; and to be thankful for the Time you have been permitted the Uſe of it; and not cry after it, like a Child for its Nurſe and its Mamma. For what doth it ſignify, what gets the better of you, or on what you depend? And in what are you ſuperior to him, who cries for a Puppet, if you lament for a paultry Academy, and a Portico, and an Aſſembly of young People; and ſuch-like Amuſements? Another comes, lamenting, that he muſt no longer drink the Water of *Dircè* (*f*). Why, is not the *Marcian* Water as good? "But I was uſed to that." And in time you will be uſed to the other. And, when you are attached to this too, you may cry again, and ſet yourſelf in Imitation of *Euripides*, to celebrate, in Verſe,

The Baths of Nero, *and the* Marcian *Water.*

Hence ſee the Origin of Tragedy, when trifling Accidents befal fooliſh Men. "Ah, when ſhall "I ſee *Athens*, and the Citadel, again!" Wretch, are not you contented with what you ſee every Day? Can you ſee any thing better than the Sun, the Moon, the Stars, the whole Earth, the Sea? But

(*f*) A beautiful clear River in *Bœotia*, flowing into the *Iſmenus*. The *Marcian* Water was conveyed by *Ancus Martius* to *Rome*. UPTON.

But if beſides, you comprehend him who adminiſters the Whole, and carry him about in yourſelf, do you ſtill long after Pebbles, and a fine Rock (*g*)? What will you do then, when you are to leave even the Sun and Moon? Will you ſit crying, like an Infant? What then have you been doing in the School? What did you hear? What did you learn? Why have you written yourſelf a Philoſopher, inſtead of writing the real Fact? I have made ſome (*h*) Introductions [you may ſay]; and read over *Chryſippus*; but I have not ſo much as gone near the Door of a Philoſopher (*i*). For what Pretenſions have I, to any thing of the ſame kind with *Socrates*, who died, and who lived, in ſuch a Manner? Or with *Diogenes*? Do you obſerve either of theſe crying, or out of Humour, that he is not to ſee ſuch a Man, or ſuch a Woman; nor to live any longer at *Athens*, or at *Corinth*; but at *Suſa*, for Inſtance, or *Ecbatana*? For doth He ſtay, and repine, who is at his Liberty, whenever he pleaſes, to quit the Entertainment, and play no longer? Why doth he not ſtay, as Children do, as long as he is amuſed? Such a one, no doubt, will bear perpetual

(*g*) Mr. *Upton* conjectures this to be an Alluſion to ſome poetical, or rhetorical Deſcription.

(*h*) Brief Summaries of any Science, for the Uſe of Beginners, are often ſo called.

(*i*) Perhaps the true Reading ſhould be Φιλοσοφιας, Philoſophy.

petual Baniſhment, and a Sentence of Death, wonderful well! Why will not you be weaned, as Children are; and take more ſolid Food? Will you never ceaſe to cry after your Mammas and Nurſes, whom the old Women about you have taught you to bewail? "But if I go away, "I ſhall trouble Them." — *You* trouble them! No: it will not be *you*: but that which troubles you too, *Principle*. What have you to do then? Pluck out your [falſe] Principle; and, if they are wiſe, they will pluck out theirs too; or, if not, they will groan for themſelves.

§. 4. Boldly make a deſperate Puſh, Man, as the Saying is, for Proſperity, for Freedom, for Magnanimity. Lift up your Head, at laſt, as free from Slavery. Dare to look up to God, and ſay; "Make uſe of me for the future as thou "wilt. I am of the ſame Mind: I am equal "with Thee. I refuſe nothing which ſeems "good to Thee. Lead me whither Thou wilt. "Clothe me in whatever Dreſs Thou wilt. Is "it Thy Will, that I ſhould be in a public or a "private Condition; dwell here, or be baniſh-"ed; be poor, or rich? Under all theſe Circum-"ſtances I will make thy Defence to Men (*k*). "I will

(*k*) There are innumerable Paſſages in St. *Paul*, which, in reality, bear that noble Teſtimony which *Epictetus* here requires in his imaginary Character. Such are thoſe in which he *glories in Tribulation*; ſpeaks with an heroic Con-

tempt

"I will ſhow what the Nature of every Thing "is."—No. Rather ſit alone, in a warm (*l*) Place, and wait till your Mamma comes to feed you. If *Hercules* had ſat loitering at Home, what would he have been? *Euryſtheus*, and not *Hercules*. Beſides, by travelling through the World, how many Acquaintance, and how many Friends, had he? But none more his Friend, than God: for which Reaſon he was believed to be the Son of God; and was ſo. In Obedience to Him, he went about extirpating Injuſtice, and lawleſs Force. But you are not *Hercules*; nor able to extirpate the Evils of others: nor even *Theſeus*, to extirpate the Evils of *Attico*. Extirpate your own then. Expel, inſtead of *Procruſtes* and *Sciron* (*m*), Grief, Fear, Deſire, Envy, Malevolence, Avarice, Effeminacy, Intemperance, [from your Mind]. But theſe can be no otherwiſe expelled, than by looking up to God alone, as your Pattern: by attaching yourſelf to him alone, and being conſecrated to his Commands. If you wiſh for any thing

tempt of Life, when ſet in Competition with the Performance of his Duty; rejoices in Bonds and Impriſonments, and the View of his approaching Martyrdom: and repreſents Afflictions as a Proof of God's Love. See *Acts* xx. 23, 24. *Rom.* v. 3. viii. 35—39. 2 Tim. iv. 6.

(*l*) The Senſe of the original Phraſe, an Ox's Belly, is obſcure to me. The *French* Tranſlation hath, *in your Cradle*.

(*m*) Two famous Robbers who infeſted *Attica*, and were at laſt killed by *Theſeus*. UPTON.

thing elſe, you will, with Sighs and Groans, follow what is ſtronger than you: always ſeeking Proſperity without, and never able to find it. For you ſeek it where it is not, and neglect to ſeek it where it is.

CHAP. XVII.

How to adapt Pre-conceptions to particular Caſes.

§. 1. WHAT is the firſt Buſineſs of one who ſtudies Philoſophy (*a*)? To part with Self-Conceit. For it is impoſſible for any one to begin to learn what he hath a Conceit that he already knows. We all go to the Philoſophers, talking at all Adventures upon negative and poſitive Duties; Good and Evil; Fair and Baſe. We praiſe, cenſure, accuſe; we judge and diſpute about fair and baſe Enterpriſes. And for what do we go to the Philoſophers? To learn what we ſuppoſe ourſelves not to know. And what is this? Theorems. We are deſirous to hear what the Philoſophers ſay, for its Elegance and Acuteneſs; and ſome with a View only to Gain. Now it is ridiculous to ſuppoſe, that a Perſon will learn any thing, but what he deſires to learn; or make an Improvement, in what he doth not learn. But moſt are deceived, in the ſame Manner as *Theopompus*, the Orator, when he

(*a*) See B. II. c. 11. §. 1.

he blames *Plato*, for defining every thing. "For, "what, ſays he, did none of us, before you, uſe "the Words *Good* and *Juſt*: or did we utter "them as empty Sounds, without underſtanding "what each of them meant?" Why, who tells you, *Theopompus*, that we had not natural Ideas and Pre-conceptions of each of theſe? But it is not poſſible, to adapt Pre-conceptions to their correſpondent Subjects, without having minutely diſtinguiſhed them, and examined what is the proper Subject to each. You may make the ſame Objection to the Phyſicians. For who of us did not uſe the Words, Wholeſome and Unwholeſome, before *Hippocrates* was born: or did we utter them as empty Sounds? For we have ſome Pre-conception of Wholeſome too; but we cannot adapt it. Hence, one ſays, Let the Patient abſtain from Meat; another, Give it him: one ſays, Let him be bled; another, Cup him. And what is the Reaſon, but not being able to adapt the Pre-conception of Wholeſome, to particular Caſes? Thus, too in Life: who of us doth not talk of Good or Evil; Advantageous and Diſadvantageous: for who of us hath not a Pre-conception of each of theſe? But is it then a diſtinct and perfect one? Show me this.

How ſhall I ſhow it?

§. 2. Adapt it properly to particular Subjects. *Plato*, to go no farther, puts Definitions under

the

the Pre-conception of Uſeful; but you, under that of Uſeleſs. Can both of you be right? How is it poſſible? Again: doth not one Man adapt the Pre-conception of Good, to Riches? Another, not to Riches, but to Pleaſure, or Health? Upon the whole, if none of us, who uſe Words, either utter them without Meaning, or need to take any manner of Care in diſtinguiſhing our Pre-conceptions, why do we differ? Why do we wrangle? Why do we cenſure each other? But what Occaſion have I to mention this mutual Contradiction? If you yourſelf adapt your Pre-conceptions properly, how comes it to paſs, that you do not proſper? Why do you meet with any Hindrance? Let us for the preſent omit the ſecond Topic, concerning the *Purſuits*, and the Duties relative to them: Let us omit the Third too, concerning *Aſſent*. I make you a Preſent of all theſe. Let us inſiſt only on the Firſt (*b*); which affords almoſt a ſenſible Proof, that you do not adapt your Pre-conceptions right. You deſire what is poſſible in itſelf, and poſſible for you. Why then are you hindered? Why are not you in a proſperous Way? You do not decline what is neceſſary. Why then do you incur any thing, [which is your Averſion]? Why are you unfortunate? When you deſire any thing, why doth it not happen? When you do not deſire it, why doth

(*b*) *i. e.* The Topic of the *Deſires* and *Averſions*.

doth it happen? For this is the greateſt Demonſtration of ill Succeſs and Miſery. I deſire ſomething; and it doth not happen: and what is more wretched than I? From an Impatience of this, *Medea* came to murder her own Children: an Action of a noble Spirit in this View; for ſhe had a proper Impreſſion of what it was to be diſappointed of one's Deſire. "Thus I ſhall puniſh him, who hath injured and diſhonoured me: and what is ſo wicked a Wretch good for? But how is this to be effected? I will murder the Children: but that will be puniſhing myſelf. And what do I care?" This is the Error of a Soul indued with great Powers. For ſhe knew not where the Completion of our Deſires is to be found: that it is not to be had from without; nor by altering the Appointment of Things. Do *not* deſire the Man for your Huſband, and nothing which you *do* deſire will fail to happen. Do not deſire to keep him to yourſelf. Do not deſire to ſtay at *Corinth*; and, in a Word, have no Will, but the Will of God; and who ſhall reſtrain you; who ſhall compel *you*, any more than *Jupiter*? When you have ſuch a Guide, and conform your Will and Inclinations to his, what need you fear being diſappointed? Yield up your Deſire and Averſion [as Slaves] to Riches, or Poverty; the one will be diſappointed, the other incurred. Yield them

up

up to Health, Power, Honours, your Country, Friends, Children, in ſhort, to any thing independent on Choice, you will be unfortunate. But yield them up to *Jupiter*, and the other Gods. Give yourſelf up to theſe: let theſe govern: let both be ranged on the ſame Side with theſe; and how can you be any longer unproſperous? But if, poor Wretch, you envy, and pity, and are jealous, and tremble, and never ceaſe, a ſingle Day, from complaining of yourſelf; and the Gods, why do you boaſt of your Education? What Education, Man? That you have learned convertible Syllogiſms? Why do not you, if poſſible, unlearn all theſe, and begin again; convinced, that hitherto, you have not even touched upon the Point? And, for the future, beginning from this Foundation, proceed, in Order, to the Superſtructure; that nothing may happen which you do not wiſh, and that every thing may happen which you do. Give me but one young Man, who brings this Intention with him to the School; who is a Champion for this Point; and ſays, "I yield up all the reſt: it ſuffices "me, if once I become able to paſs my Life, free "from Hindrance and Grief: to ſtretch out my "Neck to all Events, as free; and to look up "to Heaven, as the Friend of God; fearing no-"thing that can happen." Let any one of you ſhow himſelf of ſuch a Diſpoſition, that I may

ſay

ſay, "Come into the Place, young Man, that "is of right your own; for you are deſtined to "be an Ornament to Philoſophy. Youſs are "theſe Poſſeſſions; yours theſe Books; yours "theſe Diſcourſes." Then, when he hath maſter'd, and got the better of this firſt Claſs, let him come to me again, and ſay; "I deſire indeed to "be free from Paſſion, and Perturbation; but I "deſire too, as a pious, a philoſophic, and a "carefully attentive Man, to know, what is my "Duty to God, to my Parents, to my Relations, "to my Country, and to Strangers." "Come "into the ſecond Claſs too; for this likewiſe is "yours." "But I have now ſufficiently ſtudied "the ſecond Claſs too; and I would willingly "be ſecure, and (*c*) unſhaken by Error and De-"luſion, not only awake, but even when aſleep; "when warmed with Wine; when diſeaſed with "the Spleen." "You are a God, Man: your "Intentions are great."

§. 3. "No. But I, for my part, deſire to "underſtand what *Chryſippus* ſays, in his logical "Treatiſe of the (*d*) *Pſeudomenos*."—Go hang yourſelf,

(*c*) There are ſeveral Readings and Conjectures. I have followed *Wolfius*; who reads, for ασιτως, ασυχως; as agreeing beſt with the Senſe.

(*d*) The *Pſeudomenos* was a famous Problem among the Stoics; and it is this. When a Perſon ſays, *I lie*; doth he lie, or doth he not? If he lies, he ſpeaks Truth: if he ſpeaks Truth, he lies. The Philoſphers compoſed many Books

yourſelf, pitiful Wretch, with ſuch an Intention as this. What Good will it do you? You will read the Whole lamenting all the while; and ſay to others, trembling, "Do as I do." — "Shall I read to you, my Friend, and you to "me?—You write (*e*) ſurprizingly, Sir; and you "very finely imitate the Stile of *Plato*; and you, "of *Xenophon*; and you, of *Antiſthenes*." And thus, having related your Dreams to each other, you return again to the ſame State. Your Deſires and Averſions, your Purſuits, your Intentions, your Reſolutions, your Wiſhes and Endeavours, are juſt what they were. You do not ſo much as ſeek for one to adviſe you; but are offended when you hear ſuch Things as theſe; and cry, "An ill-natured old Fellow! He never wept "over me, when I was ſetting out, nor ſaid; "To what a Danger are you going to be expoſed! "If you come off ſafe, Child, I will illuminate "my Houſe." "This would have been the "Part of a good-natured Man." Truly, it will be a mighty Happineſs, if you do come off ſafe: it

Books on this Difficulty. *Chryſippus* wrote ſix. *Philetas* waſted himſelf to Death in ſtudying to anſwer it. MENAGE *on* DIOG. LAERT. L. II. §. 108. BRUCKER *Hiſt. Crit. Philoſ.* vol. i. p. 613, 614.

(*e*) This is ſpoken by *Epictetus*, in the Perſon of one of his Scholars; to ridicule their complimenting each other on their Writings, while they neglected the more important Concern of moral Improvements.

it will be worth while to make an Illumination. For you (*f*) ought to be immortal, and exempt from Sickneſs, to be ſure.

§. 4. Throwing away then, I ſay, this Self-conceit, by which we fancy, we have gained ſome Knowledge of what is uſeful, we ſhould come to philoſophic Reaſoning, as we do to Mathematics and Muſic: otherwiſe we ſhall be far from making any Improvement, even if we have read over all the Collection and Compoſitions, not only of *Chryſippus*, but of *Antipater* and *Archedemus* too.

CHAP. XVIII.

How the Appearances of Things are to be combated.

§. 1. EVERY Habit and Faculty is preſerved, and increaſed, by correſpondent Actions: as the Habit of Walking, by walking; of Running, by running. If you would be a Reader, read: if a Writer, write. But if you do not read for a Month together, but do ſomewhat elſe; you will ſee what will be the Conſequence. So, after ſitting ſtill for ten Days, get up and attempt to take a long Walk; and you will find how your Legs are weakened. Upon the whole then, whatever you would make habitual, practiſe it: and, if you would not make a Thing habitual,

(*f*) Or ſhould be ſo rather.

bitual, do not practiſe it; but habituate yourſelf to ſomething elſe.

§. 2. It is the ſame with regard to the Operations of the Soul. Whenever you are angry, be aſſured, that it is not only a preſent Evil, but that you have increaſed a Habit, and added Fuel to a Fire. When you are overcome by the Company of Women, do not eſteem it as a ſingle Defeat, but that you have fed, that you have increaſed, your Diſſoluteneſs. For it is impoſſible, but that Habits and Faculties muſt either be firſt produced, or ſtrengthened and increaſed by correſpondent Actions. Hence the Philoſophers derive the Growth of all Infirmities. When you once deſire Money, for Example, if a Degree of Reaſoning ſufficient to produce a Senſe of the Evil be applied, the Deſire ceaſes, and the governing Faculty of the Mind regains its Authority; whereas, if you apply no Remedy, it returns no more to its former State: but, being again excited by a correſpondent Appearance, it kindles at the Deſire more quickly than before; and by frequent Repetitions, at laſt becomes callous (*a*): and by this Infirmity is the Love of Money fixed. For he who hath had a Fever, even after it hath left him, is not in the ſame State of Health as before, unleſs he was perfectly cured: and the ſame thing happens in Diſtempers of the Soul

(*a*) Hardened againſt proper Reflections.

Soul likewiſe. There are certain Traces and Bliſters left in it; which, unleſs they are well effaced, whenever a new Hurt is received in the ſame Part, inſtead of Bliſters become Sores.

§. 3. If you would not be of an angry Temper then, do not feed the Habit. Give it nothing to help its Increaſe. Be quiet at firſt, and reckon the Days in which you have not been angry. I uſed to be angry every Day; now every other Day; then every third and fourth Day: and if you miſs it ſo long as thirty Days, offer a Sacrifice of Thankſgiving to God. For Habit is firſt weakened, and then intirely deſtroyed. "I was "not vexed To-day (*b*); nor the next Day; "nor for three or four Months after; but took "heed to myſelf, when ſome provoking Things "happened." Be aſſured, that you are in a fine Way. "To-day, when I ſaw a handſome Perſon, "I did not ſay to myſelf, O that I could poſſeſs "her! And, how happy is her Huſband (for he "who ſays this, ſays too, how happy is her Gal-"lant): nor do I go on to repreſent her as pre-"ſent, as undreſs'd, as lying down beſide me." On this I ſtroak my Head, and ſay, Well done, *Epictetus:* thou haſt ſolved a pretty Sophiſm; a much prettier than one very celebrated in the

(*b*) Theſe ſeveral Facts are here ſuppoſed, to be recollected at different Times.

Schools (*c*). But, if even the Lady ſhould happen to be willing, and give me Intimations of it, and ſend for me, and preſs my Hand, and place herſelf next to me; and I ſhould then forbear, and get the Victory; that would be a Sophiſm beyond all the Subtleties of Logic. This, and not diſputing artfully, is the proper Subject for Exultation.

§. 4. How then is this to be effected? Be willing to approve yourſelf to yourſelf. Be willing to appear beautiful in the Sight of God: be deſirous to converſe in Purity with your own pure Mind, and with God: and then, if any ſuch Appearance ſtrikes you, *Plato* directs you: "Have "Recourſe to Expiations: Go a Suppliant to the "Temples of the averting Deities." It is ſufficient, however, if you propoſe to yourſelf the Example of wiſe and good Men, whether alive or dead; and compare your Conduct with theirs. Go to *Socrates*, and ſee him lying by *Alcibiades*, yet ſlighting his Youth and Beauty. Conſider what a Victory he was conſcious of obtaining! What an *Olympic* Prize! In what Number did he ſtand from *Hercules* (*d*)? So that, by Heaven, one

(*c*) In this Place, and the following Lines, the Original mentions particular Forms of Argument, which are now little underſtood; and could not be at all inſtructive to the *Engliſh* Reader.

(*d*) *Hercules* is ſaid to have been the Author of the Gymnaſtic Games; and the firſt Victor. Thoſe who afterwards conquered

one might juſtly ſalute *Him* (*e*); Hail! incredibly (*f*) great, univerſal Victor! not thoſe ſorry Boxers and Wreſtlers; nor the Gladiators, who reſemble them.

§. 5. By placing ſuch an Object over-againſt you, you will conquer any Appearance, and not be drawn away by it. But, in the firſt place, be not hurried along with it, by its haſty Vehemence: but ſay; *Appearance*, wait for me a little. Let me ſee what you are, and what you repreſent. Let me try you. Then, afterwards, do not ſuffer it to go on drawing gay Pictures of what will follow: if you do, it will lead you where-ever it pleaſes. But rather oppoſe to it ſome good and noble Appearance, and baniſh this baſe and ſordid one. If you are habituated to this kind of Exerciſe, you will ſee what Shoulders, what Nerves, what Sinews, you will have. But now it is mere trifling Talk, and nothing more. He is the true Practitioner, who exerciſes himſelf

conquered in Wreſtling, and the Pancratium, were numbered from him. UPTON.

(*e*) Mr. *Upton* inſerts νικητις, which he conjectures, ſhould be νικησας, into the Text, from his Manuſcript: where, probably, it was written merely by an Accident of the Tranſcriber's caſting his Eye upon that Word in the next Line. The Senſe needs not this Addition, and perhaps doth better without it.

(*f*) This pompous Title was given to thoſe, who had been Victors in all the *Olympic* Games.

againſt ſuch Appearances as theſe. Stay, Wretch, do not be hurried away. The Combat is great, the Atchievement divine: for Empire, for Freedom, for Proſperity, for Tranquillity. Remember God. Invoke Him for your Aid, and Protector; as Sailors do *Caſtor* and *Pollux*, in a Storm. For what Storm is greater than that which ariſes from violent Appearances, contending to overſet our Reaſon? Indeed, what is the Storm itſelf, but Appearance? For, do but take away the Fear of Death, and let there be as many Thunders and Lightnings as you pleaſe, you will find, that in the ruling Faculty, all is Serenity and Calm: but, if you are once defeated, and ſay, you will get the Victory another Time, and then the ſame thing over again; aſſure yourſelf, you will at laſt be reduced to ſo weak and wretched a Condition, that you will not ſo much as know when you do amiſs; but you will even begin to make Defences for your Behaviour, and thus verify the Saying of *Heſiod*:

With conſtant Ills, the Dilatory *ſtrive.*

CHAP. XIX.

Concerning Thoſe who embrace Philoſophy only in Words.

§. 1. THE Argument, called The ruling one, concerning which Diſputants queſtioned each other, appears to have its Riſe from hence.

hence (*a*). Of the following Propoſitions, any Two imply a Contradiction to the Third. They are theſe. *That every thing paſt is neceſſarily true: That an Impoſſibility is not the Conſequence of a Poſſibility:* And, *That ſomething is a Poſſibility, which neither is nor will be true. Diodorus*, perceiving this Contradiction, made uſe of the Probability of the Two firſt, to prove, That nothing is poſſible, which neither is nor will be true. Some again hold the Second and Third; That *ſomething is poſſible, which neither is nor will be true*; and, That, *an Impoſſibility is not the Conſequence of a Poſſibility:* and, conſequently, aſſert, That *not every thing paſt is neceſſarily true.* This Way *Cleanthes*, and his Followers, took; whom *Antipater* copiouſly defends. Others, laſtly, maintain the Firſt and Third; *That ſomething is poſſible, which neither is nor will be true:* and That *every thing paſt is neceſſarily true:* but then, That *an Impoſſibility may be the Conſequence of a Poſſibility.* But all theſe Three Propoſitions cannot be at once maintained, becauſe of their mutual Contradiction. If any one ſhould aſk me then, which of them I maintain; I anſwer him, That I cannot

 tell.

(*a*) The curious Reader may ſee this whole Matter explained, with the greateſt Acuteneſs and Accuracy, by the very learned and ingenious Mr HARRIS, in Mr. *Upton*'s Notes.

tell. But I have heard it related, that *Diodorus* held one Opinion about them; the Followers of *Panthædes*, I think, and *Cleanthes*, another; and *Chryſippus* a third.

What then is *yours* (*b*)?

(*c*) None. Nor was I born to examine the Appearances of Things to my own Mind; to compare what is ſaid by others, and thence to form ſome Principle of my own, as to the Topic [which you mention]. Therefore, [in reſpect to it,] I am no better than a Grammarian [who repeats what he hath read]. Who was the Father of *Hector*? *Priam*. Who were his Brothers? *Paris* and *Deiphobus*. Who was his Mother? *Hecuba*. This I have heard related. From whom? *Homer*. But I believe *Hellanicus*, and other Authors, have written on the ſame Subject. And what better Account have I of the ruling Argument? But, if I was vain enough, I might, eſpecially at an Entertainment (*d*), aſtoniſh all the Company by an Enumeration of Authors, relating to it. *Chryſippus* hath written wonderfully, in his firſt Book of Poſſibilities. *Cleanthes* and

(*b*) This is ſpoken to *Epictetus* by one of his Hearers.

(*c*) With Mr. *Upton*, I read οὐδὲν: but it ſeems neceſſary, that οὐδὲ ſhould likewiſe ſtand; and it is ſo tranſlated.

(*d*) Some Philoſophers affected to ſhow their Learning at ſuch Times; and it is againſt this idle Oſtentation that *Epictetus* points his Diſcourſe: for the Study of Logic itſelf, under proper Regulations, he often ſtrongly recommends.

and *Archedemus* have each written ſeparately on this Subject. *Antipater* too hath written, not only in his Treatiſe of Poſſibilities, but purpoſely in a Diſcourſe on the ruling Argument. Have you not read the Work? "No." Read it then. — And what Good will it do him? He will be more trifling and impertinent than he is already. For what elſe have *you* gained by reading it? What Principle have you formed upon this Subject? But you tell us of *Helen*, and *Priam*, and the Iſle of *Calypſo*, which never was, nor ever will be. And here, indeed, it is of no great Conſequence, if you retain the Story, without forming any Principle of your own. But it is our Misfortune to do ſo much more in Morality, than upon ſuch Subjects as theſe.

§. 2. Talk to me concerning Good and Evil (*e*). Hear.

The Wind from Ilium *to the* Cicon's *Shore*
Hath driven me. —

Of Things, ſome are good, ſome evil, and ſome indifferent. Now the good, are the Virtues, and whatever partakes of them; and the evil, Vices, and what partakes of Vice: the in-

(*e*) This I apprehend to be ſpoken by one of the Scholars of *Epictetus*; who ſeeing the Contempt with which his Maſter treats logical Subtleties, in the foregoing Paragraph, deſires him to diſcourſe upon Ethics.

different, lie between theſe, as Riches, Health, Life, Death, Pleaſure, Pain.

Whence do you know this?

Hellanicus ſays it, in his *Egyptian* Hiſtory (*f*). For what doth it ſignify, whether one names the Hiſtory of *Hellanicus*, or the Ethics of *Diogenes*, or *Chryſippus*, or *Cleanthes?* Have you then examined any of theſe Things, and formed a Principle of your own? But ſhow me, how you are uſed to exerciſe yourſelf on Shipboard. Remember this Diviſion (*g*), when the Maſt rattles, and ſome idle Fellow ſtands by you, while you are ſcreaming, and ſays, "For Heaven's ſake, talk "as you did a little while ago. Is it Vice to "ſuffer Shipwreck? Or doth it partake of Vice?" Would not you take up a Log, and throw it at his Head? "What have we to do with you, "Sir? We are periſhing, and you come and "jeſt." Again: if *Cæſar* ſhould ſummon you, to anſwer an Accuſation, Remember the Diviſion. If, when you are going in, pale and trembling, any one ſhould meet you, and ſay, "Why do "you tremble, Sir? What is this Affair you are "engaged

(*f*) *Epictetus* gives this abſurd Reply to ridicule the Fondneſs of his Scholars for quoting Authors, and making a Parade of their Reading: and inſinuates, that it is not at all material, whether a Perſon, who on ſuch Subjects, means nothing further than Talk, knows of what he is talking, or blunders about it ever ſo groſsly.

(*g*) Of Things into good, evil, and indifferent.

" engaged in? Doth *Cæſar* within, give Virtue " and Vice to thoſe who approach him?"— " What do *you* too inſult me, and add to my " Evils?"—" Nay, but tell me, Philoſopher, " why you tremble? Is there any other Danger, " but Death, or a Priſon, or bodily Pain, or " Exile, or Defamation?"—" Why what ſhould " there be elſe?"—" Are any of theſe Vice? " Or do they partake of Vice? What then, did " you yourſelf uſe to ſay of theſe Things?"— " What have you to do with me, Sir? My " own Evils are enough for me."—You ſay " right. Your own Evils are indeed enough " for you; your Baſeneſs, your Cowardice, and " that Arrogance, by which you were elated, as " you ſat in the Schools. Why did you plume " yourſelf with what is not your own? Why did " you call yourſelf a Stoic?"

§. 3. Obſerve yourſelves thus in your Actions, and you find of what Sect you are. You will find, that moſt of you are *Epicureans*; a few Peripatetics, and thoſe but looſe ones (*b*). For, by what Action will you prove, that you think Virtue equal, and even ſuperior, to all other Things? Show me a Stoic, if you have one (*i*). Where? Or how ſhould you? You can ſhow, indeed, a Thouſand, who repeat the Stoic Rea-

(*b*) The Peripatetics held other Things beſides Virtue to be good; but not in near ſo high a Degree.

(*i*) See Note *e*. B. ii. c. 16.

ſonings. But do they repeat the *Epicurean* worſe? Are they not juſt as perfect in the Peripatetic? Who then is a *Stoic?* As we call that a *Phidian* Statue, which is formed according to the Art of *Phidias*; ſo ſhow me ſome one Perſon formed according to the Principles which he profeſſes. Show me one, who is ſick, and happy; in Danger, and happy; dying and happy; exiled, and happy; diſgraced, and happy. Show him me; for, by Heaven, I long to ſee a Stoic. But you [will ſay, you] have not one perfectly formed. Show me then one who is forming: one who is approaching towards this Character. Do me this Favour. Do not refuſe an old Man a Sight which he hath never yet ſeen. Do you ſuppoſe, that you are [aſked] to ſhow the *Jupiter* or *Minerva* of *Phidias*, a Work of Ivory or Gold? Let any of you ſhow me a human Soul, willing to have the ſame Sentiments with thoſe of God: not to accuſe either God or Man: not to be diſappointed of its Deſire, or incur its Averſion: not to be angry: not to be envious: not to be jealous: in a Word, willing from a Man to become a God; and, in this poor mortal Body, aiming to have Fellowſhip with *Jupiter*. Show him to me. But you cannot. Why then do you impoſe upon yourſelves, and play Tricks with others? Why do you put on a Dreſs not your own; and walk about in it, mere Thieves and Pilferers

Pilferers of Names and Things, which do not belong to you? Here, I am your Preceptor, and you come to be inſtructed by me. And indeed my Intention is to ſecure you from being reſtrained, compelled, hindered: to make you free, proſperous, happy; looking to God upon every Occaſion, great or ſmall. And you come to learn and ſtudy theſe Things. Why then do not you finiſh your Work, if you have the proper Intention; and I, beſides the Intention, the proper Qualifications? What is wanting? When I ſee an Artificer, and the Materials lying ready, I expect the Work. Now here is the Artificer; here are the Materials; what is it we want? Is not the Thing capable of being taught? It is. Is it not in our own Power then? The only Thing of all others that is ſo. Neither Riches, nor Health, nor Fame, nor, in ſhort, any thing elſe is in our Power, except a right Uſe of the Appearances of Things. This alone is, by Nature, not ſubject to Reſtraint, not ſubject to Hindrance. Why then do not you finiſh it? Tell me the Cauſe. It muſt be by my Fault, or yours, or from the Nature of the Thing. The Thing itſelf is practicable, and the only one in our Power. The Fault then muſt be either in me, or in you, or, more truly, in both. Well then, ſhall we now, at laſt, bring this Intention along with us? Let us lay aſide all that is paſt.

Let us begin. Only believe me, and you will ſee the Conſequence.

CHAP. XX.

Concerning the Epicureans, *and Academics.*

§. 1. TRUE and evident Propoſitions muſt, of Neceſſity, be uſed even by thoſe, who contradict them. And, perhaps, one of the ſtrongeſt Proofs, that there is ſuch a Thing as Evidence, is the Neceſſity which thoſe, who contradict it, are under to make uſe of it. If a Perſon, for Inſtance, ſhould deny, that any thing is univerſally true, he will be obliged to aſſert the contrary, that nothing is univerſally true. What, Wretch, not even this itſelf? For what is this, but to ſay, that every thing univerſal is falſe. Again: if any one ſhould come, and ſay, "*Know* that there "is nothing to be *known*; but all Things are "uncertain:" or another; "*Believe* me, and it "will be the better for you, no Man ought to "be *believed* in any thing:" or a Third, "*Learn* "from me, that nothing is to be *learned*; I tell "you this, and will teach the Proof of it, if you "pleaſe." Now what Difference is there between ſuch as theſe, and thoſe who call themſelves Academics? Who ſay to us, "Be *convin-*"*ced*, that no one ever is *convinced* [on good "Grounds].

" Grounds]. Believe us, that no body believes " any body."

§. 2. Thus alſo, when *Epicurus* would deſtroy the natural Relation of Mankind to each other, he makes uſe of the very thing he is deſtroying. For what doth he ſay? " Be not deceived; be " not ſeduced, and miſtaken. There is no na- " tural Relation between reaſonable Beings. Be- " lieve me. Thoſe who ſay otherwiſe, miſlead " and impoſe upon you."—Why are *you* concerned for us then? Let us be deceived. *You* will fare never the worſe, if all the reſt of us are perſuaded, that there is a natural Relation between Mankind; and that it is by all means to be preſerved. Nay, it will be much ſafer and better. Why do you give yourſelf any Trouble about us, Sir? Why do you break your Reſt for us? Why do you light your Lamp? Why do you riſe early? Why do you compoſe ſo many Volumes? Is it that none of us ſhould be deceived, concerning the Gods; as if they took any Care of Men? Or that we may not ſuppoſe the Eſſence of Good conſiſts in any thing, but in Pleaſure? For, if theſe Things be ſo, lie down and ſleep, and lead the Life of which you judge yourſelf worthy; that of a mere Reptile. Eat and drink, and ſatisfy your Paſſion for Women, and eaſe yourſelf and ſnore. What is it to you, whether others think right or wrong about theſe Things? For what have you

to

to do with us? You take care of Sheep, becauſe they afford us their Milk, their Wool, and, at laſt, their Fleſh. And would it not be a deſirable Thing that Men might be ſo lulled and inchanted by the Stoics, as to give themſelves up to be milked and fleeced by you, and ſuch as you? Should not theſe Doctrines be taught to your Brother *Epicureans* only, and concealed from the reſt of the World; who ſhould by all means, above all things, be perſuaded, that we have a natural Relation to each other: and that Temperance is a good Thing, in order that all may be kept ſafe for *you*? Or is this Relation to be preſerved towards ſome, and not towards others? Towards whom then, is it to be preſerved? Towards ſuch as mutually preſerve, or ſuch as violate it? And who violate it more, than you, who teach ſuch Doctrines?

§. 3. What was it then, that waked *Epicurus* from his Sleep: and compelled him to write what he did; what elſe, but that which is of all others the moſt powerful in Mankind, Nature; which draws every one, however unwilling and reluctant, to its own Purpoſes. For ſince, ſays ſhe, you think that there is no Relation between Mankind, write this Doctrine, and leave it for the Uſe of others; and break your Sleep upon that Account; and, by your own Practice, confute your own Principles. Do we ſay, that *Oreſtes* was rouſed from ſleep by the Agitation of the Furies;

ries; and was not *Epicurus* waked by Furies, more cruel and avenging, which would not ſuffer him to reſt; but compelled him to divulge his own Evils, as Wine and Madneſs do the Prieſts of *Cybele*? So ſtrong and unconquerable a Thing is human Nature! For how can a Vine have the Properties not of a Vine, but of an Olive Tree? Or an Olive Tree, not thoſe of an Olive Tree, but of a Vine? It is impoſſible. It is inconceivable. Neither, therefore, is it poſſible for a human Creature intirely to loſe human Affections. But even thoſe who have undergone a Mutilation, cannot have their Inclinations alſo mutilated: and ſo *Epicurus*, when he had mutilated all the Offices of a Man, of a Maſter of a Family, of a Citizen, and of a Friend, did not mutilate the Inclinations of Humanity: for he could not, any more than the idle Academics can throw away, or blind their own Senſes; though this be, of all others, the Point they labour moſt. What a Misfortune is it, when any one, after having received, from Nature, Standards and Rules for the Knowledge of Truth, doth not ſtrive to add to theſe, and make up their Deficiencies; but, on the contrary, endeavours to take away, and deſtroy, whatever Truth may be known even by them?

§. 4. What ſay you, Philoſopher? What do you think of Piety and Sanctity? If you pleaſe, I will prove that they are good.—Pray do prove it; that

that our Citizens may be converted (*a*), and honour the Deity, and may no longer neglect what is of the higheſt Importance.—Have you the Proofs, then?—I have, and I thank you. Since you are ſo well pleaſed with this then, learn the contrary: That there are no Gods; or, if there are, that they take no Care of Mankind; neither have we any Concern with them: that this Piety and Sanctity, which is ſo much talked of by many, is only an Impoſition of boaſting and ſophiſtical Men: or, perhaps, of Legiſlators, for a Terror and Reſtraint to Injuſtice.—Well done, Philoſopher. Our Citizens are much the better for you. You have already brought back all the Youth, to a Contempt of the Deity.—What! doth not this pleaſe you, then? Learn next, that Juſtice is nothing: that Shame is Folly: that the paternal Relation is nothing; the filial, nothing.—Well ſaid, Philoſopher: perſiſt; convince the Youth: that we may have many more, to think and talk like you. By ſuch Doctrines as theſe, have our well-governed States flouriſhed! Upon theſe was *Sparta* founded! *Lycurgus*, by his Laws, and Method of Education, introduced ſuch Perſuaſions as theſe; That it is juſt as honourable, as it is diſhonourable, to be Slaves; and juſt as diſhonourable, as honourable, to be free! They who died at *Thermopylæ*, died from ſuch Principles as theſe! And

(*a*) A New Teſtament Word.

And from what other Doctrines did the *Athenians* leave their City (*b*)?

§. 5. And yet, they who talk thus, marry, and produce Children; and engage in public Affairs, and get themſelves made Prieſts and Prophets (of whom? Of Gods that have no Exiſtence); and conſult the *Pythian* Prieſteſs, only to hear Falſhoods, and interpret the Oracles to others. What monſtrous Impudence and Impoſture!

§. 6. (*c*) What are you doing Man? You contradict yourſelf every Day; and yet you will not give up theſe paultry Cavils. When you eat, where do you carry your Hand? To your Mouth, or to your Eye? When you bathe, where do you go? Do you ever call a Kettle, a Diſh; or a Spoon, a Spit? If I were a Servant to one of theſe Gentlemen, were it at the Hazard of being flayed every Day, I would plague him. "Throw ſome "Oil into the Bath, Boy." I would take Pickle, and pour upon his Head. "What is this?" Really, Sir, an Appearance ſtruck me ſo perfectly alike, as not to be diſtinguiſhed from Oil. "Give "me

(*b*) When the *Athenians* found themſelves unable to reſiſt the Forces of the *Perſians*, they left their City; and, having removed their Wives and Children, and their moveable Effects, to *Træzen* and *Salamis*, went on board their Ships, and defended the Liberty of *Greece* by their Fleet. UPTON *from* CICERO, &c.

(*c*) What follows is againſt the Academics, who denied the Evidence of the Senſes.

"me the Soup." I would carry him a Diſh full of Vinegar. "Did not I aſk for the Soup?"—Yes, Sir, this is the Soup.—"Is not this Vine-"gar?" Why ſo, more than Soup? "Take it "and ſmell to it, take it and taſte it." "How do "you know then, but our Senſes deceive us?" If I had three or four Fellow-ſervants to join with me, I would make him either choke with Paſſion, and burſt, or change his Opinions. But now they inſult us, by making uſe of the Gifts of Nature, while in Words they deſtroy them. Grateful and modeſt Men, truly! Who, if there were nothing elſe in the Caſe, while they are eating their daily Bread, dare to ſay, "We do not know "whether there be any *Ceres*, or *Proſerpine*, or "*Pluto*(*d*)." Not to mention, that while they enjoy the Night and Day, the Seaſons of the Year, the Stars, the Earth and Sea, they are not the leaſt affected by any of theſe Things; but only ſtudy to throw out ſome idle Problem; and, when they have cleared their Stomachs, go and bathe: but take not the leaſt Care what they ſay; nor on what Subjects; nor to whom; nor what may be the Conſequence of their Talk: whether any well-diſpoſed young Man, by hearing ſuch Doctrines, may not be affected by them, and ſo affected, as entirely

(*d*) By theſe Terms, the Stoics meant intelligent Powers, joining, to bring the Fruits of the Earth to Maturity, and to carry on the Courſe of Nature.

entirely to loſe the Seeds of his good Diſpoſition: whether they may not furniſh an Adulterer with Occaſions of growing ſhameleſs in his Guilt: whether a public Plunderer may not find Excuſes from theſe Doctrines: whether he, who neglects his Parents, may not gain an additional Confidence from them—(*e*). "What then, in *your* "Opinion, is good and evil, fair and (*f*) baſe; "ſuch Things, or ſuch Things?"—Why ſhould one ſay any more againſt ſuch Creatures as theſe, or give them any Account, or receive any from them, or endeavour to convince them? By *Jupiter*, one might ſooner hope to convince the moſt unnatural Debauchees, than thoſe, who are thus deaf and blind to their own Evils (*g*).

(*e*) Theſe ſeem to be the Words of the Academic, deſirous of beginning a Diſpute with *Epictetus*, to revenge himſelf by puzzling him, for the ſevere Things which he had been ſaying againſt that Sect. But *Epictetus* refuſes to enter into it, and gives his Reaſon.

(*f*) I have followed Mr. *Upton*'s Addition of αισχρον; but, perhaps, even καλον may be an Addition, firſt ariſing from writing η καλον twice over.

(*g*) This reſembles what our Saviour ſaith to the *Jewiſh* Rulers; *Verily I ſay unto you, that the Publicans and the Harlots go into the Kingdom of God before you.* Matt. xxi. 31.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXI.

Of Inconſiſtency.

§. 1. THERE are ſome Things which Men confeſs, with Eaſe; others, with Difficulty. No one, for Inſtance, will confeſs himſelf a Fool, or a Blockhead; but, on the contrary, you will hear every one ſay, "I wiſh my For-"tune was equal to my Mind." But they eaſily confeſs themſelves fearful; and ſay, "I am ſome-"what timorous, I confeſs: but in other re-"ſpects you will not find me a Fool." No one will eaſily confeſs himſelf intemperate in his Deſires; upon no Account diſhoneſt, nor abſolutely very envious, or meddling: but many confeſs themſelves to have the Weakneſs of being compaſſionate. What is the Reaſon of all this? The principal is, an Inconſiſtency and Confuſion in what relates to Good and Evil. But different People have different Inducements. In general, whatever they imagine to be baſe, they do not abſolutely confeſs. Fear and Compaſſion, they imagine to belong to a well meaning Diſpoſition; but Stupidity, to a Slave. Offences againſt Society they do not own: but, in moſt Faults, they are brought to a Confeſſion, chiefly from imagining, that there is ſomething involuntary in them; as in Fear and Compaſſion. And, though a Perſon

ſon (*a*) ſhould in ſome Meaſure confeſs himſelf intemperate in his Deſires, he accuſes his Paſſion, and expects Forgiveneſs, as for an involuntary Fault. But Diſhoneſty is not imagined to be, by any means, involuntary. In Jealouſy too, there is ſomething, they ſuppoſe, of involuntary; and this likewiſe, in ſome Degree, they confeſs.

§. 2. Converſing among ſuch Men, therefore, thus confuſed, thus ignorant what they ſay, what are, or are not, their Evils, whence they have them, and how they may be delivered of them; it is worth while, I think, to aſk one's ſelf continually, "Am I too one of theſe? What do I imagine myſelf to be? How do I conduct myſelf? As a prudent, as a temperate Man? Do I too, ever talk at this Rate, That I am ſufficienly inſtructed for what may happen? Have I that Perſuaſion, That I know nothing, which becomes one that knows nothing? Do I go to a Maſter, as to an Oracle, prepared to obey; or do I, as well as others, like a ſtupid Driveller (*b*), enter the School, only to learn the Hiſtory [of Philoſophy], and underſtand Books, which I did not underſtand before; or, perhaps, to

(*a*) Mr. *Upton*'s Copy.

(*b*) We have no Expreſſion exactly like that in the *Greek*. The Tranſlation comes the neareſt to it of any I could think on.

" to explain them to others?" (*c*) You have been fighting at Home, with your Servant, Sir: you have turned the Houſe upſide-down, and alarmed the Neighbourhood: and do you come to me with a pompous Show of Wiſdom, and ſit and paſs Judgment how I explain a Sentence? How I prate whatever comes into my Head? Do you come, envious and dejected, that nothing is brought you from Home? And, in the midſt of the Diſputations, ſit thinking on nothing, but how your Father or your Brother may behave to you? " What are they ſaying about me at Home? " Now they think I am improving, and ſay, " He will come back with univerſal Knowledge. " I wiſh I could learn every Thing before my Re- " turn: but this requires much Labour; and no- " body ſends me any Thing. The Baths are " very bad at *Nicopolis*; and Things go very ill " both at Home, and here."

§. 3. After all this, it is ſaid, nobody is the better for the philoſophic School. Why, who comes to the School? I mean, who comes to be reformed? Who, to ſubmit his Principles to Correction? who, with a Senſe of his Wants? Why do you wonder then, that you bring back from the School, the very Thing you carried there? For

(*c*) This ſeems to be ſpoken by *Epictetus* to one of his Scholars.

For you do not come to lay aſide, or correct, or change, your Principles. How ſhould you? Far from it. Rather conſider this, therefore, whether you have not what you come for. You come to talk about Theorems. Well: and are not you more impertinently talkative than you were? Do not theſe paultry Theorems furniſh you with Matter for Oſtentation? Do not you ſolve convertible and hypothetical Syllogiſms? Why then, are you ſtill diſpleaſed, if you have the very Thing for which you came?—"Very true: but, if my "Child, or my Brother ſhould die; or if I muſt "die, or be tortured myſelf, what Good will "theſe Things do me?"—Why, did you come for *this?* Did you attend upon me for *this?* Was it upon any ſuch Account, that you ever lighted your Lamp, or ſat up at Night? Or did you, when you went into the Walk, propoſe any Appearance to your own Mind to be diſcuſſed, inſtead of a Syllogiſm? Did any of you ever go through ſuch a Subject jointly? And, after all, you ſay, Theorems are uſeleſs. To whom? To ſuch as apply them ill. For Medicines for the Eyes are not uſeleſs to thoſe, who apply them when, and as, they ought. Fomentations are not uſeleſs: Poiſers are not uſeleſs: but they are uſeleſs to ſome; and, on the contrary, uſeful to others. If you ſhould aſk me now, are Syllogiſms uſeful? I anſwer, that they are uſeful: and, if you pleaſe, I will ſhow you

you how (*d*)—"Will they be of Service to me, "then?"—Why: did you aſk, Man, whether they would be uſeful to *you*, or in general? If any one in a Dyſentery ſhould aſk me, whether Acids be uſeful; I anſwer, They are. "Are they "uſeful for *me*, then?"—I ſay No. Firſt try to get the Flux ſtopped, and the Exulceration healed. Do you too firſt get your Ulcers healed; your Fluxes ſtopped. Quiet your Mind, and bring it free from Diſtraction, to the School; and then you will know what is the Force of Reaſoning.

CHAP. XXII.

Of Friendſhip.

§. 1. TO whatever Objects a Perſon devotes his Attention, theſe Objects he, probably loves. Do Men ever devote their Attention then, to Evils?—By no Means.—Or even to what doth not concern them?—No: nor this.—It remains then, that *Good* muſt be the ſole Object of their Attention; and, if of their Attention, of their Love too. Whoever, therefore, underſtands *Good*, is capable likewiſe of Love: and he who cannot diſtinguiſh Good from Evil, and Things indifferent from both, how is it poſſible, that he can love? The prudent Perſon alone then, is capable of loving.

How

(*d*) The *Greek* is pointed at ἀποδείξω; but the Senſe requires the Stop at πως.

How ſo? I am not this prudent Perſon, yet I love my Child.

I proteſt it ſurprizes me, that you ſhould, in the firſt Place, confeſs yourſelf imprudent. For in what are you deficient? Have not you the Uſe of your Senſes? Do not you diſtinguiſh the Appearances of Things? Do not you provide ſuch Food, and Cloathing, and Habitation, as are ſuitable to you? Why then do you confeſs, that you want Prudence? In Truth, becauſe youare often ſtruck, and diſconcerted by Appearances, and their Speciouſneſs gets the better of you; and hence you ſometimes ſuppoſe the very ſame Things to be good, then evil, and, laſtly, neither: and, in a Word, you grieve, you fear, you envy, you are diſconcerted, you change. Is it from hence, that you confeſs yourſelf imprudent? And are you not changeable too in Love? Riches, Pleaſure, in ſhort, the very ſame Things, you at ſome times eſteem good, and at others, evil: and do not you eſteem the ſame Perſons too, alternately good and bad? And, at one time, treat them with Kindneſs, at another, with Enmity? One time, commend, and at another, cenſure them?

Yes. This too is the Caſe, with me.

Well then, can he who is deceived in another, be his Friend, think you?

No, ſurely.

Or doth he, who loves him with a changeable Affection, bear him genuine Good-will?

Nor he, neither.

Or he, who now vilifies, then admires him?

Nor he.

Do you not often ſee little Dogs careſſing, and playing with each other, that you would ſay, nothing could be more friendly: but, to learn what this Friendſhip is, throw a Bit of Meat between them, and you will ſee. Do you too throw a Bit of an Eſtate, betwixt you and your Son, and you will ſee, that he will quickly wiſh *you* under Ground, and you *him:* and then you, no doubt, on the other Hand, will exclaim; What a Son have I brought up! He would bury me alive! Throw in a pretty Girl, and the old Fellow and the young one will, both, fall in Love with her: or let Fame or Danger intervene, the Words of the Father of *Admetus* will be yours (*a*):

You

(*a*) *Admetus*, King of *Theſſaly*, being deſtined to die, *Apollo* obtained a Reverſal of his Sentence from the Fates, on Condition that ſome Perſon could be found to die in his ſtead. *Admetus* tried all his Friends, and among the reſt, his Father, *Pheres*; but no one choſe to be his Repreſentative, but his Wife, *Alceſtis*. After her Death, *Pheres* is introduced preparing Honours for her Funeral, and condoling with his Son, on her Loſs. *Admetus* rejects his Preſents, with great Indignation; and makes him the ſevereſt Reproaches, on his Cowardice and Mean-ſpiritedneſs, in not parting

You hold Life dear: Doth not your Father too?

Do you ſuppoſe, that he did not love his own Child, when he was a little one? That he was not in Agonies, when he had a Fever; and often wiſhed to undergo that Fever in his ſtead? But, after all, when the Trial comes home, you ſee what Expreſſions he uſes. Were not *Eteocles* and *Polynices* born of the ſame Mother, and of the ſame Father? Were they not brought up, and did they not live, and eat, and ſleep, together? Did not they kiſs and fondle each other? So that any one, who ſaw them, would have laughed at all the Paradoxes, which Philoſophers utter

parting with a few remaining Years of Life to ſave his Son from an untimely Death; and in ſuffering *Alceſtis* to deſcend to the Grave for him, in the Bloom of Youth. The Quotation made by *Epictetus*, is Part of the Anſwer of *Pheres*, to the Reproaches of his Son.

Some of the fineſt and moſt touching Parts of the Dialogue, in *Edward* and *Eleonora*, are taken from the *Alceſtis*; but Mr. *Thomſon* is much happier, in the Conduct of his Story, than *Euripides*. *Eleonora* expoſes herſelf to Death, againſt the Conſent, and without the Knowledge, of her Huſband; which by no means appears to have been the Caſe of *Alceſtis*. This Circumſtance renders *Admetus* a moſt deſpicable Character, throughout the Play; and the Reproaches which he throws upon *Pheres* appear abſurd, and ſhocking. It is a little remarkable, that *Epictetus* ſhould treat the Father with ſo much Contempt, and beſtow none on the Son, to whom it was, at leaſt equally, due. See B. III. c. 20. §. 1. and VAL. MAX. L. IV. c. 6. §. 1.

about Love. And yet, when a Kingdom, like a Bit of Meat, was thrown betwixt them, ſee what they ſay, and how eagerly they wiſh to kill each other (*b*). For univerſally, be not deceived, no Animal is attached to any thing ſo ſtrongly, as to its own Intereſt. Whatever therefore, appears a Hindrance to that, be it Brother, or Father, or Child, or Miſtreſs, or Friend, is hated, abhorred, execrated; for, by Nature, it loves nothing like its own Intereſt. This is Father, and Brother, and Family, and Country, and God (*c*). Whenever therefore, the Gods ſeem to hinder this, we vilify even them, and throw down their Statues, and burn their Temples; as *Alexander* ordered the Temple of *Eſculapius* to be burnt, becauſe he had loſt the Man he loved.

§. 2. Whenever therefore, any one makes his Intereſt to conſiſt in the ſame thing with Sanctity, Virtue, his Country, Parents, and Friends, all theſe are ſecured: but, where-ever they are made to interfere, Friends, and Country, and Family, and Juſtice itſelf, all give way, borne down by the Weight of Self-intereſt. For where-ever *I* and *mine* are placed, thither muſt every Animal gravitate. If in Body, that will ſway us; if in Choice,

(*b*) The Original quotes ſome Verſes from *Euripides*, of a Dialogue between *Eteocles* and *Polynices*, before the Walls of *Thebes*; of which the Tranſlation gives the general Senſe.

(*c*) See *Matt.* xii. 50.

Choice, that; if in Externals, theſe. If therefore, *I* be placed in a right Choice, then only, I ſhall be a Friend, a Son, or a Father, ſuch as I ought. For, in that Caſe, it will be for my Intereſt to preſerve the faithful, the modeſt, the patient, the abſtinent, the beneficent, Character; to keep the Relations of Life inviolate. But, if I place my *ſelf* in one Thing, and Virtue in another, the Doctrine of *Epicurus* will ſtand its Ground, That Virtue is nothing, or mere Opinion (*d*).

§. 3. From this Ignorance it was, that the *Athenians* and *Lacedemonians* quarrelled with each other; and the *Thebans* with both: the *Perſian* King, with *Greece*; and the *Macedonians*, with both: and now the *Romans*, with the *Getes*. And, in ſtill remoter Times, the *Trojan* War aroſe from the ſame Cauſe. *Paris* was the Gueſt of *Menelaus*; and whoever had ſeen the mutual Proofs of Good-will, that paſſed between them, would never have believed, that they were not Friends. But a tempting Bit, a pretty Woman,

(*d*) By *ſelf* is here meant the proper Good, or, as *Solomon* expreſſes it, *Eccl.* xii. 13. *The Whole of Man.* The Stoic proves excellently, the Inconvenience of placing this, in any thing but a right Choice (a right Diſpoſition and Behaviour): but how it is the Intereſt of each Individual, in every Caſe, to make that Choice, in Preference to preſent Pleaſure, and in Defiance of preſent Sufferings, appears only from the Doctrine of a future Recompence.

was thrown in between them; and for this they went to War. At preſent, therefore, when you ſee dear Brothers have, in Appearance, but one Soul, do not immediately pronounce upon their Friendſhip; not though they ſhould ſwear it, and affirm it was impoſſible to live aſunder. (For the governing Faculty of a bad Man is faithleſs, unſettled, injudicious; ſucceſſively vanquiſhed by different Appearances). But inquire, not as others do, whether they were born of the ſame Parents, and brought up together, and under the ſame Preceptor: but this Thing only, in what they place their Intereſt; in Externals, or in Choice. If in Externals, no more call them Friends, than faithful, or conſtant, or brave, or free; nay, nor even Men, if you are wiſe. For it is no Principle of Humanity, that makes them bite and vilify each other; and take Poſſeſſion of public Aſſemblies, as wild Beaſts do of Solitudes and Mountains; and convert Courts of Juſtice into Dens of Robbers: nor that prompts them to be intemperate, Adulterers, Seducers; or leads them into other Offences, that Men commit againſt each other, from the one ſingle Principle, by which they place themſelves, and their own Concerns, in Things independent on Choice.

§. 4. But, if you hear, that theſe Men, in reality ſuppoſe Good to be placed only in Choice, and in a right Uſe of the Appearances of Things;

no

no longer take the trouble of inquiring, if they are Father and Son, or old Companions and Acquaintances; but as boldly pronounce, that they are Friends, as that they are faithful and juſt. For where elſe can Friendſhip be met, but with Fidelity and Modeſty, and a Communication (*e*) of Virtue; and of no other Thing?

Well: but ſuch a one paid me the utmoſt Regard, for ſo long a Time; and did not he *love* me?

How can you tell, Wretch, if that Regard be any other than he pays to his Shoes, or his Horſe, when he cleans them? And, how do you know, but when you ceaſe to be a neceſſary Utenſil, he may throw you away, like a broken Stool?

Well: but it is my Wife; and we have lived together many Years.

And how many did *Eriphyle* live with *Amphiaraus*; and was the Mother of Children, and not a few? But a Bracelet fell in between them. What was this Bracelet? The Principle [ſhe had formed] concerning ſuch Things. This turned her into a ſavage Animal: this cut aſunder all Love; and ſuffered neither the Wife, nor the Mother, to continue ſuch (*f*).

(*e*) Perhaps δοσις, in the *Greek*, ſhould be διαδοσις.

(*f*) *Amphiaraus* married *Eriphyle*, the Siſter of *Adraſtus*, King of *Argos*. He was an excellent Soothſayer; and, by his

§. 5. Whoever therefore, among you, ſtudies to be, or to gain a Friend, let him cut up all theſe Principles by the Root; hate them; drive them utterly out of his Soul. Thus in the firſt place, he will be ſecure from inward Reproaches, and Conteſts; from Change of Mind, and Self-torment. Then, with reſpect to others; to every one, like himſelf, he will be unreſerved. To ſuch as are unlike, he will be patient, mild, gentle, and ready to forgive them, as failing in Points of the greateſt Importance; but ſevere to none; being fully convinced of *Plato*'s Doctrine, That the Soul is never willingly deprived of Truth. Without all this, you may, in many Reſpects, live as Friends do; and drink, and lodge, and travel together, and be born of the ſame Parents; and ſo may (*g*) Serpents too: but neither they, nor you, can ever be Friends, while you have theſe brutal and execrable Principles.

CHAP.

his Skill, foreſaw, that it would prove fatal to him, if he engaged himſelf in the *Theban* War. Wherefore, to avoid inevitable Deſtruction, he hid himſelf: but was diſcovered by his Wife *Eriphyle*, whom *Polynices* had corrupted, with a Preſent of a golden Chain. STATIUS's *Thebais*, L. VI.

(*g*) Mr. *Upton*'s Copy.

CHAP. XXIII.

Of the Faculty of Speaking.

§. 1. A BOOK will always be read with the greater Pleaſure, and Eaſe too, if it be written in a fair Character: therefore every one will the more eaſily attend to Diſcourſes likewiſe, ornamented with proper and beautiful Expreſſions. It (*a*) ought not then to be ſaid, that there is no ſuch Thing as the Faculty of Elocution: for this would be at once the Part of an impious and fearful Perſon (*b*). Impious; becauſe he diſhonours the Gifts of God; juſt as if he ſhould deny any Uſe in the Faculty of Sight, Hearing, and Speech itſelf. Hath God then given you Eyes in vain? Is it in vain, that he hath infuſed into them, ſuch a ſtrong and active Spirit, as to be able to repreſent the Forms of diſtant Objects (*c*)? What Meſſenger is ſo quick and diligent?

(*a*) Theſe are the Words of *Epictetus*; to which there are others equivalent afterwards. His Meaning, probably, is, that the Value and Uſefulneſs of the Faculty of Elocution ought not to be denied: in Oppoſition to the Doctrine of *Epicurus*, who declared all the liberal Arts and Sciences to be uſeleſs and miſchievous. See DIOG. LAERT. L. X. §. 6. and MENAGE's Notes there.

(*b*) He proves the Timidity at the Beginning of §. 3.

(*c*) It was an old Notion, that Viſion was performed by the Emiſſion of Rays from the Eye to the Object, not the

diligent? Is it in vain, that he hath made the intermediate Air, ſo yielding, and elaſtic, that Sight penetrates through it? And is it in vain, that he hath made the Light; without which all the reſt would be uſeleſs? Man, be not ingrateful; nor, on the other Hand, unmindful of your ſuperior Advantages (*d*): but for Sight, and Hearing, and indeed for Life itſelf, and the Supports of it, as Fruits, and Wine, and Oil, be thankful to God: but remember, that He hath given you another Thing, ſuperior to them all; which makes uſe of them, proves them, eſtimates the Value of each (*e*). For what is it that pronounces upon the Value of each of theſe Faculties? Is it the Faculty itſelf? Did you ever perceive the Faculty of Sight or Hearing, to ſay any thing concerning itſelf? Or Wheat, or Barley, or Horſes, or Dogs? No. Theſe Things are appointed as Inſtruments and Servants, to obey that which is capable of uſing the Appearances of Things. If you inquire the Value of any thing; of *what* do you inquire? What is it that anſwers you?

Admiſſion of Rays from the Object into the Eye; and to this *Epictetus* here refers.

(*d*) Mr. *Upton* gives a different Senſe to χρειασσονων; but I think, that both παλιν, and what afterwards follows, juſtifies the *Engliſh* Tranſlation.

(*e*) See B. I. c. 1.

you (*f*)? How then can any Faculty be ſuperior to this; which both uſes all the reſt as Inſtruments, and tries and pronounces concerning each of them? For which of them knows, what itſelf is; and what is its own Value? Which of them knows, when it is to be uſed, and when not? Which is it, that opens and ſhuts the Eyes, and turns them away from improper Objects? Is it the Faculty of Sight? No: but that of *Choice*. Which is it, that opens and ſhuts the Ears? What is it, by which they are made curious and inquiſitive; or, on the contrary, deaf, and unaffected by what is ſaid? Is it the Faculty of Hearing? No: but that of *Choice*. Will this then, perceiving itſelf to exiſt in [Man amidſt] the other Faculties, [which are] all blind and deaf, and unable to diſcern any thing, but thoſe Offices, in which they are appointed to miniſter, and be ſubſervient to it; and that itſelf alone ſees clearly, and diſtinguiſhes the Value of each of the reſt; will this, I ſay, inform us, that any thing is ſupreme, but itſelf? What doth the Eye, when it is opened, do more, than ſee? But whether we ought to look upon the Wife of any one, and in what manner, what is

(*f*) The Hearer is underſtood in this Place to ſay, The Faculty of Choice. It is not improbable, however, that the *Greek* Word προαιρετικη, may have been omitted in tranſcribing.

it that tells us? The Faculty of *Choice.* Whether we ought to believe, or to diſbelieve what is ſaid; or whether, if we do believe, we ought to be moved by it, or not, what is it that tells us? Is it not the Faculty of *Choice?* Again: the very Faculty of Elocution, and that which ornaments Diſcourſe, if there be any ſuch peculiar Faculty, what doth it more, than merely ornament and arrange Expreſſions, as Curlers do the Hair? But whether it be better to ſpeak, or to be ſilent; or better to ſpeak in this, or in that Manner; whether this be decent, or indecent; and the Seaſon and Uſe or each; what is it that tells us, but the Faculty of *Choice?* What then, would you have it appear, and bear Teſtimony againſt itſelf? What means this? If the Caſe be thus, that which ſerves, may be ſuperior to that to which it is ſubſervient; the Horſe to the Rider; the Dog, to the Hunter; the Inſtrument, to the Muſician; or Servants to the King. What is it that makes uſe of all the reſt? *Choice.* What takes care of all? *Choice.* What deſtroys the whole Man, at one time, by Hunger; at another by a Rope, or a Precipice? *Choice.* Hath Man, then, any thing ſtronger than this? And how is it poſſible, that what is liable to Reſtraint ſhould be ſtronger, than what is not? What hath a natural Power of hindering the Faculty of Sight? Both Choice, and what depends

pends on Choice. And it is the ſame of the Faculties of Hearing and Speech. And what hath a natural Power of hindering Choice? Nothing independent on itſelf, only its own Perverſion. Therefore *Choice* alone is Vice: *Choice* alone is Virtue.

§. 2. Since, then, Choice is ſuch a Faculty, and placed in Authority over all the reſt, let it come forth and ſay to us, that the Body is, of all Things, the moſt excellent. If even the Body itſelf pronounced itſelf to be the moſt excellent, it could not be borne. But now, what is it, *Epicurus*, that pronounces all this? What was it, that compoſed Volumes concerning (*g*) the End of [Being], the (*g*) Nature of Things, the (*g*) Rule [of Reaſoning]; that aſſumed a philoſophic Beard; that, as it was dying, wrote, that it was *then ſpending its laſt and happieſt Day* (*h*)? Was this, Body, or was it the Faculty of Choice? And can you then, without Madneſs, confeſs any thing ſuperior to *this?* Are you in reality ſo deaf and blind? What then, doth any one, diſhonour the other Faculties? Heaven forbid! Doth any one deny, that the Faculty of Sight (*i*) is

(*g*) Celebrated Treatiſes on theſe Subjects, compoſed by *Epicurus*.

(*h*) Theſe Words are Part of a Letter written by *Epicurus*, when he was dying, to one of his Friends. See DIOG. LAERT. L. X. §. 22.

(*i*) Probably for προαιρετικης ſhould be read ορατικης; which Word is uſed by *Epictetus*, but a little more than a Page before.

is uſeful, and preferable [to the Want of it]? Heaven forbid! It would be ſtupid, impious, and ungrateful to God. But we render to each its Due. There is ſome Uſe of an Aſs, tho' not ſo much as of an Ox; and of a Dog, though not ſo much as of a Servant; and of a Servant, though not ſo much as of the Citizens; and of the Citizens, though not ſo much as of the Magiſtrates. And, though ſome are more excellent than others, thoſe Uſes, which the laſt afford, are not to be deſpiſed. The Faculty of Elocution, hath its Value, though not equal to that of Choice. When therefore I talk thus, let not any one ſuppoſe, that I would have you neglect Elocution, any more than your Eyes, or Ears, or Hands, or Feet, or Clothes, or Shoes. But if you aſk me, what is the moſt excellent of Things, what ſhall I ſay? I cannot ſay, *Elocution*; but a right *Choice*: for it is that which makes uſe of this, and all the other Faculties, whether great or ſmall. If this be ſet right, a bad Man becomes good; if it be wrong, a good Man becomes wicked. By this we are unfortuate, fortunate; we diſapprove, or approve each other. In a word, it is this, which, neglected, forms Unhappineſs; and, well cultivated, Happineſs.

§. 3. But to take away the Faculty of Elocution: and to ſay, that it is in reality nothing, is not

not only ingrateful to thoſe who gave it, but cowardly too. For ſuch a Perſon ſeems to me to be afraid, that, if there be any ſuch Faculty, we may not, on occaſion, be able to treat it with Contempt. Such are they too, who deny any Difference between Beauty, and Deformity. Was it poſſible then, to be affected in the ſame Manner by ſeeing *Therſites*, as *Achilles*; or *Helen*, as any (*k*) other Woman? Theſe alſo are the fooliſh and clowniſh Notions of thoſe, who are ignorant of the Nature of Things; and afraid, that, whoever perceives a Difference, muſt preſently be carried away, and overcome. But the great Point is to leave to each Thing its own proper Faculty; and then to ſee what the Value of that Faculty is, and to learn what is the principal Thing, and, upon every Occaſion, to follow that, and to make it the chief Object of our Attention: to conſider other Things as trifling in Compariſon of this; and yet, as far as we are able, not to neglect even theſe. We ought, for Inſtance, to take care of our Eyes; but not as of the principal Thing, but only on account of the Principal: becauſe *that* will no otherwiſe preſerve its own Nature, than by making a due Eſtimation of the reſt, and preferring ſome to others. What is the uſual Practice then? That of a Traveller, who returning into his

(*k*) Mr. *Upton*'s Reading ἐν ετυχε.

his own Country, and meeting on the Road with a good *Inn*, being pleaſed with the *Inn*, ſhould remain at the *Inn*. Have you forgot your Intention, Man? You were not travelling *to* this Place, but only *through* it. "But this is a fine "Place." And how many other fine Inns are there, and how many pleaſant Fields? But only to be paſt through in your Way. The Buſineſs is, to return to your Country; to relieve the Anxieties of your Family; to perform the Duties of a Citizen; to marry; have Children; and go through the public Offices. For you did not ſet out, to chuſe the fineſt Places; but to return, to live in that where you were born, and of which you are appointed a Citizen.

§. 4. Such is the preſent Caſe. Becauſe by Speech, and verbal Precepts, we are to arrive at Perfection; and purify our own Choice; and rectify that Faculty, of which the Office is, the Uſe of the Appearances of Things: and, becauſe, for the Delivery of Theorems, a certain Manner of Expreſſion, and ſome Variety and Subtilty of Diſcourſe, becomes neceſſary; many, captivated by theſe very Things, one, by Expreſſion, another, by Syllogiſms, a third, by convertible Propoſitions, juſt as our Traveller was by the good Inn, go no further: but ſit down and waſte their Lives ſhamefully there, as if amongſt the Sirens. Your Buſineſs, Man, was to prepare yourſelf

for ſuch an Uſe of the Appearances of Things, as Nature demands: Not to be fruſtrated of your Deſires, or incur your Averſions: never to be diſappointed, or unfortunate: but free, unreſtrained, uncompelled; conformed to the Adminiſtration of *Jupiter*; obedient to that; finding Fault with nothing: but able to ſay, from your whole Soul, the Verſes which begin,

Conduct me, Jove; *and thou*, *O* Deſtiny.

While you have ſuch a Buſineſs before you, will you be ſo pleaſed with a pretty Form of Expreſſion, or a few Theorems, as to chuſe to ſtay and live with them, forgetful of your Home; and ſay, "They are fine Things!" Why, who ſays they are not fine Things? But only as a Paſſage; as an Inn. For, could you ſpeak like *Demoſthenes*, what hinders, but that you might be a diſappointed Wretch? Could you reſolve Syllogiſms like *Chryſippus*, what hinders, but that you might be miſerable, ſorrowful, envious, in ſhort, diſturbed, unhappy? Nothing. You ſee then, that theſe are mere Inns, of ſmall Value; and that your Point in View, is quite another Thing. When I talk thus to ſome, they ſuppoſe, that I am overthrowing all Care about Speaking, and about Theorems: but I do not overthrow that; only the reſting in theſe Things without End, and placing our Hopes there. If any one, by maintaining this, hurts an Audience,

ence, place me amongſt thoſe hurtful People: for I cannot, when I ſee one Thing to be the principal and moſt excellent, call another ſo, to gain your Favour.

CHAP. XXIV.

Concerning a Perſon whom he treated with Diſregard.

§. 1. WHEN a certain Perſon ſaid to him; "I have often come to you, with a "Deſire of hearing you; and you have never "given me any Anſwer; but now, if poſſible, I "intreat you to ſay ſomething to me:" Do you think, replied *Epictetus*, that, as in other Things, ſo in Speaking, there is an Art, by which he, who underſtands it, ſpeaks ſkilfully, and he, who doth not, unſkilfully?

I do think ſo.

He then, who, by ſpeaking, both benefits himſelf, and is able to benefit others, muſt ſpeak ſkilfully; but he who rather hurts, and is hurt, muſt be unſkilful in this Art of ſpeaking. For you may find ſome Speakers hurt, and others benefited. And are all Hearers benefited by what they hear? Or will you find ſome benefited, and ſome hurt (*a*)?

Both.

Then thoſe who hear ſkilfully are benefited, and thoſe who hear unſkilfully, hurt.

Granted. Is

(*a*) 2 *Cor.* ii. 16.

Is there any Art of Hearing, then, as well as of Speaking?

It ſeems ſo.

If you pleaſe, conſider it thus too. To whom do you think, the Practice of Muſic belongs?

To a Muſician.

To whom the proper Formation of a Statue?

To a Statuary.

And do you not imagine ſome Art neceſſary, to view a Statue ſkilfully?

I do.

If, therefore, to *ſpeak* properly belongs to one who is ſkilful, do not you ſee, that to *hear* with Benefit belongs likewiſe to one who is ſkilful? For the preſent, however, if you pleaſe, let us ſay no more of doing Things perfectly, and with Benefit, ſince we are both far enough, from any thing of that Kind: but this ſeems to be univerſally confeſſed, that he, who would hear Philoſophers, needs ſome Kind of Exerciſe in Hearing. Is it not ſo? Tell me then, on what I ſhall ſpeak to you? On what Subject are you able to hear me (*b*)?

On Good and Evil.

The Good and Evil of what? Of a Horſe?

No.

Of an Ox.

No.

What

(*b*) See *John* viii. 43.

What then, of a Man?

Yes.

Do we know, then, what *Man* is? What is his Nature; what our Idea of him is; and how far our Ears are open in reſpect to this Matter (*c*). Nay, do you underſtand what Nature is; or are you able, and in what Degree, to comprehend me, when I come to ſay; "But I muſt uſe De-"monſtration to you?" How ſhould you? Do you comprehend what Demonſtration is; or, how a Thing is demonſtrated; or by what Methods; or, what reſembles a Demonſtration, and yet is not a Demonſtration? Do you know what True, or Falſe is? What is conſequent to a Thing, and what contradictory? Or unſuitable, or diſſonant? But I muſt excite you to Philoſophy. How ſhall I ſhow you that Contradiction, among the Generality of Mankind, by which they differ, concerning Good and Evil, Profitable and Unprofitable, when you know not what *Contradiction* means? Show me then, what I ſhall gain, by diſcourſing with you? Excite an Inclination in me, as a proper Paſture excites an Inclination to eating, in a Sheep: for if you offer him a Stone, or a Piece of Bread, he will not

(*c*) Κατα ποσον, περι του, ſhould be κατα ποσον περι τουτου. There is no Need of altering τα ωτα τετρημενα. *Opening the Ear*, is a Phraſe of Scripture. *Job* xxxiii. 16. xxxvi. 10. *Iſ.* xlii. 20. *Mark* vii. 34, 35. And even digging open the Ear. *Pſ.* xl. 6. in the *Hebrew*.

not be excited. Thus we too have certain natural Inclinations to ſpeaking, when the Hearer appears to be ſomebody; when he gives us Encouragement: but if he ſits by, like a Stone, or a Tuft of Graſs, how can he excite any Deſire in a Man? Doth a Vine ſay to an Huſbandman, "Take care of me?" No: but invites him to take care of it, by ſhowing him, that, if he doth, it will reward him for his Care. Who is there, whom engaging ſprightly Children do not invite to play, and creep, and prattle, with them? But who was ever taken with an Inclination to divert himſelf, or bray, with an Aſs; for, be the Creature ever ſo little, it it ſtill a little Aſs.

§. 2. Why do you ſay nothing to me, then?

I have only this to ſay to you: That, whoever is ignorant what he is, and wherefore he was born, and in what kind of a World, and in what Society; what Things are good, and what evil; what fair, and what baſe: who underſtands neither Diſcourſe, nor Demonſtration; nor what is true, nor what is falſe; nor is able to diſtinguiſh between them: ſuch a one will neither exert his Deſires, nor Averſions, nor Purſuits, conformably to Nature: he will neither intend, nor aſſent, nor deny, nor ſuſpend, his Judgment, conformably to Nature: but will wander up and down, intirely deaf and blind, ſuppoſing himſelf

to

to be ſomebody (*d*); while he is in reality, nobody. Is there any thing new, in all this? Is not this Ignorance the Cauſe of all the Errors that have happened, from the very Original of Mankind? Why did *Agamemnon* and *Achilles* differ? Was it not for want of knowing what is advantageous, what diſadvantageous? Doth not one of them ſay, It is advantageous to reſtore *Chryſeis* to her Father: the other, That it is not? Doth not one ſay, That he ought to take away the Prize of the other; the other, that he ought not? Did they not, by theſe means, forget who they were, and for what Purpoſe they had come there? Why, what did you come for, Man: to gain a Miſtreſs, or to fight? — "To fight." — With whom? With the *Trojans*, or *Greeks?* — "With the *Trojans*." — Leaving *Hector*, then, do you draw your Sword upon your own King? And do you, good Sir, forgetting the Duties of a King,

Intruſted with a Nation, and its Cares,

go to ſquabbling, about a Girl, with the braveſt of your Allies; whom you ought, by every Method, to conciliate and preſerve? And will you be inferior to a ſubtle Prieſt, who pays his Court, with

(*d*) Δοκων μεν τις ειναι, ων δ' ουδεις, is very near to δοκει ειναι τις, μηδεν ων, *Gal.* vi. 3. There is a ſimilar Expreſſion of *Plato*, at the End of the Apology of *Socrates*.

with the utmoſt Care, to you fine Gladiators?— You ſee the Effects, which Ignorance of what is advantageous, produces. — "But I am "[you may ſay], as well as other People." — What, richer than *Agamemnon?* — "But I am "handſome too." — What, handſomer than *Achilles?* — "But I have fine Hair too." — Had not *Achilles* finer and brighter? Yet he never combed it nicely, nor curled it. — "But I am "ſtrong too."—Can you lift ſuch a Stone then, as *Hector*, or *Ajax?* — "But I am of a noble "Family too." — Is your Mother a Goddeſs, or your Father deſcended from *Jupiter?* And what Good did all this do *Achilles*, when he ſat crying for a Girl? — "But I am an Orator." — And was not he? Do not you ſee how he treated the moſt eloquent of the *Greeks*, *Phœnix* and *Ulyſſes?* How he ſtruck them dumb? This is all I have to ſay to you; and even this, againſt my Inclination.

Why ſo?

Becauſe you have given me no Encouragement. For what can I ſee in you, to encourage me, as ſpirited Horſes do their Riders? Your Perſon? That you disfigure. Your Dreſs? That is effeminate. Your Behaviour? Your Look? Abſolutely nothing. When you would hear a Philoſopher, do not ſay to him, "You tell me no-"thing;" but only ſhow yourſelf worthy, or fit,

to

to *hear*; and you will find how you will move him to *ſpeak*.

CHAP. XXV.

That Logic is neceſſary.

WHEN one of the Company ſaid to him, "Convince me that Logic is neceſſary?" Would you have me demonſtrate it to you, ſays he? —"Yes." — Then I muſt uſe a demonſtrative Form of Argument — "Granted." — And how will you know then, whether I argue ſophiſtically? On this, the Man being ſilent; You ſee, ſays he, that, even by your own Confeſſion, Logic is neceſſary; ſince without its Aſſiſtance, you cannot learn ſo much as whether it be neceſſary or not.

CHAP. XXVI.

What is the Property of Error in Life.

§. 1. EVERY Error in Life implies a Contradiction: for, ſince he who errs, doth not mean to err, but to be in the Right, it is evident, that he acts contrary to his Meaning. What doth a Thief mean? His own Intereſt. If, then, Thieving be againſt his Intereſt, he acts contrary to his own Meaning. Now every rational

rational Soul is naturally averſe to Self-contradiction: but ſo long as any one is ignorant, that it is a Contradiction, nothing reſtrains him from acting contradictorily: but, whenever he diſcovers it, he muſt as neceſſarily renounce and avoid it, as any one muſt diſſent from a Falſhood, whenever he perceives it to be a Falſhood: but, while this doth not appear, he aſſents to it, as to a Truth.

§. 2. He then is an able Speaker, and excels at once in Exhortation and Conviction, who can diſcover, to each Man, the Contradiction by which he errs, and prove clearly to him, that what he would, he doth not; and what he would not do, that he doth (*a*). For, if that be ſhown, he will depart from it, of his own accord: but, till you have ſhown it, be not ſurpriſed that he remains where he is: for he doth it on the Appearance, that he acts rightly (*b*). Hence *Socrates*, relying on this Faculty, uſed to ſay, "It "is not my Cuſtom to cite any other Witneſs "of my Aſſertions; but I am always contented "with my Opponent. I call and ſummon him "for my Witneſs; and his ſingle Evidence

(*a*) *For that which I do, I allow not: for what I would, that do I not; but what I hate, that I do.* Rom. vii. 15.

(*b*) See B. I. c. 18. Note (*a*).

" is inſtead of all others (*c*)." For he knew, that, if a rational Soul be moved by any thing, the Scale muſt turn, whether it will or no (*d*). Show the governing Faculty of Reaſon a Contradiction, and it will renounce it: but, till you have ſhown it, rather blame yourſelf, than him who is unconvinced.

(*c*) See c. 12. §. 2.

(*d*) Something here is loſt in the Original. The Tranſlation hath connected the Senſe in the beſt and ſhorteſt Manner it could.

END *of the* FIRST VOLUME.

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